Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated battery, abuse of a child, and child endangerment. The Supreme Court remanded for resentencing. After Defendant was resentenced for his rape conviction, he appealed, challenging whether the district court on remand could order the rape sentence to run consecutive to his other sentences. The court of appeals determined that Defendant’s sentence was not reviewable on appeal because the new sentence was within the presumptive range under the Kansas Sentence Guidelines Act (KSGA). The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal because appellate jurisdiction exists to determine whether the district court had authority to impose a consecutive sentence, even if that sentence fell within the presumptive range; (2) running the new rape sentence consecutive to the other sentences was a permissible mechanism under the KSGA for the district court to regulate the sentence’s length; and (3) a district court may designate that the sentence for the primary crime of conviction runs consecutive to the defendant’s other sentences under the KSGA’s multiple-conviction sentencing statute. View "State v. Morningstar" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of rape of a child under fourteen. The district court sentenced Defendant in accordance with Jessica’s Law to two consecutive life sentences with no possibility of parole for approximately ninety-one years. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the district court (1) did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior misconduct, (2) did not place an unconstitutional condition on Defendant’s defense, and (3) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order a psychiatric evaluation of the complaining witness. The Court affirmed Defendant’s sentence with the exception of the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision, which was vacated because it was erroneously imposed. View "State v. McCune" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of capital murder, first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm. In a separate penalty phase, the same jury sentenced Defendant to death for the capital offense and to a consecutive controlling sentence of life without the possibility of parole for fifty years on the remaining convictions. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions with the exception of his conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, which the Court vacated because it was multiplicitous with Defendant’s capital murder conviction; and (2) vacated Defendant’s death sentence, holding that the district court failed properly to instruct the jury on its duty to consider mitigating circumstances. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Gleason" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after adjudging him an aggravated habitual sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction but vacated Defendant’s sentence, holding (1) the district court erroneously admitted statements Defendant made in a pretrial notice of alibi, but there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict; and (2) the Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Turner required that Defendant be sentenced as a persistent sex offender rather than as a habitual sex offender. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

In State v. Bunyard, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may be convicted of rape if intercourse begins consensually but consent is withdrawn after penetration and the intercourse continues by force or fear. Bunyard held that a defendant is entitled to a “reasonable time” in which to act after consent is withdrawn and communicated to the defendant. In this case, Defendant was found guilty of rape. The court of appeals reversed the conviction. Citing Defendant’s testimony that he briefly continued the intercourse after the victim withdrew consent, the court concluded that the district court erred in failing to give a Bunyard instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court disapproves of Bunyard’s “reasonable time to withdraw” language and its definition of “reasonable time”; (2) when a defendant is charged with rape for an offense committed before July 1, 2011 and the evidence suggests the victim initially consented but withdrew consent after penetration, the trial court must instruct the jury as to the elements of rape and give an additional instruction on withdrawn consent; and (3) the additional withdrawn consent instruction was warranted in this case, and the district court’s failure to give it was not harmless. View "State v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with crimes arising out of an incident in which she accompanied her boyfriend and his cousin to the apartment of the victim and fatally shot the victim. Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in giving a no-sympathy jury instruction; (2) the district court did not reversibly err in refusing to supplement the pattern jury instruction on aiding and abetting; (3) Defendant’s claim on ineffective assistance of counsel was not properly before the Court; and (4) Defendant’s claim of cumulative error failed. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant and three other individuals were prosecuted for the murder of one victim and the assault of another. One defendant entered into a plea agreement, and the other three were convicted at separate jury trials. Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to convict Defendant of felony murder and aggravated burglary; (2) being an aider and abettor for a crime is not an alternative means of committing the crime, separate and distinct from committing the crime as a principal; (3) the trial court did not err in giving a pattern felony-murder instruction to the jury; and (4) the narrowed jury instructions on the elements of felony murder and aggravated burglary were not erroneous. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated trafficking. Defendant appealed, raising numerous challenges to his conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the aggravated trafficking statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad; (2) Defendant lacked standing to assert that the aggravated trafficking statute was unconstitutionally vague; (3) the charged offense of aggravated trafficking is not identical to the offense of promoting prostitution; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing arguments; and (5) the district court did not err in increasing Defendant’s sentence based on prior convictions not proven to a jury. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated battery, and attempted aggravated robbery based on an incident in which Defendant snuck into a victim’s vehicle, held a knife to the victim’s throat as the victim was driving, and demanded the victim’s money. After the victim jumped out of the vehicle, Defendant backed the vehicle to where the victim was standing, got out of the vehicle, and continued demanding the victim’s money, ultimately without success. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery, concluding that Defendant never formed the specific intent to take Defendant’s vehicle and that the brief taking of the vehicle was merely incidental to his failed attempt to rob Defendant of his money. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the robbery statute creates no requirement of specific intent and requires only a “taking” of property, whether the taking is incidental or intentional. View "State v. Suady" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and two counts of indecent liberties with a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but remanded on sentencing issues, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting prior crimes evidence; (2) photographs of covers of DVDs and magazines found in Defendant’s house were improperly admitted into evidence, but the error was harmless; (3) the reasonable doubt instruction issued at Defendant’s trial was legally appropriate and not clearly erroneous; and (4) resentencing was required on Defendant’s sentence for one count of indecent liberties with a child, and Defendant was improperly sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring and lifetime postrelease supervision. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law