Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants were charged with one count each of cultivation of marijuana five or more plants and other drug-related offenses. Appellants filed separate motions to suppress, arguing (1) police officers violated the curtilage of their apartment when they entered the back patio enclosure, thereby having no legal authority to view marijuana baggies, and (2) the officers lacked any exigencies to enter the apartment and conduct the search. The trial court denied Appellants’ motions to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) officers breached the curtilage of Appellants’ apartment when viewing the marijuana baggies, in addition to conducting an illegal search of Appellants’ apartment; and (2) the evidence seized should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. View "Pace v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of first-degree rape, one count of second-degree rape, and one count of second-degree sodomy. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence of his confession, arguing that the police obtained his confession in violation of Miranda v. Arizona because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Miranda did not apply because Defendant was not in custody at the time he made incriminating statements to the police. View "Wells v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree assault. A public defender from the local Department of Public advocacy (DPA) office was appointed to represent Defendant. Prior to trial, counsel advised the trial court that another attorney in the local DPA was representing the alleged victim in an unrelated matter. Defendant requested the appointment of new counsel. The trial court denied the request, concluding that there was not conflict of interest, and ordered the trial to proceed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s refusal to appoint new counsel violated his right to conflict-free counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The court of appeals ultimately concluded that Defendant had not shown that his lawyer had an unconstitutional conflict of interest during her representation of him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a public defender’s conflict of interest is not necessarily imputed to all other public defenders in the same Public Defender office; and (2) Defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel in this case. View "Samuels v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 1993, Appellant was convicted in a state court of multiple crimes and sentenced to a total of forty-two years’ imprisonment. In 1994, a federal district court sentenced Appellant to 152 months’ incarceration for separate crimes. At the time of Appellant’s federal sentencing, he was in the custody of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (DOC). The Federal Bureau of Prisons issued a detainer in order to obtain custody upon Appellant’s release from state custody. In 2001, the Kentucky Parole Board (KPB) paroled Appellant to his federal detainer, after which Appellant was transferred from state custody to federal custody. In 2012, Appellant was released from federal supervision. In 2013, after obtaining new criminal charges, the KPB revoked Appellant’s parole. In 2015, Appellant, then a prisoner at the Northpoint Training Center, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the DOC permanently surrendered jurisdiction over his sentence when it transferred custody to federal authorities. The circuit court denied Appellant’s petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Hale, the DOC did not forfeit its right to require Appellant to satisfy the remainder of his sentence upon his return to the Commonwealth. View "Murrell v. Bottom" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, and use of a minor in a sexual performance. Appellant was sentenced to a total of thirty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred by failing to direct a verdict of acquittal for first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse; (2) two of Appellant’s remaining arguments concerning his first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse convictions were moot; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for a sexual misconduct jury instruction; (4) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument, but the misstatements were not so egregious that they constitute flagrant misconduct undermining the essential fairness of Appellant’s trial; and (5) there was no cumulative effect of multiple errors that would justify reversal. View "Murphy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession a handgun as a convicted felon, possessing marijuana, and operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license. Appellant appealed the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence found in the vehicle he was driving at the time of his arrest. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record contained substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings of fact; (2) warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few well-established exceptions, such as inventory searches; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, the police acted reasonably in seizing Appellant’s vehicle and performing the subsequent inventory search of its contents. View "Cobb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was convicted of eleven crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err in determining that Appellant had waived his right to counsel; (2) the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of Appellant’s person; (3) admission of evidence that the confidential informant’s work resulted in convictions in other cases was not palpable error; (4) the trial court did not err in denying a directed verdict; and (5) the trial court properly allowed Appellant’s sentence to be enhanced as a subsequent offender. View "Lamb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1980, Appellant was convicted of three counts of capital murder, three counts of first-degree robbery, and one count of burglary. Appellant was sentenced to death for each of the murders. After he was sentenced, Appellant was subjected to a psychological evaluation, which revealed that he had an overall IQ score of 81. On appeal, Appellant’s psychological evaluation was not raised. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2004, Appellant filed a motion to set aside his death sentences on the grounds that he was intellectually disabled. After two remands, the trial judge (1) ordered that Appellant was not entitled to state funds for a psychological evaluation; (2) determined that, because Appellant indicated that he would refuse evaluation by the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), he had waived his intellectual disability claim; and (3) ordered that Appellant’s case be dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to public funds for an expert of his choosing; but (2) Appellant did not waive his intellectual disability claim. Remanded to the trial court to order the KCPC to perform a psychological evaluation of Appellant. View "White v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Robert Guernsey and Trustin Jones were indicted for murder and first-degree robbery. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty against Guernsey and Jones, identifying murder committed in the course of first-degree robbery as the statutory aggravator. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered an order excluding the death penalty as disproportionate. The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s order excluding the death penalty and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the circuit court erred by concluding prior to trial that the death penalty would be disproportionate in this prosecution for murder and first-degree robbery; and (2) the Commonwealth did not forfeit the right to interlocutory review of the issue presented. View "Commonwealth v. Guernsey" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of theft by unlawful taking of property worth more than ten thousand dollars, second degree burglary, third degree burglary, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of twenty years in prison. Appellant appealed, raising four allegations of error. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions, holding that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach Appellant with his failure to disclose his alibi and his alibi witness to the police or prosecuting authorities prior to trial, and the error required reversal. Remanded for a new trial. View "Cunningham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law