Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle on a DUI-suspended license. Defendant was charged with a Class D felony under the penalty-enhancement provision in Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.090(2)(c) because this was his third such offense in less than three years. Defendant challenged the enhancement by collaterally attacking his earlier convictions, arguing that his guilty pleas in those cases were invalid under Boykin v. Alabama. The circuit court rejected the challenge. Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that there was insufficient evidence showing that Defendant’s prior guilty pleas complied with the Boykin requirements. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Defendant’s conviction, holding that Defendant’s prior convictions were not subject to collateral attack on Boykin matters in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Fugate" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. Defendant had recently become a “fully-patched” member of the Iron Horsemen motorcycle club at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by permitting increased security during trial; (2) did not err by admitting testimony regarding the culture of the Iron Horsemen; (3) erred in permitting alleged ex parte communication between the Commonwealth and the trial court, but the error was harmless; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by overruling Defendant’s motion for a mistrial. View "Rigdon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree assault, fourth-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, and third-degree arson. Appellant appealed, arguing, primarily, that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntarily intoxication under Ky. Rev. Stat. 501.080(1). The Supreme Court reversed the second-degree assault conviction and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to entitle Defendant to a voluntary intoxication instruction, and the failure to include the instruction was reversible error as to the second-degree assault conviction; and (2) the remaining convictions’ required mental states cannot be negated by voluntary intoxication, and therefore, those convictions and sentences were not in error. View "King v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of incest, first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and other crimes. Appellant was sentenced to a total of sixty-five years in prison, the maximum sentence allowable in this case. On appeal, Appellant argued, inter alia, that he was entitled to relief because during voir dire the juror who ultimately became foreperson lied on her juror qualification form and also during voir dire proceedings concerning whether a member of her family had ever been prosecuted in a criminal matter. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the jury foreperson wrongfully failed to disclose the criminal prosecutions of her family, and the concealment of that information denied Appellant the opportunity to challenge the juror for cause or alternatively, use a peremptory strike to remove the juror; and (2) Appellant was deprived of a substantial right not subject to harmless error analysis. View "Gullett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants were charged with one count each of cultivation of marijuana five or more plants and other drug-related offenses. Appellants filed separate motions to suppress, arguing (1) police officers violated the curtilage of their apartment when they entered the back patio enclosure, thereby having no legal authority to view marijuana baggies, and (2) the officers lacked any exigencies to enter the apartment and conduct the search. The trial court denied Appellants’ motions to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) officers breached the curtilage of Appellants’ apartment when viewing the marijuana baggies, in addition to conducting an illegal search of Appellants’ apartment; and (2) the evidence seized should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. View "Pace v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of first-degree rape, one count of second-degree rape, and one count of second-degree sodomy. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence of his confession, arguing that the police obtained his confession in violation of Miranda v. Arizona because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Miranda did not apply because Defendant was not in custody at the time he made incriminating statements to the police. View "Wells v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree assault. A public defender from the local Department of Public advocacy (DPA) office was appointed to represent Defendant. Prior to trial, counsel advised the trial court that another attorney in the local DPA was representing the alleged victim in an unrelated matter. Defendant requested the appointment of new counsel. The trial court denied the request, concluding that there was not conflict of interest, and ordered the trial to proceed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s refusal to appoint new counsel violated his right to conflict-free counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The court of appeals ultimately concluded that Defendant had not shown that his lawyer had an unconstitutional conflict of interest during her representation of him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a public defender’s conflict of interest is not necessarily imputed to all other public defenders in the same Public Defender office; and (2) Defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel in this case. View "Samuels v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 1993, Appellant was convicted in a state court of multiple crimes and sentenced to a total of forty-two years’ imprisonment. In 1994, a federal district court sentenced Appellant to 152 months’ incarceration for separate crimes. At the time of Appellant’s federal sentencing, he was in the custody of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (DOC). The Federal Bureau of Prisons issued a detainer in order to obtain custody upon Appellant’s release from state custody. In 2001, the Kentucky Parole Board (KPB) paroled Appellant to his federal detainer, after which Appellant was transferred from state custody to federal custody. In 2012, Appellant was released from federal supervision. In 2013, after obtaining new criminal charges, the KPB revoked Appellant’s parole. In 2015, Appellant, then a prisoner at the Northpoint Training Center, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the DOC permanently surrendered jurisdiction over his sentence when it transferred custody to federal authorities. The circuit court denied Appellant’s petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Hale, the DOC did not forfeit its right to require Appellant to satisfy the remainder of his sentence upon his return to the Commonwealth. View "Murrell v. Bottom" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, and use of a minor in a sexual performance. Appellant was sentenced to a total of thirty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred by failing to direct a verdict of acquittal for first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse; (2) two of Appellant’s remaining arguments concerning his first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse convictions were moot; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for a sexual misconduct jury instruction; (4) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument, but the misstatements were not so egregious that they constitute flagrant misconduct undermining the essential fairness of Appellant’s trial; and (5) there was no cumulative effect of multiple errors that would justify reversal. View "Murphy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession a handgun as a convicted felon, possessing marijuana, and operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license. Appellant appealed the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence found in the vehicle he was driving at the time of his arrest. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record contained substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings of fact; (2) warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few well-established exceptions, such as inventory searches; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, the police acted reasonably in seizing Appellant’s vehicle and performing the subsequent inventory search of its contents. View "Cobb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law