Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that that two prosecutors who made arguments to the jury misstated the law by suggesting that premeditation could occur after a homicidal act. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) although the prosecutors misstated the law, it was not reasonably probable that the prosecutors’ misstatements of law affected the outcome of the trial, and therefore, reversal of Defendant’s convictions was not warranted; and (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he admitted into evidence two jailhouse letters written by Defendant. View "State v. Huddleston" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a habeas corpus action alleging, inter alia, that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to challenge an incorrect written jury instruction that diluted the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction and remanded his case for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the incorrect instruction was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under fourteen years of age. Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that he had the specific intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires, the sexual desires of the children, or both. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the convictions, holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding that Defendant engaged in the lewd fondling or touching of the two children with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires, the desires of the children, or both; but (2) vacated the sentences in part, holding that the sentencing court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision and lifetime electronic monitoring. Remanded. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences in two cases. The first case, which was tried to a jury, involved sex offenses against a thirteen-year-old, and the second case arose from an unrelated incident involving burglary and theft that was tried to the bench on stipulated facts while the jury in the first case deliberated. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in both cases, holding (1) prosecutor improperly opined on the credibility of a witness during the trial on the sex crime charges, but the mistake did not require reversal of Defendant’s sex crime convictions; (2) Defendant’s trial counsel did not provide him with ineffective assistance; (3) sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s sex crime convictions; and (4) Defendant’s argument that the district court’s failure to make on-the-record findings on Defendant’s departure motion rendered his sentences in the burglary and theft case illegal was without merit. View "State v. Dull" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3502(a)(1)(A), which defines rape as sexual intercourse with a person who does not consent to the sexual intercourse under circumstances when “the victim is overcome by force or fear.” On appeal, Defendant argued that the phrase “force or fear” establishes alternative means of committing rape, and because the State failed to present evidence establishing the victim was overcome by fear, there was insufficient evidence to support the rape conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the issue of alternative means did not need to be decided definitively in this case because the evidence established that the victim was overcome by both force and fear. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) including the language “force or fear” in the jury instruction on rape did not make this an alternative means case because the phrase “force or fear” merely presents options within a means; and (2) sufficient evidence was presented at trial that the victim was overcome by force when Defendant had nonconsensual sex with him. View "State v. Nunez" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after he admitted stabbing his mother to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) one comment by the prosecutor during closing arguments was improper, but the misconduct did not deny Appellant a fair trial; (2) the district court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of reckless second-degree murder; (3) the district court did not err in excluding evidence about Appellant's auditory hallucinations prior to the killing; (4) the district court did not err in determining for sentencing purposes that Appellant was not “mentally retarded” under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4634; and (5) the district court did not err in refusing to commit Appellant to the state security hospital rather than prison. View "State v. Maestas" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape, blackmail, and breach of privacy. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions for rape and breach of privacy, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision reversing Defendant’s rape conviction, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the phrase “force or fear” in Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3502(a)(1)(A) establishes a single means of committing rape; and (2) the court of appeals erred in interpreting the term “fear” and in determining that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to show that the victim did not consent to the sexual intercourse because she was overcome by fear. View "State v. Brooks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy, an off-grid person felony, and sentenced to a hard twenty-five life sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting evidence that Appellant was previously charged with aggravated incest of his stepdaughter and subsequently entered into a diversion agreement regarding the charge; (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of aggravated criminal sodomy; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion for a departure sentence. View "State v. Remmert" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court did not commit reversible error in instructing or failing to instruct the jury on several issues; (2) Defendant’s claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress post-Miranda statements he made to police was not preserved for appellate review; (3) Defendant’s argument that the complaint filed against Defendant was defective was without merit; (4) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of the crimes; and (5) cumulative error did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. View "State v. Littlejohn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of eight counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and related offenses. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive hard twenty-five life sentences plus fifty-nine months. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by improperly cross-examining an expert witness for the defense, introducing the concept of “grooming” without evidentiary support and misstating the law by arguing that grooming could establish Defendant’s sexual intent, and vouching for the credibility of the State’s witnesses while openly opining about Defendant’s truthfulness; and (2) the district court erred by excluding testimony about prior false allegations of sexual abuse on the basis that the proffered witnesses were related to Defendant. View "State v. Akins" on Justia Law