Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Elvis Wynn was convicted by a Knox County jury of first-degree bail jumping and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) after failing to appear at an October 2022 sentencing hearing for previous charges. The Knox Circuit Court sentenced him to twenty years of imprisonment based on the jury's recommendation. Wynn appealed the convictions.Previously, in September 2022, Wynn had pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, operating a motor vehicle under the influence, and second-degree PFO. He was released on home incarceration and ordered to appear for sentencing in October 2022, which he failed to do. Consequently, he was indicted on new charges of first-degree bail jumping and first-degree PFO. After being arrested in February 2023, he received a seven-year sentence for the original charges. In September 2023, a jury trial was held for the new charges, resulting in his conviction and the twenty-year sentence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed Wynn's appeal, where he argued that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior felony charges and that his twenty-year sentence violated the statutory sentencing cap. The court found that while the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the video of Wynn's prior court appearance, this error was harmless given the nature of the charges and the compelling evidence against him.Regarding the sentencing issue, the court distinguished Wynn's case from Kimmel v. Commonwealth, noting that Wynn's sentences arose from separate indictments and trials. Therefore, the statutory sentencing cap did not apply, and the trial court correctly ordered the sentences to run consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence exceeding twenty years. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the judgment of the Knox Circuit Court. View "WYNN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Darryl Ellery pled guilty to first-degree assault and was sentenced to five years in prison, probated for five years, with a restitution order of $305.14 to be paid monthly. In January 2017, a probation officer recommended revoking Ellery’s probation for absconding, and a warrant was issued. The warrant was served in October 2021, and at a November 15, 2021, hearing, the court granted a continuance but did not extend Ellery’s probation. At a subsequent hearing, Ellery argued the court lost jurisdiction as his probation expired in June 2021 without extension. The court rejected this and revoked his probation.Ellery appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it failed to extend Ellery’s probation at the November 15, 2021, hearing. The court also rejected the Commonwealth’s argument to adopt the fugitive tolling doctrine, citing separation of powers and lack of legislative enactment.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. The Commonwealth argued for reinstating the revocation, suggesting the court should adopt the fugitive tolling doctrine or reinterpret KRS 533.020(4). Ellery countered that the appeal was moot as he completed his sentence and argued against adopting the fugitive tolling doctrine.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the appeal was not moot under the public interest exception. The court reaffirmed its interpretation of KRS 533.020(4) from Commonwealth v. Tapp, which requires a duly entered court order to extend probation. The court declined to adopt the fugitive tolling doctrine, citing legislative intent and separation of powers. The court concluded that the circuit court lost jurisdiction when it failed to extend Ellery’s probation at the November 15, 2021, hearing, affirming the Court of Appeals' decision. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. ELLERY" on Justia Law

Dillian Ford was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and ordered to pay $10,972 in jail fees for the 422 days he was held in custody. The jail fees were imposed based on a stipulation that Carlisle County would pay McCracken County twenty-six dollars a day for housing inmates. Ford challenged the imposition of these fees, arguing that there was no evidence of a jail reimbursement policy adopted by the county jailer with the approval of the county's governing body, as required by KRS 441.265(2)(a).The Carlisle Circuit Court imposed the jail fees based on the stipulation. Ford appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the imposition of the fees. Ford then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky, arguing both the lack of evidence for the jail fees and a new argument regarding an amendment to KRS 441.265(1)(a) that he claimed removed the trial court's authority to impose jail fees.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that the stipulation regarding the agreement between Carlisle and McCracken counties did not meet the evidentiary burden required by Capstraw v. Commonwealth. The Court held that there was no evidence in the record of a jail reimbursement policy adopted by the county jailer with the approval of the county's governing body. Therefore, the imposition of jail fees was not justified. The Court vacated the portion of Ford's sentence imposing the jail fees but did not address the validity of the fifteen-year sentence for the underlying convictions. The Court of Appeals' decision was reversed. View "Ford v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Melzena Moore pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter of Raymond Jackson under extreme emotional disturbance (EED) as part of a plea agreement. The issue on appeal is whether the Laurel Circuit Court erred in denying Moore the domestic violence exemption to the mandatory minimum sentence for parole eligibility. This exemption would allow Moore to be considered for parole after serving 20% of her eighteen-year sentence and qualify her for counseling and rehabilitation programs.The Laurel Circuit Court found that Moore was a victim of domestic violence based on a single corroborated incident but concluded that her shooting of Jackson did not occur "with regard to" the domestic violence. The court denied Moore the exemption, citing a lack of corroborating evidence for her account of the events leading up to the shooting and questioning her credibility. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, instructing the trial court to grant the exemption, arguing that the trial court failed to properly apply the "some connection" standard and did not adequately consider the expert testimony provided by Moore.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in its analysis by not making sufficient factual findings regarding the totality of the evidence of domestic violence. The court emphasized that the "some connection" standard does not require a direct causal link or contemporaneous act of domestic violence. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further factual findings and proper application of the legal standard to determine if Moore qualifies for the domestic violence exemption. View "Commonwealth v. Moore" on Justia Law

In November 2020, John Ray Williams was convicted in Graves Circuit Court for first-degree sexual abuse of his granddaughter, L.W. Shortly after his conviction, Williams sent a postcard to Leslie, his former daughter-in-law and a key witness in his trial, which contained her birth date and social security number, and included a message that Leslie found threatening. Williams was subsequently charged with retaliating against a participant in the legal process and being a first-degree persistent felony offender.The Graves Circuit Court jury found Williams guilty on both charges and recommended the maximum sentence of twenty years, which the trial court imposed. Williams appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to be informed of his prior sexual abuse conviction and that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the retaliation charge.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence of Williams' prior conviction was admissible under Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b) because it was relevant to proving his retaliatory intent and was more probative than prejudicial. The court also found that the jury instructions were sufficient and that Williams' conduct threatened damage to Leslie's tangible property, satisfying the statutory requirements for a retaliation conviction. The court concluded that Williams was not entitled to a directed verdict and upheld his conviction and sentence. View "WILLIAMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In 2016, Thomas Raider was arrested and charged with multiple drug offenses. He was granted monitored conditional release but failed to comply with its terms, leading to his re-arrest. In 2017, Raider entered a plea agreement that included participation in Drug Court as a condition of his pretrial diversion. Despite multiple sanctions for noncompliance, Raider ultimately absconded from the program and was terminated from Drug Court in 2018. In 2022, after being taken into custody on new charges, the trial court initiated revocation proceedings for Raider's pretrial diversion without a motion from the Commonwealth.The Estill Circuit Court revoked Raider's pretrial diversion and sentenced him to five years in prison, as per his plea agreement. Raider appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the Commonwealth must file a motion to revoke pretrial diversion before the trial court can act.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case to determine whether a trial court can revoke pretrial diversion on its own initiative. The Court held that Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 533.256 does not require the Commonwealth to file a motion before a trial court can revoke pretrial diversion. The Court emphasized that the trial court has the authority to notice, schedule, and conduct hearings to revoke diversion if a defendant fails to comply with the conditions of the diversion agreement. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Estill Circuit Court's revocation of Raider's pretrial diversion and subsequent sentencing. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. RAIDER" on Justia Law

John Anderson was convicted of failing to make a required disposition of property in the Hickman District Court on August 17, 2020. He failed to appear for sentencing and did not report to jail as ordered, leading to a bench warrant. Despite his fugitive status, Anderson's lawyer filed an appeal to the Hickman Circuit Court, which affirmed his conviction. Anderson's counsel then sought discretionary review before the Court of Appeals while Anderson remained a fugitive. Anderson surrendered to custody after the Commonwealth urged the Court of Appeals to apply the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (FDD) and deny discretionary review.The Hickman Circuit Court undertook Anderson's appeal despite his fugitive status and affirmed his conviction. Anderson's counsel sought discretionary review before the Court of Appeals, which was initially granted by the motion panel. However, the merits panel of the Court of Appeals later applied the FDD and dismissed Anderson's appeal, reasoning that Anderson sought the benefit of discretionary review while a fugitive.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the FDD should not apply to Anderson's appeal because he surrendered to custody before the Court of Appeals ruled on his motion for discretionary review. The court emphasized that the FDD is intended to prevent fugitives from benefiting from the judicial system while remaining at large, but Anderson's voluntary return to custody negated the need for the FDD's application. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of Anderson's appeal. View "ANDERSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Apren Poore was indicted by a Whitley County Grand Jury on charges of receiving a stolen firearm, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. He entered a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, which included a "hammer clause" that stipulated a harsher sentence if he failed to appear at sentencing. Poore pleaded guilty, and the trial court accepted his plea. However, Poore failed to appear for his sentencing hearing due to being detained in another county on shoplifting charges. Consequently, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of twenty years' imprisonment as recommended by the Commonwealth.The Whitley Circuit Court initially scheduled Poore's sentencing for April 2023, later rescheduled to May 1, 2023. Poore's counsel filed motions to withdraw as his attorney and to withdraw Poore's guilty plea, citing irreconcilable differences and Poore's admission to a rehabilitation facility. Poore failed to appear for the May 1 hearing, leading to the trial court granting the motion for counsel to withdraw but denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. A bench warrant was issued for Poore's arrest, and he was subsequently sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on June 5, 2023.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and concluded that the trial judge exercised independent discretion in sentencing Poore but improperly imposed court costs. The court affirmed the twenty-year sentence, finding no abuse of discretion in considering the hammer clause. However, it vacated the portion of the judgment imposing court costs and fees, as the installment plan did not comply with statutory requirements. View "POORE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

David Vincent was stopped by Officer David Robertson of the Edmonton Police Department based on a tip from a known informant and an alleged equipment violation. The informant reported that two individuals at a gas station appeared to be intoxicated. Officer Robertson observed a vehicle with red parking lights, which he believed violated a new law that had not yet taken effect. He followed the vehicle, observed no traffic violations, and stopped it. Vincent was found to have a suspended license, and a search of the vehicle revealed drugs and paraphernalia.The Metcalfe Circuit Court denied Vincent's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop, ruling that the officer's belief about the equipment violation was an objectively reasonable mistake of law. The court also found the informant's tip provided a sufficient basis for the stop. Vincent entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and the subsequent search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the stop was not justified by the equipment violation because the law had not yet taken effect, and the officer's mistake of law was not reasonable. Additionally, the informant's tip did not provide reasonable suspicion for the stop, as it was based on observations that could be explained by innocent behavior and was not corroborated by the officer's own observations. The court remanded the case for the trial court to grant Vincent's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the unlawful stop. View "VINCENT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Brandon Woodside was convicted by a Hardin County jury of first-degree burglary and being a persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison. Woodside broke into an occupied motel room in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, assaulted the occupant, Marvin, and fled the scene. Marvin and a witness provided consistent testimony about the incident. Woodside's defense was voluntary intoxication due to methamphetamine use, and he testified about his drug use and the events leading up to the assault.The Hardin Circuit Court allowed the defense to ask Marvin if he was receiving any benefit for his testimony but limited further questioning about his immigration status unless Marvin indicated he was receiving a benefit. Marvin testified that he had not received any benefit related to his participation in the case. Woodside argued that the trial court erred by not allowing him to question Marvin about his immigration status and potential bias related to a U visa application, which could have affected Marvin's credibility.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Hardin Circuit Court's judgment. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of Marvin regarding his immigration status. The court found that the trial court reasonably allowed questioning about any benefits Marvin might have received but did not permit a speculative inquiry into his immigration status without evidence of a benefit. The court also noted that the defense did not present any post-trial evidence of Marvin receiving a benefit or engaging in conduct probative of untruthfulness. The trial court's decision to limit the cross-examination was deemed appropriate and within its discretion. View "WOODSIDE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law