Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1980, Appellant was convicted by a jury of three counts of capital murder and sentenced to death on each of the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2004, Appellant filed a post-conviction motion to set aside his death sentences on the grounds that he is intellectually disabled. The circuit court judge ordered the Finance and Administration Cabinet to pay up to $5,000 for a mental health evaluation by a private psychologist. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a showing that use of a state facility was impractical. On remand, the circuit court determined that the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) was capable of conducting the necessary evaluations and ordered that any failure to cooperate would constitute a waiver of Appellant’s intellectual disability claim. After Appellant indicated that he would refuse evaluation by KCPC, the trial court determined that he had waived his intellectual disability claim and ordered that his case be dismissed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Appellant was not entitled to public funds for an expert of his choosing; and (2) reversed the judgment on the issue of waiver, holding that Appellant’s continued failure to submit to KCPC’s custody did not constitute waiver. Remanded. View "White v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, first-degree burglary, and tampering with physical evidence. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison with possibility of parole after twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported the burglary and tampering with physical evidence convictions; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting incriminating hearsay testimony; (3) Defendant’s right to present a defense was not denied when the Commonwealth did not conduct requested DNA testing; and (4) the trial court’s admission of hearsay evidence was not palpable error. View "Williams v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder, first-degree burglary, and defacing a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion and a Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 60.02 motion as an alternative to his RCr 11.42 motion. Both motions were joined into a single action. The circuit court denied Defendant’s post-conviction motions. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) there was no error based on trial counsel’s failure to request a renewed competency motion during trial or in trial counsel’s waiving Defendant’s presence during trial; (2) the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s claims that were conclusively disproved through an examination of the record; (3) there was no error in pre-trial counsel’s strategy to permit Defendant to be interviewed by law enforcement; and (4) the circuit court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing concerning Defendant’s claim of error based on pre-trial counsel’s failure to convey a twenty-year plea offer to him. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. McGorman" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with seven counts of first-degree sodomy. All seven counts of the indictment read identically. Appellant was acquitted on two counts and convicted of the other five. Later, the court of appeals vacated Appellant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Appellant’s counsel had been ineffective. On remand, Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming his re-prosecution was barred by double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals claiming again that the prohibition on double jeopardy would be violated by retrial. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a new trial in this case raised a substantial risk that Appellant will be tried for crimes for which he has already been acquitted in violation of his double-jeopardy right against successive prosecution. Remanded. View "Dunn v. Hon. Beth Maze" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, first-degree possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that was found on his person and in his car following a sniff search by a narcotics-detection dog that was conducted after a routine traffic stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the arresting officer prolonged the seizure and conducted the search in violation of Rodrigues and Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights; and (2) therefore, the fruits of that search must be suppressed. View "Davis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and alcohol intoxication in a public place. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the weapon seized at his arrest, arguing that the arresting officer lacked sufficient cause to arrest Appellant for alcohol intoxication and that the ensuing search of his person incident to the improper arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals upheld the validity of the arrest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant’s arrest for alcohol intoxication in a public place was unlawful because the offense was not committed in the presence of the arresting officer; and (2) therefore, the search conducted incident to that arrest was not valid, and the evidence obtained during the search should have been suppressed. View "Maloney v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to three counts of incest, one count of first-degree sexual abuse, and to being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that Ky. Rev. Stat. 530.020, the incest statute, does not criminalize sexual intercourse between a stepfather and his adult stepdaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss and judgment, holding that, in accordance with Raines v. Commonwealth, a plain reading of section 530.020 did not include the victim’s age as an element of the crime and that the legislative intent was to prohibit sexual intercourse between persons with certain relationships, including stepparents and stepchildren. View "Howard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree incest of his granddaughter, referred to as Sarah. During her opening statement, Appellant’s attorney commented on Sarah’s alleged untruthfulness. The Commonwealth moved for a mistrial on the basis that defense counsel had characterized Sarah as a liar. The trial court granted the mistrial motion and scheduled the case for retrial. Appellant filed a motion to prohibit retrial and dismiss the indictment, which the trial court denied. Appellant then filed a writ of prohibition with the court of appeals requesting an order prohibiting the trial court from retrying him. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that defense counsel’s statements constituted improper evidence that prejudiced the Commonwealth’s right to a fair trial, and therefore, a mistrial was an appropriate remedy. View "Sneed v. Hon. Rodney Burress" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) did not err when it granted the Commonwealth’s intra-trial motion to amend the indictment; (3) did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion for a mistrial; (4) did not err when it denied Defendant’s motions for a directed verdict; and (5) did not commit palpable error when it admitted testimony about prior and uncharged crimes and other bad acts. View "Bartley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of wanton murder. The trial court adopted the jury’s recommended penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court properly instructed the jury on self-protection; (2) the combination murder instruction permitting Appellant to be convicted of either intentional or wanton murder did not violate Appellant’s right to a unanimous verdict; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict, as there was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict for intentional or wanton murder. View "Gribbins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law