Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree fleeing or evading the police, illegal possession of a controlled substance, and second-degree criminal mischief. The jury also found Appellant guilty of being a persistent felony offender (“PFO”) in the first-degree. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an enhanced sentence of twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.40, the rule prescribing the number of peremptory challenges in a criminal case, is valid, and the trial court properly relied on that rule in this case; and (2) the Commonwealth improperly characterized Appellant’s PFO status, but the mischaracterization was not palpable error. View "Glenn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to several crimes, including capital murder. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to death for his six capital crimes and to life imprisonment for rape, kidnapping, and arson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court properly accepted Appellant’s guilty plea; (2) playing Appellant’s videotaped guilty plea colloquy for the jury did not constitute reversible error; (3) the trial court properly denied Appellant’s guilty but mentally ill plea; (4) the jury was properly selected; (5) the trial judge did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to exclude certain photographs; (6) the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officers and properly permitted the jury to watch his videotaped statement; (7) the jury instructions did not deny Appellant due process or reliable sentencing; and (8) Appellant’s sentences were constitutional, and his death sentences were not arbitrary and disproportionate. View "Dunlap v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, fleeing or evading police, and being a persistent felony offender. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. Appellee subsequently filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 motion seeking relief from the judgment by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Appellee was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged errors. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing, concluding that Appellee’s allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were not clearly refuted by the record. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s order, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Appellee’s Rule 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing because a hearing was not necessary to determine that Appellee was not prejudiced by any errors of trial counsel regardless of whether those errors amounted to unprofessional performance. View "Commonwealth v. Searight" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Appellee for one count of murder. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that he was legally justified to act in self-defense and therefore immune from prosecution pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085. The trial court denied Appellee’s motion to dismiss. Appellee subsequently filed a notice of appeal. The court of appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory appeal, holding that an order denying immunity from prosecution is immediately appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals was not authorized by statute or by the Constitution to consider an appeal from an interlocutory order denying immunity pursuant to section 503.085; and (2) furthermore, the collateral order exception to the finality doctrine did not apply in this circumstance. View "Commonwealth v. Farmer" on Justia Law

Appellee, an experienced criminal attorney, was indicted on five counts of failure to file Kentucky tax returns for the tax years 2002 through 2006. Appellee proceeded pro se until a day before the jury trial was scheduled to begin, at which point Appellees requested a continuance for the purpose of possibly retaining private counsel. The trial court overruled the motion for a continuance. At no stage during the proceedings did the court conduct a Faretta hearing. Appellee was subsequently found guilty of five counts of failing to file a state tax return. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court, holding that criminal defendants who are experienced criminal trial attorneys are not entitled to a Faretta hearing or inquiry prior to representing themselves. View "Commonwealth v. Ayers" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of intentional murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it (1) denied her motion to suppress statements she gave to police after a polygraph examination because she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her Miranda rights, and (2) failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of first-degree manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting Appellant's statements given to the police because, under the totality of the circumstances, nothing showed that Appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her rights as to her post-polygraph interview with police; and (2) Appellant's argument that the trial court failed to give an instruction on first-degree manslaughter was not properly preserved and not subject to palpable-error review. View "Wise v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sodomy and first-degree burglary, enhanced by the status offense of persistent felony offender (PFO) in the second degree, and was sentenced to thirty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree burglary charge; (2) properly applied Ky. R. Evid. 412, the rape shield rule, to prohibit admission of evidence of the victim's sexual history; and (3) did not err in allowing the Commonwealth to proceed to trial on the PFO charge. View "Minter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree assault and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed one of Appellant's convictions for first-degree assault, reversed the other conviction, and remanded, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to strike three prospective jurors for cause, failing to provide limiting instructions, or allowing a fact witness to present an expert opinion; (2) the Commonwealth's question to Appellant was to whether it was lawful for him to possess a firearm was not reversible error; but (3) the Commonwealth's proof did not support a conviction for one of the first-degree assault convictions. View "McDaniel v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, among other charges. The Supreme Court affirmed except as to Defendant's conviction for wanton endangerment, which the Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not violate Defendant's due process right to a fair trial by failing to remove two jurors for cause; (2) the trial court did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation by introducing a hospital laboratory report without the testimony of the person who prepared the report; but (3) the prosecution of the wanton endangerment charge violated Defendant's double jeopardy rights, and the wanton endangerment instruction violated Defendant's right to a unanimous verdict. Remanded. View "Little v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee entered guilty pleas to three charges of theft by unlawful taking over $300. The final judgment provided that Appellee be placed on supervised probation for five years and pay restitution. After the expiration of Appellee's probationary period, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Appellee's probation based upon his failure to pay restitution. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that, pursuant to Conrad v. Evridge, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to revoke Appellee's probation. In so holding, the circuit court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that Ky. Rev. Stat. 533.020(4) operated to automatically extend Appellee's probationary period so long as he failed to complete payment of the restitution as ordered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 533.020(4) authorizes a trial court to extend the duration of a sentence of probation only if such an extension is necessary for payment of restitution; and (2) upon expiration of Appellee's probationary period, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case and was without authority to revoke Appellee's probation. View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law