Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered a guilty or no contest plea to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which was a nonperson felony due to Defendant's two previous misdemeanor convictions for the same offense. During the proceeding, Defendant unsuccessfully challenged the State's reliance on one of his misdemeanor convictions, claiming that his attorney had filed a guilty plea in that case without consulting him. On appeal, Defendant again objected to the inclusion of the prior misdemeanor in his criminal history. The court of appeals determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if a defendant charged with felony DUI pleads guilty or no contest to the felony, and wishes to challenge the validity of a prior misdemeanor DUI used to classify the severity level of the current charge or to enhance the sentence following conviction on the current charge, the defendant will be limited on appeal to arguing the impropriety of the prior misdemeanor's effect as a sentencing enhancement; and (2) the court of appeals should have considered the merits of Defendant's claim in this case that he should have been sentenced for misdemeanor DUI rather than felony DUI. Remanded. View "State v. Key" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) under Kansas' version of a stand-your-ground-law in effect at the time of the crime, he was immune from prosecution; and (2) he was deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his argument that he was immune from prosecution under the stand-your-ground statute because he made the argument for the first time on appeal, and the statute must be asserted before trial or opens or a dispositive plea is entered; and (2) the prosecutor made an incorrect statement of law about the jury's process during the rebuttal portion of closing argument, but this error was harmless. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated murder. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion for a separate sentencing proceeding. The assistant county attorney personally served on Defendant's counsel a notice of her intent to request a separate sentencing proceeding. After Defendant's conviction, the district court held a separate sentencing hearing and sentenced Defendant to a hard forty life sentence. Defendant later filed a motion seeking to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the service and filing of the notice of the State's intent to ask for a separate sentencing hearing had not complied with statutory mandates. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that the State complied with the statutory notice provisions of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4624(1). View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing that he did not aid and abet Michael Navarro, the person who actually killed the victim, but was merely present at the time of the shooting. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict because there was evidence Defendant took an active role in the commission of the crimes and intended to aid and abet Navarro; (2) the trial court did not err in declining to add Defendant's proposed language to the aiding and abetting jury instruction; and (3) any error on the part of the trial court in failing to instruct the jury to consider the testimony of Navarro's girlfriend with caution because she was an accomplice was harmless. View "State v. Llamas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of malicious second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se petition under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512 for postconviction DNA testing of evidence collected from the crime scene. The district court summarily denied Defendant's petition because the plain language of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512 permits only persons convicted of first-degree murder and rape to petition for DNA testing. Defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of Kansas' postconviction DNA testing scheme. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling denying Defendant's petition, (1) holding that section 21-2512 violates the Fourth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by denying access to postconviction DNA testing to individuals convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment; and (2) extending the statute to include offenders in the same situation as Defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Cheeks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court did not violate Defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial in granting the State's request for a continuance; and (2) the district court did erred in giving the jury an eyewitness identification instruction that included the degree of certainty factor disapproved of by the Supreme Court in State v. Mitchell, but because there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict absent the error, reversal was not required in this case. View "State v. Dobbs" on Justia Law

Steven Novotny appealed his jury convictions of first-degree felony murder and aggravated battery. Novotny argued the district court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his house; (2) denying his motion to suppress one victim's identification of him as the shooter; and (3) improperly instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. Furthermore, Novotny argued the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct during closing arguments and the cumulative effect of trial errors deprived him of a fair trial. Finding none of these arguments availing, the Supreme Court affirmed Novotny's convictions and sentences. View "Kansas v. Novotny" on Justia Law

Defendant Jazwane Jefferson appealed his convictions of first degree murder and the underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in failing to suppress his statements, which he contended were obtained during an illegal seizure of his car. The Supreme Court agreed that officers unlawfully seized defendant's car, then used that seizure to obtain the incriminating statements. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the State failed to establish that defendant's statements were sufficiently attenuated from the seizure. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's suppression ruling and defendant's convictions. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Kansas v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse with a child who is under fourteen years of age. Because Defendant was older than seventeen, the crime was an off-grid person felony, and the district court sentenced Defendant to a hard twenty-five lifetime prison term. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during her rebuttal closing argument by declaring that the victim was telling the truth, but the error was harmless; and (2) Defendant's sentence did not violate the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights' proscription against cruel or unusual punishment. View "State v. Ochs" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the aggravated robbery was accomplished by "threat of bodily harm" as specifically charged; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, as the prosecutor's comment about Defendant's attorney did not rise to prejudicial intentional misconduct; and (3) the language in the felony-murder statute does not create alternative means of committing the crime. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law