Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Kansas Supreme Court
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In the State of Kansas v. Frank Raymond Crudo, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, ruling against Crudo on all five arguments he presented. Crudo was pulled over for a non-functioning license plate light, and upon approaching the vehicle, officers smelled marijuana, leading to a search of Crudo's truck and attached camper. They found varying amounts of marijuana in different locations, leading to multiple charges against Crudo.Crudo's arguments included: (1) the search of his camper was unconstitutional as it should not be considered part of his vehicle for the purposes of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, (2) the testimony of Lieutenant Ricard at his second trial should have been considered expert testimony and therefore inadmissible due to non-compliance with expert testimony rules, (3) the use of a permissive inference instruction was in error and affected the trial outcome, (4) his second trial for possession with intent to distribute marijuana violated double jeopardy principles, and (5) cumulative error.On the first point, the court ruled that probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception does not need to be "localized" to a specific area of the vehicle and therefore extended to the camper. On the second point, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Lt. Ricard's testimony as lay opinion testimony. On the third point, the court agreed that the permissive inference instruction was in error, but found it harmless. On the fourth point, the court found that Crudo's convictions for possession and distribution were based on separate acts and thus did not constitute double jeopardy. Lastly, because there was only one error (the permissive inference instruction), the doctrine of cumulative error did not apply. View "State v. Crudo" on Justia Law

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In the State of Kansas, Robert Lowell-Lawrence Ward, the defendant, attempted to withdraw his 2013 plea of no contest to various crimes, eight years later in 2021. The district court summarily denied his motion, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmatively upheld these rulings. The Court found that Ward's motion to withdraw his plea was untimely and procedurally barred, as he failed to prove "excusable neglect," a necessary condition to overcome the one-year time bar for such motions as per Kansas statute K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3210(e). The Court clarified that a motion's untimeliness does not necessarily prevent its consideration, provided the defendant can demonstrate excusable neglect for the delay, which the defendant failed to do. The Court emphasized that a district court cannot bypass this procedural requirement and directly address the merits of an untimely motion without first determining the presence or absence of excusable neglect. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower courts, but for different reasons, focusing on the procedural bar rather than the merits of the motion. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, Devawn T. Mitchell was convicted for first-degree felony murder, aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, two counts of felony fleeing and eluding, and misdemeanor fleeing and eluding. Mitchell appealed, arguing that the district court inappropriately found him competent to stand trial, failed to obtain a psychological evaluation before sentencing him, and incorrectly applied his "B" criminal history score to increase his mandatory minimum sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the lower court's decisions. In addressing Mitchell's competence to stand trial, the court determined that the district court had correctly followed procedure, ordering a competency evaluation and holding a hearing. The court found that Mitchell failed to prove he was incompetent and therefore upheld the lower court's finding of competence.Regarding the failure to order a psychological evaluation, the Supreme Court noted that Mitchell did not explicitly request such an evaluation. As the request was not made, the district court was under no obligation to order an evaluation.As for the application of Mitchell's criminal history score, the court ruled that the lower court correctly applied the score to Mitchell's mandatory minimum life sentence before parole eligibility. The court found that neither the plain language nor any reasonable interpretation of the statutes prohibited the use of Mitchell's criminal history score to calculate his minimum life sentence before parole eligibility.In sum, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed Mitchell's conviction and sentence. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

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In the case at hand, the appellant, Melissa Lowe, was convicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon involving an incident with her ex-husband's girlfriend. Lowe appealed her conviction, arguing that the district court should have instructed the jury on simple assault, a misdemeanor, as a lesser included offense. The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed with Lowe that the district court erred by failing to give a lesser included offense instruction, as there was evidence which could have justified a conviction for simple assault.However, the court noted that under Kansas law, Lowe bore the burden to firmly convince the court that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the district court not failed to give the lesser included offense instruction. Looking at the entire record, the Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that there was nothing to establish that the jury would have reached a different result. The jury had rejected Lowe's version of events, finding the witnesses' accounts that Lowe swerved her car towards the victim credible enough to convict her of aggravated assault. Consequently, the court held that the failure to give the lesser included offense instruction was not reversible error. The court affirmed both the judgment from the district court and the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Lowe" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Defendant's felony theft charge as multiplicitous and reversed the ruling of a panel of the court of appeals reversing that decision, holding that the State's theory of felony theft was insufficient as a matter of law on the facts of this case.Defendant was charged with one count each of felony theft and violation of the Kansas Retailers' Sales Tax Act. The district court dismissed the felony theft charge on multiplicity grounds. The panel reversed, concluding that the State presented sufficient evidence for the court to bind Defendant over on felony theft. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's arguments regarding the asserted incompatibility between statutory theft and a statutory Tax Act violation were unavailing. View "State v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court convicting Defendant of driving under the influence, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the results of an evidentiary breath test (EBT) based on a violation of his statutory right to counsel under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1001(c)(1).In his motion to suppress, Defendant alleged that he invoked his right to counsel at least two times before the EBT was administered but that law enforcement failed to honor his statutory right to counsel after he submitted to the EBT. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a pre-EBT request for counsel is not sufficient to invoke the post-EBT right. The district court subsequently found Defendant guilty of driving under the influence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 8-1001(c)(1) is ambiguous as to the timing of a post-EBT request for counsel and permits the post-EBT right to counsel to be invoked either before or after the EBT. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that for a person properly to invoke the statutory right to post-EBT counsel, the plain language of the amended statute requires the person to make a request for counsel after administration of the EBT. View "State v. Kerrigan" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of, among other crimes, one count of first-degree felony murder based on the underlying inherently dangerous felony of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant failed to establish that the jury instructions on his fleeing-and-eluding charge created an alternative-means crime by listing more than one felony for which he was attempting to elude capture; (2) the grand jury indictment substituted by the State for a pending criminal complaint was sufficient to invoke the district court's jurisdiction under established precedent; (3) the substitution of the indictment complied with Defendant's due process rights; (4) the prosecutor did not err during closing argument by telling the jury that a State's witness had no motive to be untruthful; and (5) the cumulative error doctrine did not apply. View "State v. Jordan" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the award of credit under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6615(a) is not limited to time spent "solely" in custody for the charge for which the defendant was being sentenced, thus affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the trial court.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to two counts of premeditated first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a hard fifty sentence on count 1 and sentenced count 2 to run concurrently. The court declined to grant Defendant any jail time credit. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because Defendant spent 572 days in jail while his case was pending he must be awarded 572 days in jail time credit against his hard 50 sentences; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for a downward departure sentence. View "State v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Dameon Baumgarner's wrongful conviction claim seeking compensation under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-5004, holding that Baumgarner was "imprisoned" for purposes of the wrongful conviction compensation statute because his sentence was controlled by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6603(g).Baumgarner was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, and the district court sentenced him to a ten-month prison term, suspended. After Baumgarner was released from jail, the court of appeals reversed his conviction. Thereafter, Baumgarner brought this action alleging a wrongful conviction under section 60-5004, under which he was required to establish that he was "convicted of a felony crime and subsequently imprisoned." The district court dismissed the claim on the grounds that Baumgarner had not been "imprisoned" because he was not confined in a Kansas Department of Corrections facility. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Baumgarner was imprisoned for purposes of the wrongful conviction statute because his sentence was controlled by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6603(g), which contemplates sixty days imprisonment in a county jail as a condition of probation in felony cases. View "In re Wrongful Conviction of Baumgarner" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court judge summarily denying Defendant's motion for relief under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 and refusing to appoint him counsel, holding that the court of appeals properly affirmed Defendant's convictions based on res judicata principles.Defendant was convicted of one count of rape and sentenced to 272 months in prison. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant later brought his pro se motion under section 60-1507, asserting that his trial counsel did not adequately probe the alleged victim's veracity and that the alleged victim lied. The court summarily dismissed Defendant's case as untimely without appointing Defendant an attorney. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly ruled that Defendant's motion failed based on res judicata. View "Quinn v. State" on Justia Law