Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years in prison. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred when it allowed into evidence the fact that Appellant owned two guns with the same model number as the weapon used in the murder crime, though neither weapon was used to commit the crime, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay testimony regarding the victim's request to borrow money from his wife, but the error was harmless in the context of this case; and (3) the trial court properly refused to allow Appellant to inform the jury he had already been tried twice for these charges and the prior two juries deadlocked. View "Harris v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee was charged with assault in the fourth degree. Before Appellee was arrested but after an arrest warrant was issued, Appellee's attorney made an ex parte request to a different district court judge from the one who issued the arrest warrant, seeking to set the warrant aside and issue a summons. The warrant was withdrawn and a summons issued instead. The Commonwealth's request for the reinstatement of the arrest warrant was denied. Appellee later pled guilty to the charge. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the Commonwealth to answer a question of law and answered that Kentucky law does not authorize an ex parte motion by a criminal defendant to vacate or set aside a warrant for his or her arrest with no notice or opportunity for the Commonwealth to be heard. View "Commonwealth v. Minton" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for being a persistent felony offender (PFO) 2. The PFO 2 count was based on an earlier conviction for which Defendant was granted diversion. Defendant was still on diversion when the grand jury indicted him for the later offenses. Upon Defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the PFO 2 count because Defendant had not been finally sentenced on the previously diverted felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a conviction for which a defendant is currently on diversion cannot be used to indict that defendant as a PFO 2 when he commits a subsequent felony offense; and (2) the sentence on the prior felony must be imposed at the time the defendant commits the subsequent crime in order for the conviction to support a PFO 2 charge. View "Commonwealth v. Derringer" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of attempted murder and one count of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). For these crimes, Appellant received a fifty-year prison sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony identifying Appellant as a former inmate to be presented to the jury; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence that he threatened a prison guard during apprehension to be presented to the jury; (3) the Commonwealth impermissibly exceeded the scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.055 when it told the jury about Appellant's prior convictions, and accordingly, the Court vacated Appellant's sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase; and (4) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the PFO charge. View "Webb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him of attempted murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree wanton endangerment, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree assault, holding (1) in light of the particular facts of this case, Appellant's convictions for both attempted murder and first-degree assault for the same shooting resulted in a double jeopardy violation; and (2) none of Appellant's remaining arguments alleging prosecutorial misconduct established reversible error. Remanded for entry of a new judgment that excluded the reversed conviction. View "Kiper v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree criminal mischief, and driving under the influence. For these crimes, Appellant received a thirty-five year prison sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion when allowing the introduction of Appellant's pre-arrest silence during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting the introduction of an accident scene video; (3) the trial court properly admitted a 911 recording; (4) any potential error that arose out of the admission of Appellant's post-collision use of profanity was harmless; and (5) the trial court did not commit palpable error in permitting the introduction of Appellant's misdemeanor theft by deception conviction during the sentencing phase of her trial. View "Baumia v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree fleeing or evading police, fourth-degree assault, possession of marijuana, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment and fined Appellant $600. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's convictions and sentences for first-degree fleeing or evading and first-degree PFO, holding that the trial court's jury instruction on the fleeing or evading charge were erroneous; and (2) held that the trial court erred by imposing fines upon Appellant after previously finding him to be indigent and therefore vacated those portions of his sentences imposing fines. View "Wright v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to, among other offenses, five counts of first-degree robbery. First-degree robbery is a "violent offense" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401, and under that statute, a person convicted of a violent offense does not become eligible for parole until he has served the lesser of eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed or twenty years. Appellant moved for relief from his guilty plea, claiming he was not apprised of the parole ramifications of his sentence. The trial court summarily denied Appellant's motion, and an unanimous panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) counsel renders deficient assistance under Commonwealth v. Padilla and Strickland v. Washington when his guilty plea advice does not accurately reflect the parole consequences under the violent offender statute; but (2) the deficient performance alleged in this case did not entitle Appellant to relief because it could not have resulted in any prejudice. View "Stiger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner's second trial on charges of capital kidnapping, attempted murder, arson, and receiving stolen property ended when the trial court declared a mistrial for the Commonwealth's violation of a pretrial order. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from retrying him, arguing that a retrial would violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. Although Petitioner would not suffer irreparable injury if the retrial were to proceed, Petitioner argued that the administration of justice would suffer great and irreparable injury if the retrial took place. The Supreme Court declined to issue the writ, holding that the writ of prohibition was not an available remedy, as Petitioner offered nothing to persuade the Court that he would suffer any injury that could not be corrected on appeal. View "St. Clair v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The circuit court sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) granting a continuance was a proper exercise of judicial discretion; (2) the trial court did not err by not permitting Appellant to cross-examine the victim regarding her failure to appear on the first trial date; (3) the trial court did not err by permitting the victim to testify concerning her fear of contracting a disease from Appellant; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial; (5) Appellant was correctly found competent to stand trial; (6) no error resulted as a result of the prosecutor's comments; and (7) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing a juror for cause. View "Slone v. Commonwealth " on Justia Law