Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of first-degree rape and one count of first-degree sexual abuse for an incident involving his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) insufficient evidence supported Appellant’s conviction for first-degree rape because the Commonwealth did not prove the “forcible compulsion” element; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting Appellant’s computer password into evidence; and (3) the trial court committed reversible error when it did not allow Appellant to ask the victim about her prior inconsistent statement, and thus, Appellant’s conviction for first-degree sexual abuse must also be reversed. Remanded. View "Yates v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2000, Appellant pled guilty to one count of theft by deception and was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment, probated for a period of five years. After Appellant failed to report to her probation officer, the trial court issued a warrant for her arrest. In 2011, Appellant was finally served with the arrest warrant. After a probation revocation hearing, the trial court dismissed the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke Appellant’s probation, determining that Appellant’s period of probation had already expired. The court of appeals reversed, concluded that because Appellant “intentionally absconded,” she was barred from claiming that her probationary period had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the issuance of a warrant for a probation violation will toll the period of probation preventing the probationer from being automatically discharged pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 533.020(4); (2) the warrant, however, must be issued before the expiration of the period of probation; and (3) since the circuit court issued a warrant for Appellant’s arrest within the five-year probationary period, it retained jurisdiction to conduct a probation revocation hearing. View "Whitcomb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of robbery in the first degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree for robbing a cashier clerk at a convenience store at knifepoint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by allowing three witnesses to identify Appellant as the perpetrator on the store surveillance video and in still shot photos; (2) did not err or violate Appellant’s due process rights by denying Appellant’s motion for a continuance of trial; and (3) did not err by denying Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. View "Morgan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree manslaughter, tampering with physical evidence, alcohol intoxication, and criminal trespass. For his crimes, Appellant received a twenty-five-year prison sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and corresponding sentence, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress statements he made during his interrogation at police headquarters; (2) failing to suppress the evidence of subsequent statements made during Appellant’s hospitalization; (3) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence of hair comparisons; and (4) finding Appellant in criminal contempt of court. View "Meskimen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee was the target of a drug investigation conducted by investigators from the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) and Operation UNITE, a task force receiving federal funds that investigates drug-related crimes. No local law enforcement officer or entity participated in the investigation. Two indictments were returned by a Powell County grand jury charging Appellee with several drug-related offenses. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictments against him, holding that neither the OAG officers nor the Operation UNITE detectives had jurisdiction to conduct the investigation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the OAG was not vested with statewide jurisdiction to investigate drug crimes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 218A.240(1) specifically vests the OAG with the authority to enforce and investigate drug crimes throughout the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant entered an Alford plea to eleven counts of first-degree robbery and was sentenced to twenty-one years imprisonment. In 2008, Appellant filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, alleging that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance by misinforming him that he would be eligible for parole when he had served twenty percent of his sentence. The trial court denied the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on the specific allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel pertaining to his parole eligibility. The court of appeals concluded that Appellant failed to preserve his right to appeal the summary denial of his Rule 11.42 motion because he did not request additional findings pursuant to Rule 11.42(6). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant did not waive his right to appeal the trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 11.42 motion. View "Cawl v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine and second-degree persistent felony offender status. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the drug-related evidence seized by a state police officer and a parole officer during a warrantless search of his residence while he was a parolee. Specifically, Appellant argued that the warrantless search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the parole officers did not have reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress, holding that because the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee, Appellant had no basis for application of the exclusionary rule. View "Bratcher v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Appellant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized upon his arrest. The circuit court and court of appeals both affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress, holding that police officers’ search and ultimate seizure of a gun and controlled substances found on Appellant’s person was supported by sufficient cause and thus was a valid search incident to arrest. View "Vega v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine, first-degree possession of a controlled substance, and promoting contraband. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred by not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea, holding (1) the trial court’s decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles; and (2) the trial court’s decision to release the Commonwealth from its recommended conditional penalty and to allow the prosecution to recommend the maximum sentence instead did not amount to a rejection of the plea agreement. View "Prater v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of robbery, burglary, unlawful imprisonment, receiving stolen property, and being a persistent felony offender (PFO). Appellant was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the trial court erred when it misinformed Appellant that he could not proceed to trial with a hybrid form of representation and therefore denied Appellant his right to represent himself for one pretrial motion while still retaining the services of counsel for the remainder of the proceedings; and (2) because the trial judge misstated the law, reversal and a new trial were necessary. View "Mitchell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law