Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Without a search warrant, police walked onto Appellee's property and into an area near his home late at night to search trash in closed trash containers that had not been put out on the street for trash collection. The containers ended up containing evidence of drug trafficking. The trial court denied suppression of the evidence, concluding that Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash cans or their contents. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to all the charges, reserving his right to appeal the suppression question. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Defendant had a constitutionally recognized expectation of privacy in his trash at the time of the searches that required suppression of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the police retrieved Defendant's trash from the curtilage of his home without a search warrant, the search violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and Defendant was entitled to have the evidence obtained suppressed. View "Commonwealth v. Ousley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree fleeing or evading police, fourth-degree assault, possession of marijuana, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Defendant was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment and was fined $600. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's convictions and sentences for first-degree fleeing or evading and first-degree PFO, as the trial court's jury instructions on the fleeing or evading charge were erroneous; and (2) vacated the portions of Defendant's sentences for fourth-degree assault and possession of marijuana imposing fines, as the trial court erred by imposing fines upon Appellant. View "Wright v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Joshua Peacher and Nereia Allen appealed from judgments of the circuit court following a joint trial in which both were convicted of murder, first-degree assault, and first-degree criminal abuse from their mistreatment of Allen's two-year-old nephew, Christopher, resulting in serious physical injuries and his death. The couple was also convicted of abuse for their mistreatment of Allen's other two-year-old nephew, Wyatt. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgments in both cases, holding (1) both Defendants received a fundamentally fair trial; (2) neither Defendant was entitled to relief because the trial court erred slightly in defining complicity for the jury; (3) Peacher was not entitled to relief because he was tried jointly with Allen; (4) neither Defendant was prejudiced by the jury instructions pertaining to murder and first-degree assault of Christopher; and (5) Allen was not entitled to a directed verdict or to the dismissal of any of the charges against her. View "Peacher v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of intentional murder and sentenced to death. The deaths occurred as a result of a shooting during which Appellant claimed he was acting in self-defense. Defendant appealed, raising multiple issues in support of reversal of his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed reversible error in (1) admitting testimony from a policy detective that Appellant's behavior after the shooting was inconsistent with someone who had actually acted in self-defense, thereby implying that from his experienced observations Appellant had fabricated his self-defense claim; (2) admitting evidence of Appellant's post-arrest invocation of his right to remain silent; (3) failing to strike for cause a potential juror who was the sibling of the victim's advocate directly connected to the case; and (4) excluding evidence of the victims' statements immediately before the shooting. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ordway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of numerous counts of incest, rape, and sodomy for his sexual relationships with his two minor stepdaughters, M.P. and C.P. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, remanded to the trial court for resentencing on Appellant's incest convictions as to victim M.P., and vacated all imposed court costs and the partial public-defender fee, holding (1) ex post facto principles, which impact due process, required resentencing for Appellant's incest convictions as to victim M.P.; and (2) the trial court erred in levying court costs and partial public-defender fees on Defendant because he was indigent, and the court erred in ordering a review of court costs and public defender fees upon his release from prison. View "Miller v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of a misdemeanor and probated for the two-year statutory maximum on the condition that he attend counseling recommended by the Office of Probation and Parole. The Office recommended that Appellant enroll in the state's three-year sex offender treatment program. At a hearing, the trial court ordered briefing on the question of whether probation could be extended beyond the two-year limit for misdemeanors. The court then extended Defendant's probation until he completed the sex offender treatment program. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding (1) Defendant could not be required to complete a program that extended beyond his period of probation; (2) because Defendant completed his probation, he was discharged from it as a matter of law; and (3) to the extent the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether Defendant's probation should be revoked, its judgment was reversed. View "Miller v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-five years imprisonment and imposed a $200 public defender fee and $180 in court costs. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the judgment imposing a public defender fee and court costs, holding that the trial court did not err in assessing the costs and fee against Defendant, but it erred in ordering review of Defendant's ability to pay upon release, as the decision to impose costs and fees based on a defendant's ability to pay must be made by the trial court upon sentencing; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Goncalves v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree robbery. Defendant was a minor at the time he committed the felonies, and because the offenses involved a firearm, Defendant was automatically transferred to the circuit court as a youthful offender to be tried as an adult. The trial court determined Defendant should be granted probation on his ten-year sentence. The trial court subsequently revoked Defendant's probation and sentenced him to the Department of Corrections (DOC) to serve his sentence. The DOC classified Defendant as a violent offender, a status that restricted Defendant's parole eligibility. Defendant filed a declaration of rights action, arguing that the DOC erred in classifying him as a violent offender because he was a youthful offender. The circuit court agreed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Violent Offender Statute applied to youthful offenders for purposes of parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parole-eligibility limitations of the Violent Offender Statute apply to youthful offenders; and (2) therefore, the DOC correctly classified Defendant as a violent offender subject to that statute's parole-eligibility restrictions. View "Edwards v. Harrod" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The victim of Appellant's alleged crimes was his step-granddaughter. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing testimony from the victim's mother and father regarding changes in the child's behavior, which the mother implied were symptomatic of child sexual abuse based upon discussions she had with a clinical psychologist. Appellant alleged that this testimony amounted to inadmissible evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was not admissible for the purpose of proving that the victim was sexually abused, but Appellant was not entitled to a reversal of his convictions because (1) the trial court sustained Appellant's objection to the specific testimony at issue and granted all of the relief he requested concerning the evidence; and (2) Appellant withdrew his motion for a mistrial with regard to the mother's testimony and failed to move for a mistrial as a result of the father's testimony, and therefore, Appellant's argument that he should have received a mistrial as a consequence of the evidence was not properly preserved. View "Blount v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder for the murders of his four children and the attempted murder of his wife. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. At the trial, Appellant presented an insanity defense supported by expert testimony, and the Commonwealth provided an expert rebuttal witness. Appellant appealed, claiming that once he presented evidence that he was insane, the burden of disproving his insanity defense shifted to the Commonwealth, and because the Commonwealth did not meet this burden, the trial court erred in convicting him. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding that Appellant's introduction of evidence of mental illness sufficient to raise the issue of insanity as a defense did not require the Commonwealth to then disprove mental illness, and therefore, the burden of proving insanity rested on Appellant. View "Biyad v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law