Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to twenty-six counts of sexual exploitation of a child. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a downward durational and/or dispositional departure motion, asking the court to depart from the presumptive prison term based on seven mitigating factors. The district court considered each mitigating factor at the sentencing hearing and denied the motion, finding that the mitigating factors were not substantial and compelling. Defendant was sentenced to a hard twenty-five life-imprisonment sentence. With the exception of vacating a portion of Defendant's sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's hard twenty-five life sentence, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's departure motion; and (2) the postrelease lifetime supervision sentence imposed by the district court was illegal. View "State v. Floyd" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of possession of drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. The drugs and paraphernalia were first observed in Defendant's apartment by a public housing employee who had made an uninvited entry into the apartment to check for potential damage from a sewer back-up at the facility. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements and the drug-related evidence as being products of an unlawful search and seizure. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a public housing employee was not a government actor subject to the constitutional restrictions on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the public housing employees that entered Defendant's apartment in reaction to a maintenance problem were not government actors within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment or the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. View "State v. Brittingham" on Justia Law

After entering into a plea agreement with the State, Defendant entered no contest pleas to numerous crimes in exchange for the State's promise to recommend at sentencing that the district court impose a controlling term of 102 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor violated the plea agreement by making negative comments at sentencing that undermined the parties' recommendation of a 102-month prison sentence. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's sentences. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence, holding (1) the prosecutor's comments at sentencing effectively undermined her sentencing recommendation to the district court, thereby violating the State's plea agreement with Defendant; and (2) this error was not harmless. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Urista" on Justia Law

After digital photographs of children engaged in sexual acts were found on Defendant's work computer, Defendant pleaded no contest to attempted sexual exploitation of a child. The district court imposed a fifty-two year sentence of imprisonment, with lifetime postrelease supervision. Defendant appealed, contending that the State violated the plea agreement by failing to remain silent at sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecutor was not required to "stand silent at sentencing" and that her statements were permissible to correct factual misstatements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor's questions challenging factual misstatements were appropriate and did not violate the plea agreement; but (2) the prosecutor's comment about Defendant's likelihood of recidivism violated the State's plea agreement promise to stand silent. Remanded. View "State v. Peterson" on Justia Law

At the conclusion of Defendant's seizure pursuant to a traffic stop, law enforcement officers returned to Defendant's car and asked him if they could search the vehicle. Defendant consented to the search of the car. The officers subsequently found crack cocaine in the trunk. Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of cocaine without a tax stamp. At issue on appeal was whether the traffic stop leading to Defendant's arrest became a voluntary encounter before Defendant gave consent to search. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed the conviction, holding that Defendant gave his consent to search his vehicle during a voluntary encounter with the officer. View "State v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, among other crimes. Law enforcement officers found drug evidence on Defendant after they seized him under the suspicion that he knew the whereabouts of someone for whom police had a warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers conducted an unlawful investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion and was convicted of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted, as the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity before they initiated the stop, and therefore, the seizure was illegal. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was (1) whether a driver's favorable results from field sobriety tests administered prior to a request for a preliminary breath test (PBT) dissipate the reasonable suspicion statutorily required to support a request for a PBT, and (2) whether the investigating officer in this case substantially complied with Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1012(c), which requires oral notice that refusal to take a PBT is a traffic infraction, when the officer incorrectly told Defendant he had not right to refuse the PBT. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) sobriety tests administered prior to a PBT request are part of the totality of circumstances examined by a court when determining whether there was reasonable suspicion to support the PBT request under section 8-1012(c); and (2) the officer in this case failed to comply with the notice requirements in section 8-1012(c) by incorrectly informing Defendant that he had no right to refuse the PBT. Remanded. View "State v. Edgar" on Justia Law

This capital murder case resulted from a double homicide and shooting of a third victim. After a trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. Defendant appealed, claiming he was denied his right to a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court (1) reversed the death sentence where the State stipulated that Defendant's attorney was ineffective during the trial's penalty phase; and (2) affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that defense counsel was deficient in certain areas, but that there was no evidence that the outcome of the guilt phase would have been different without these deficiencies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial counsel's representation denied Defendant his right to a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Cheatham" on Justia Law

Douglas Girard and Eugene Mallard were both convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The State filed petitions for their continued confinement as sexually violent predators, a designation that required proof that Defendants were likely to commit repeat acts of sexual violence because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder. Defendants urged the court to apply the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phamaceuticals, Inc. test to the actuarial risk assessments used by the State's expert witnesses in helping to predict the odds of Defendants reoffending. In both cases, the district court ruled that Frye v. United States applied to the actuarial risk assessments and admitted the scientific opinion testimony based partially on these statistical calculations of risk. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that neither Frye nor Daubert applied because the actuarial assessments were not scientific. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding that Frye applied in this case and that the actuarial risk assessments survived Frye's scrutiny. View "In re Care & Treatment of Girard" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child for touching the faces, hair, arms, and legs of two young girls, who were playing outside a movie theater. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years. At issue on appeal was whether the State presented sufficient evidence of a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), which provides that aggravated indecent liberties with a child is engaging in any lewd fondling or touching of a child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the touches did not tend to undermine the children's morals and were not so clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable person, the evidence against Defendant was insufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. Ta" on Justia Law