Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, first-degree possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that was found on his person and in his car following a sniff search by a narcotics-detection dog that was conducted after a routine traffic stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the arresting officer prolonged the seizure and conducted the search in violation of Rodrigues and Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights; and (2) therefore, the fruits of that search must be suppressed. View "Davis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and alcohol intoxication in a public place. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the weapon seized at his arrest, arguing that the arresting officer lacked sufficient cause to arrest Appellant for alcohol intoxication and that the ensuing search of his person incident to the improper arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals upheld the validity of the arrest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant’s arrest for alcohol intoxication in a public place was unlawful because the offense was not committed in the presence of the arresting officer; and (2) therefore, the search conducted incident to that arrest was not valid, and the evidence obtained during the search should have been suppressed. View "Maloney v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to three counts of incest, one count of first-degree sexual abuse, and to being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that Ky. Rev. Stat. 530.020, the incest statute, does not criminalize sexual intercourse between a stepfather and his adult stepdaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss and judgment, holding that, in accordance with Raines v. Commonwealth, a plain reading of section 530.020 did not include the victim’s age as an element of the crime and that the legislative intent was to prohibit sexual intercourse between persons with certain relationships, including stepparents and stepchildren. View "Howard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree incest of his granddaughter, referred to as Sarah. During her opening statement, Appellant’s attorney commented on Sarah’s alleged untruthfulness. The Commonwealth moved for a mistrial on the basis that defense counsel had characterized Sarah as a liar. The trial court granted the mistrial motion and scheduled the case for retrial. Appellant filed a motion to prohibit retrial and dismiss the indictment, which the trial court denied. Appellant then filed a writ of prohibition with the court of appeals requesting an order prohibiting the trial court from retrying him. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that defense counsel’s statements constituted improper evidence that prejudiced the Commonwealth’s right to a fair trial, and therefore, a mistrial was an appropriate remedy. View "Sneed v. Hon. Rodney Burress" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) did not err when it granted the Commonwealth’s intra-trial motion to amend the indictment; (3) did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion for a mistrial; (4) did not err when it denied Defendant’s motions for a directed verdict; and (5) did not commit palpable error when it admitted testimony about prior and uncharged crimes and other bad acts. View "Bartley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of wanton murder. The trial court adopted the jury’s recommended penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court properly instructed the jury on self-protection; (2) the combination murder instruction permitting Appellant to be convicted of either intentional or wanton murder did not violate Appellant’s right to a unanimous verdict; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict, as there was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict for intentional or wanton murder. View "Gribbins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and four counts of first-degree criminal abuse. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s admission of evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts - namely, his history of domestic violence against his spouse - was not in error; (2) the admission of hearsay statements made to an examining pediatrician was not in error, and the admission of a detective’s hearsay testimony in violation of Appellant’s confrontation rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) improper closing statements made during the Commonwealth’s closing argument did not rise to the level of misconduct requiring reversal. View "Dickerson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of intentional murder and one count of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court’s power to establish the number of peremptory challenges awarded to the Commonwealth is an impermissible delegation of legislative authority under Kentucky’s separation of governmental powers principle, and (2) he was entitled to a directed verdict on the intentional-homicide charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant did not notify the Attorney General of his intent to challenge the constitutionality of Ky. Rev. Stat. 29A.290(2)(b), Defendant failed to comply with Ky. Rev. Stat. 418.075, and therefore, the Court must decline to address the merits of his argument; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict. View "Craft v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was arrested and charged with trafficking in marijuana. Based on information given by Appellant’s son, Cody, a law enforcement officer completed an affidavit for a search warrant and presented it to the district judge, who issued the search warrant. The search of Appellant’s home led to his being charged with trafficking in marijuana in an amount greater than five pounds and related drug-related offenses. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence claiming that the affidavit violated Henson v. Commonwealth because it did not state when Cody had observed his father’s illegal activity. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. Both courts declined to apply the bright-line rule of Henson and instead found that the affidavit was sufficient to support issuance of a warrant under the totality of the circumstances test. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the validity of a search warrant affidavit and resulting warrant is determined under the totality of the circumstances and is not controlled by Henson’s bright-line rule; and (2) the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress because the search warrant was adequately supported by probable cause. View "Abney v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with multiple drug-related criminal offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all the evidence collected from his trailer, arguing that law enforcement officers unlawfully exceeded the scope of a warrantless knock and talk by entering the protected curtilage of his residence. The trial court denied the suppression motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to complicity to manufacture methamphetamine, complicity to possess marijuana, and complicity to possess drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the officers did not have the right to venture away from the front of Defendant’s house pursuant to a knock and talk and to invade the curtilage of Defendant’s residence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the factors set forth in United States v. Dunn, as well as the officers’ uncontroverted testimony, neither officer unlawfully encroached on the trailer’s curtilage. View "Commonwealth v. Dixon" on Justia Law