Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary. Defendant was placed on probation, which was later revoked due to Defendant's noncompliance with the terms of the county's drug court program. Defendant appealed both his burglary conviction and his probation revocation. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta v. California hearing to inquire into Defendant's desire to serve as his own attorney. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant did not unequivocally request to dispense with counsel and to proceed pro se, the trial court was under no obligation to engage Defendant in a Faretta colloquy. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Martin" on Justia Law

In 1992, Defendant pled guilty to illegal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. In 2010, Defendant filed a motion to void her felony conviction, which the circuit court granted. Thereafter, Defendant moved to expunge the newly voided felony conviction. The Commonwealth opposed the motion, asserting that neither Ky. Rev. Stat. 431.076 nor Ky. Rev. Stat. 431.078 provide for expungement of a voided conviction. The trial court expunged Defendant's record pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02(f), which permits a court to relieve a party from its final judgment for any reason of an extraordinary nature that justifies such relief. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds, concluding that Defendant's voided conviction amounted to the underlying charge being dismissed with prejudice, thereby qualifying for expungement under section 431.076. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court lacked authority under section 431.076 to expunge Defendant's newly voided conviction, as voiding Defendant's conviction was not the same as her charges being dismissed with prejudice; and (2) the use of the catch-all provision found in Rule 60.02(f) was error. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to four counts of complicity to rape (victim under twelve years of age) and one count each of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree sexual abuse pursuant to a conditional guilty plea. Appellant subsequently appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to a social worker on the grounds that Appellant was not provided with Miranda warnings. The trial court determined that, under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant was not entitled to Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Appellant was not subjected to custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda, and therefore, the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion to suppress. View "Buster v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree, burglary in the third degree, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of second-degree burglary, as Defendant did not request a lesser included offense of criminal trespass; and (2) Defendant's argument that the trial court improperly imposed court costs in its oral ruling at sentencing failed because the written order did not impose court costs. View "Brock v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia (PDP), second offense, pursuant to a plea agreement and received a five-year pretrial diversion. At the time Appellant entered into the diversion, the penalty for second offense PDP, a felony, was one to five years in prison. The statute was amended in April 2010, however, making the penalty for a second or subsequent offense of PDP, now a misdemeanor, ninety days to twelve months in jail. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to DUI. At her sentencing hearing, Appellant requested that the trial court continue her diversion, given that second offense PDP was now a misdemeanor, or apply the new sentence for second offense POP. The trial court voided the diversion agreement and sentenced Appellant to felony time in accordance with the prior law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, (1) when Appellant violated the terms of her diversion agreement, the court was vested with the authority to void the contract in its entirety; but (2) because there was no final judgment entered when Appellant violated the terms of her diversion, any law that had gone into effect that would mitigate Appellant's sentence should have been applied. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the post-trial revelation that the victim's wife and one of the jurors were Facebook friends did not establish grounds for a new trial, as the juror did not manifestly give a false answer regarding her Facebook relationship with the victim's wife, and merely being friends on Facebook does not, per se, establish a close relationship from which partiality on the part of a juror may reasonably be presumed; (2) Appellant's argument that the jury improperly considered penalty phase issues during the guilt phase deliberations was without merit; and (3) the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence did not afford Appellant grounds upon which his conviction should be reversed. View "McGaha v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft of identity, theft by deception under $500, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Defendant appealed, contending that after he was taken into custody, he was not properly advised of his Miranda rights, and therefore, the trial court erred in admitting the statement he made to police. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) statements made in response to assurances of confidentiality are made in violation of Miranda and must be suppressed; (2) in this case, the officer's agreement that Appellant's statement would be confidential vitiated the previously given Miranda warnings; and (3) therefore, the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements. Remanded. View "Leger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court erroneously admitted prior bad acts evidence and hearsay evidence. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony of an anonymous tip that Defendant was trafficking pills because the anonymous tip evidence was inadmissible hearsay; and (2) given the extent to which the prosecutor focused on the anonymous tip in his closing argument, the erroneously admitted anonymous-tip evidence was not harmless. View "Kerr v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee brought his vehicle to Appellant's shop for repairs. When Appellant presented Appellee with his bill, Appellee refused to pay until Appellant proved he purchased the parts he claimed to have installed. Appellant retained Appellee's vehicle while he attempted to resolve the dispute. Appellee subsequently filed a criminal complaint against Appellant, and Appellant was arrested for failure to make required disposition of property. Appellee regained possession of his vehicle, and the charges against Appellant were dismissed. Appellant then filed a mechanic's lien and brought suit against Appellee to enforce the lien. The complaint also claimed damages for, inter alia, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The trial court directed a verdict in Appellee's favor on most of Appellant's claims but concluded that Appellant asserted a valid mechanic's lien and awarded Appellant $8,000. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's orders directing verdicts on the abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in directing a verdict of dismissal on the malicious prosecution claim based on the advice of counsel defense; and (2) Appellant submitted sufficient evidence to survive a motion for a directed verdict on the abuse of process claim. View "Garcia v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to murder, resisting arrest, and tampering with physical evidence and was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. At trial, Appellant moved to suppress his confession to law enforcement officers, arguing that his Miranda waiver was involuntary, his right to counsel was invoked but denied, and his confession was coerced. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and sentence of the circuit, holding that under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's confession was involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the product of coercive police activity. View "Dye v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law