Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree robbery. Defendant was a minor at the time he committed the felonies, and because the offenses involved a firearm, Defendant was automatically transferred to the circuit court as a youthful offender to be tried as an adult. The trial court determined Defendant should be granted probation on his ten-year sentence. The trial court subsequently revoked Defendant's probation and sentenced him to the Department of Corrections (DOC) to serve his sentence. The DOC classified Defendant as a violent offender, a status that restricted Defendant's parole eligibility. Defendant filed a declaration of rights action, arguing that the DOC erred in classifying him as a violent offender because he was a youthful offender. The circuit court agreed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Violent Offender Statute applied to youthful offenders for purposes of parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parole-eligibility limitations of the Violent Offender Statute apply to youthful offenders; and (2) therefore, the DOC correctly classified Defendant as a violent offender subject to that statute's parole-eligibility restrictions. View "Edwards v. Harrod" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The victim of Appellant's alleged crimes was his step-granddaughter. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing testimony from the victim's mother and father regarding changes in the child's behavior, which the mother implied were symptomatic of child sexual abuse based upon discussions she had with a clinical psychologist. Appellant alleged that this testimony amounted to inadmissible evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was not admissible for the purpose of proving that the victim was sexually abused, but Appellant was not entitled to a reversal of his convictions because (1) the trial court sustained Appellant's objection to the specific testimony at issue and granted all of the relief he requested concerning the evidence; and (2) Appellant withdrew his motion for a mistrial with regard to the mother's testimony and failed to move for a mistrial as a result of the father's testimony, and therefore, Appellant's argument that he should have received a mistrial as a consequence of the evidence was not properly preserved. View "Blount v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder for the murders of his four children and the attempted murder of his wife. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. At the trial, Appellant presented an insanity defense supported by expert testimony, and the Commonwealth provided an expert rebuttal witness. Appellant appealed, claiming that once he presented evidence that he was insane, the burden of disproving his insanity defense shifted to the Commonwealth, and because the Commonwealth did not meet this burden, the trial court erred in convicting him. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding that Appellant's introduction of evidence of mental illness sufficient to raise the issue of insanity as a defense did not require the Commonwealth to then disprove mental illness, and therefore, the burden of proving insanity rested on Appellant. View "Biyad v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case arose after a person house sitting the home of her friends found an intruder in the house. Later it was discovered that twenty pieces of jewelry were missing from the master bedroom. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted guilty of second-degree burglary and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no palpable error in the pre-trial procedure that resulted in the identification of Defendant as the perpetrator or in the in-court identification made at trial; and (2) based upon the testimony that the jury actually heard in this case, the trial court did not err in admitting testimony regarding fingerprints pulled off evidence and regarding the thoroughness of the investigation. View "Barnes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant and her boyfriend, Roy Rankin, were prosecuted for the death of a six-month-old. The trial court instructed the jury on one count of first-degree criminal abuse as to Defendant, but the instructions covered two different theories of how Defendant allegedly committed the crime. The first instruction allowed the jury to find Defendant guilty if she intentionally abused Cecilia. The second instruction allowed the jury to find Defendant guilty if she had intentionally permitted Rankin to abuse Cecilia. The jury found Defendant guilty under the first instruction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the Commonwealth's proof was sufficient under at least one theory of first-degree criminal abuse, Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of criminal abuse; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to direct abuse by Defendant, and the resulting jury verdict under that instruction was erroneous; and (3) Defendant may nevertheless be retried under the alternative theory of permitting the abuse because the jury never reached that question, and Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. View "Acosta v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, an adult citizen, filed a petition for a declaration of rights seeking a declaration that the statutory and regulatory provisions associated with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and its sub-unit the Department of Community Based Services' (DCBS) process for investigating allegations of child abuse were unconstitutional. Appellant also challenged the constitutionality of the Cabinet's administrative process. The underlying administrative action was held in abeyance pending the conclusion of the present proceeding. The circuit court denied the petition, finding the challenged processes to be constitutional, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding that the declaratory action was not ripe for review, as the administrative proceedings being held in abeyance were not available to contextualize the operations of the statutory and regulatory process as it functions in day-to-day practice. Remanded with directions that the court hold this action in abeyance until the conclusion of the underlying administrative proceedings. View "W.B. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out. The Supreme Court affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety, and affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding that the trial court (1) correctly admitted into evidence the guns used in the crime; (2) properly failed to dismiss the indictment because of the destruction of other guns found in the victim's house; (3) did not err in failing to hold a hearing on Swan's right to proceed pro se or with hybrid counsel; (4) properly allowed a witness to testify in the penalty phase after having been present in the courtroom during guilt-phase testimony; (5) did not commit reversible error by evaluating the competency of a child witness in a short fashion and in the presence of the jury; (6) erred in failing to give an instruction on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense; and (7) erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment relating to Latonia Lumpkins. Accordingly, Owens's convictions for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment of Lumpkins were reversed. Remanded. View "Swan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of wanton murder and initially sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing phase. At Appellant's second sentencing phase trial, Appellant was represented by a public advocacy attorney that had represented Chris Eapmon, who had been jointly indicted with Appellant during his negotiations for a plea deal. Eapmon eventually pled guilty in exchange for his testimony against Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's twenty-eight year prison sentence, holding (1) Appellant did not suffer any identifiable prejudice arising out of counsel's representation; (2) the successive representation here did not violate Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.30; and (3) Appellant's confrontation rights were not violated at his second sentencing phase due to the use of videotaped testimony from the guilt phase of his trial. View "Steward v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. After Defendant's conviction was affirmed, Defendant filed a pro se motion seeking relief from the circuit court's judgment. The matter was allowed to lie dormant for four years until counsel filed an amendment to Defendant's original motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that counsel's amendment was untimely and that on the merits the claims in Defendant's original motion were refuted by the record. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, although its reasoning differed from the lower court's, holding that to the extent the amended motion sought to raise a new, factually independent claim, it was subject to dismissal as untimely, and Defendant's timely claims were facially without merit. View "Roach v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, a licensed attorney, was found in criminal contempt by the circuit court for failing to appear at a client's arraignment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant argued on review (1) he was under no duty to appear at the arraignment because he had withdrawn from representing the client, and (2) even if he had a to duty to appear there were insufficient grounds upon which to find him in criminal contempt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant had a duty to appear at his client's arraignment; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant's failure to appear at the arraignment to be criminally contemptuous. View "Poindexter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law