Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2020, John Ray Williams was convicted in Graves Circuit Court for first-degree sexual abuse of his granddaughter, L.W. Shortly after his conviction, Williams sent a postcard to Leslie, his former daughter-in-law and a key witness in his trial, which contained her birth date and social security number, and included a message that Leslie found threatening. Williams was subsequently charged with retaliating against a participant in the legal process and being a first-degree persistent felony offender.The Graves Circuit Court jury found Williams guilty on both charges and recommended the maximum sentence of twenty years, which the trial court imposed. Williams appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to be informed of his prior sexual abuse conviction and that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the retaliation charge.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence of Williams' prior conviction was admissible under Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b) because it was relevant to proving his retaliatory intent and was more probative than prejudicial. The court also found that the jury instructions were sufficient and that Williams' conduct threatened damage to Leslie's tangible property, satisfying the statutory requirements for a retaliation conviction. The court concluded that Williams was not entitled to a directed verdict and upheld his conviction and sentence. View "WILLIAMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In 2016, Thomas Raider was arrested and charged with multiple drug offenses. He was granted monitored conditional release but failed to comply with its terms, leading to his re-arrest. In 2017, Raider entered a plea agreement that included participation in Drug Court as a condition of his pretrial diversion. Despite multiple sanctions for noncompliance, Raider ultimately absconded from the program and was terminated from Drug Court in 2018. In 2022, after being taken into custody on new charges, the trial court initiated revocation proceedings for Raider's pretrial diversion without a motion from the Commonwealth.The Estill Circuit Court revoked Raider's pretrial diversion and sentenced him to five years in prison, as per his plea agreement. Raider appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the Commonwealth must file a motion to revoke pretrial diversion before the trial court can act.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case to determine whether a trial court can revoke pretrial diversion on its own initiative. The Court held that Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 533.256 does not require the Commonwealth to file a motion before a trial court can revoke pretrial diversion. The Court emphasized that the trial court has the authority to notice, schedule, and conduct hearings to revoke diversion if a defendant fails to comply with the conditions of the diversion agreement. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Estill Circuit Court's revocation of Raider's pretrial diversion and subsequent sentencing. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. RAIDER" on Justia Law

John Anderson was convicted of failing to make a required disposition of property in the Hickman District Court on August 17, 2020. He failed to appear for sentencing and did not report to jail as ordered, leading to a bench warrant. Despite his fugitive status, Anderson's lawyer filed an appeal to the Hickman Circuit Court, which affirmed his conviction. Anderson's counsel then sought discretionary review before the Court of Appeals while Anderson remained a fugitive. Anderson surrendered to custody after the Commonwealth urged the Court of Appeals to apply the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (FDD) and deny discretionary review.The Hickman Circuit Court undertook Anderson's appeal despite his fugitive status and affirmed his conviction. Anderson's counsel sought discretionary review before the Court of Appeals, which was initially granted by the motion panel. However, the merits panel of the Court of Appeals later applied the FDD and dismissed Anderson's appeal, reasoning that Anderson sought the benefit of discretionary review while a fugitive.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the FDD should not apply to Anderson's appeal because he surrendered to custody before the Court of Appeals ruled on his motion for discretionary review. The court emphasized that the FDD is intended to prevent fugitives from benefiting from the judicial system while remaining at large, but Anderson's voluntary return to custody negated the need for the FDD's application. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of Anderson's appeal. View "ANDERSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Apren Poore was indicted by a Whitley County Grand Jury on charges of receiving a stolen firearm, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. He entered a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, which included a "hammer clause" that stipulated a harsher sentence if he failed to appear at sentencing. Poore pleaded guilty, and the trial court accepted his plea. However, Poore failed to appear for his sentencing hearing due to being detained in another county on shoplifting charges. Consequently, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of twenty years' imprisonment as recommended by the Commonwealth.The Whitley Circuit Court initially scheduled Poore's sentencing for April 2023, later rescheduled to May 1, 2023. Poore's counsel filed motions to withdraw as his attorney and to withdraw Poore's guilty plea, citing irreconcilable differences and Poore's admission to a rehabilitation facility. Poore failed to appear for the May 1 hearing, leading to the trial court granting the motion for counsel to withdraw but denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. A bench warrant was issued for Poore's arrest, and he was subsequently sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on June 5, 2023.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and concluded that the trial judge exercised independent discretion in sentencing Poore but improperly imposed court costs. The court affirmed the twenty-year sentence, finding no abuse of discretion in considering the hammer clause. However, it vacated the portion of the judgment imposing court costs and fees, as the installment plan did not comply with statutory requirements. View "POORE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

David Vincent was stopped by Officer David Robertson of the Edmonton Police Department based on a tip from a known informant and an alleged equipment violation. The informant reported that two individuals at a gas station appeared to be intoxicated. Officer Robertson observed a vehicle with red parking lights, which he believed violated a new law that had not yet taken effect. He followed the vehicle, observed no traffic violations, and stopped it. Vincent was found to have a suspended license, and a search of the vehicle revealed drugs and paraphernalia.The Metcalfe Circuit Court denied Vincent's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop, ruling that the officer's belief about the equipment violation was an objectively reasonable mistake of law. The court also found the informant's tip provided a sufficient basis for the stop. Vincent entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and the subsequent search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the stop was not justified by the equipment violation because the law had not yet taken effect, and the officer's mistake of law was not reasonable. Additionally, the informant's tip did not provide reasonable suspicion for the stop, as it was based on observations that could be explained by innocent behavior and was not corroborated by the officer's own observations. The court remanded the case for the trial court to grant Vincent's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the unlawful stop. View "VINCENT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Brandon Woodside was convicted by a Hardin County jury of first-degree burglary and being a persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison. Woodside broke into an occupied motel room in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, assaulted the occupant, Marvin, and fled the scene. Marvin and a witness provided consistent testimony about the incident. Woodside's defense was voluntary intoxication due to methamphetamine use, and he testified about his drug use and the events leading up to the assault.The Hardin Circuit Court allowed the defense to ask Marvin if he was receiving any benefit for his testimony but limited further questioning about his immigration status unless Marvin indicated he was receiving a benefit. Marvin testified that he had not received any benefit related to his participation in the case. Woodside argued that the trial court erred by not allowing him to question Marvin about his immigration status and potential bias related to a U visa application, which could have affected Marvin's credibility.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Hardin Circuit Court's judgment. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of Marvin regarding his immigration status. The court found that the trial court reasonably allowed questioning about any benefits Marvin might have received but did not permit a speculative inquiry into his immigration status without evidence of a benefit. The court also noted that the defense did not present any post-trial evidence of Marvin receiving a benefit or engaging in conduct probative of untruthfulness. The trial court's decision to limit the cross-examination was deemed appropriate and within its discretion. View "WOODSIDE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Blake Jeffreys was arrested during a sting operation after unknowingly communicating with an undercover police officer and arranging to meet at a hotel for sex in exchange for $120. On May 14, 2021, Jeffreys pled guilty to promoting human trafficking. The Jefferson Circuit Court sentenced him to one year in prison, probated for five years, and ordered him to pay a $10,000 fee under KRS 529.130. Jeffreys requested the trial court waive the payment under KRS 534.030(4), but the court declined. Jeffreys appealed, arguing the fee was an unconstitutional excessive fine and should be waived.The Court of Appeals rejected Jeffreys' arguments and affirmed the trial court's decision. Jeffreys sought discretionary review from the Kentucky Supreme Court, focusing solely on the argument that the fee should be waived. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted the motion for review.The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that KRS 529.130 imposes a human trafficking victims service fee, not a fine, and is not subject to waiver under KRS 534.030(4). The court also found that KRS 453.190, which defines a "poor person" for the purpose of waiving court costs, does not apply to the fee imposed under KRS 529.130. However, the court noted that Jeffreys could seek a show cause hearing under KRS 534.020(3)(a)1 to potentially reduce or waive the payment based on his ability to pay. The court emphasized that the trial court should consider various factors, including the defendant's financial status and dependents, when determining the ability to pay. View "JEFFREYS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Tyler Story was charged with first-offense DUI after being observed driving at high speed with one headlight and failing field sobriety tests. He admitted to drinking and had a breathalyzer result of 0.178. Story requested an independent blood test, which was drawn but not tested immediately. The sample was stored by the police. Story was charged and sought to preserve the sample for independent testing. The District Court suppressed the breathalyzer results due to an error in administration, leaving the Commonwealth without evidence. The Commonwealth obtained a warrant to test the independent blood sample, which Story opposed.The Campbell District Court denied Story's motion to return the blood sample for independent testing, finding he had abandoned it. The Campbell Circuit Court denied Story's petition for a writ of prohibition against the search warrant. The District Court allowed the Commonwealth to test the sample, which showed a blood alcohol level above the legal limit. Story entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed. The Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decisions, with the Court of Appeals disagreeing on the abandonment but upholding the testing as evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that Story's statutory right to an independent blood test was infringed, but the error was harmless since the breathalyzer test was suppressed. However, the Court concluded that the Commonwealth's testing of the blood sample was conducted under an invalid warrant and without Story's consent, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court reversed the District Court's denial of Story's motion to suppress the test results, vacated his conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "STORY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

James Javonte Crite appealed the Daviess Circuit Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his apartment. Crite was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, resulting in a two-year sentence and shock probation. He argued that his landlord had no right to enter his apartment without an emergency and lacked authority to grant police entry, making the search and seizure of the firearm illegal.The Daviess Circuit Court denied Crite's motion to suppress, finding that the landlord had the right to enter the apartment under the "emergency entry" clause of the lease due to significant electrical damage that posed a danger to the tenants. The court also concluded that the police entry was reasonable to ensure the safety of the landlord and the electrician, given the information that Crite was a schizophrenic off his medication, had acted irrationally, and there was a firearm in the apartment.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the landlord's entry was justified by the emergency and that the police entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment as they were facilitating the landlord's legitimate interest in addressing the emergency.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the landlord's entry was justified under the lease's emergency entry clause due to the electrical damage posing a risk to the tenants. The police entry was deemed reasonable and necessary to ensure the safety of the landlord and the electrician. The Court also held that the seizure of the AR-15 rifle was lawful under the plain view doctrine, as the officers were lawfully present and the incriminating nature of the firearm was immediately apparent. View "CRITE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In the early morning of October 13, 2020, Calvin Taylor was found dead in his home in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, with duct tape on his mouth and arm, and three gunshot wounds. A neighbor, Treesha Shelton, heard gunshots and saw a light-colored vehicle outside Taylor’s home. Surveillance footage showed a silver minivan and a silver Saturn near Taylor’s home around the time of the murder. Larayna Manning and her son, Anthony, were known to frequent Taylor’s home, where Taylor sold crack cocaine. Manning was interviewed by police but provided limited information. A search of a minivan at Manning’s home revealed a large amount of crack cocaine. DNA evidence linked Manning to duct tape found at the crime scene.The Christian Circuit Court convicted Manning of complicity to murder and complicity to first-degree robbery, sentencing her to life imprisonment. Manning appealed, arguing that her right to a speedy trial was violated, that evidence of a prior home invasion was improperly admitted, that the Commonwealth improperly used her son’s Alford plea as substantive evidence of her guilt, and that her right to remain silent was infringed upon.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. It found that the delay in Manning’s trial was largely due to valid reasons, such as the need for DNA evidence, and that her right to a speedy trial was not violated. The court also held that the Commonwealth provided reasonable notice of its intent to introduce prior bad acts evidence and that any error in admitting this evidence was not palpable. The court acknowledged that the Commonwealth improperly used Anthony’s Alford plea as substantive evidence of Manning’s guilt but concluded that this did not result in a substantial possibility of a different outcome. Finally, the court found no improper comment on Manning’s right to remain silent.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Manning’s convictions and sentence. View "MANNING V. COMMONWEALTH" on Justia Law