Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant subsequently filed in the trial court a pro se motion seeking relief from the court's judgment. Defendant also requested an evidentiary hearing and assistance from the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA). The trial court granted the latter request, and a DPA attorney entered his notice of appearance on Defendant's behalf. The matter was allowed to lie dormant for more than four years, when counsel finally filed his amendment to Defendant's original motion. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, finding that counsel's amendment was untimely - both outside the three-year statute of limitations and barred by laches - and that on the merits the claims in Defendant's original motion were refuted by the record. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that to the extent the amended motion sought to raise a new, factually independent claim it was subject to dismissal as untimely, and Defendant's timely claims were facially without merit. View "Roach v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him, following a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree. Defendant was found guilty of having robbed at gun point the manager of a cash advance store. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years in prison enhanced to thirty years by virtue of Defendant's status as a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to suppression of the eyewitness identifications; (2) the trial court correctly limited penalty-range voir dire to unenhanced penalties for the indicted offense; (3) errors by the prosecutors were appropriately addressed by the trial court and did not render the trial unfair; and (4) the penalty phase mistrial did not require a new trial of Defendant's guilt but only a new penalty phase. View "Jacobsen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) while the trial court erred by admitting two handguns Appellant owned, which were similar to the murder weapon but were not used to commit the crime, the error was harmless; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay testimony, specifically the victim's request to borrow money from his wife, but the error was harmless in the context of the case; and (3) the trial court did not err when it refused to allow Appellant to inform the jury he had been tried twice previously for this offense and both prior juries deadlocked. View "Harris v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault in the fourth degree. Before Defendant was arrested, Defendant's attorney made an ex parte request to a different district court judge from the one who issued the warrant, requesting to set the warrant aside and issue a summons. The warrant was withdrawn and a summons issued instead. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the county attorney to answer a question of law surrounding the practice of ex parte communications by criminal defense lawyers with judges after warrants have been issued. The Court then certified the law to state that Kentucky law does not authorize as ex parte motion by a criminal defendant to vacate or set aside a warrant for his or her arrest with no notice or opportunity for the Commonwealth to be heard. View "Commonwealth v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Appellee pled guilty to fraudulent insurance acts by complicity. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the circuit court sentenced Appellee to a five-year probated sentence and ordered restitution to Amica Mutual Insurance Company in the amount of $48,597 - the full amount distributed by Amica after Appellee's house burned down. The court of appeals vacated the order of restitution and remanded to the trial court to make specific findings of the monetary damages suffered as a result of the insurance fraud, without regard to the proceeds distributed as a result of the property damage or alternate housing and living expenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a trial court is authorized to order restitution for damages not suffered as a direct result of the criminal acts for which the defendant has been convicted when, as part of a plea agreement, the defendant freely and voluntarily agrees to the restitution condition; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Appellee to reimburse Amica for the entire $48, 597. View "Commonwealth v. Morseman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review of two probation revocation cases to consider whether the trial court may proceed to hold evidentiary hearings to revoke or modify probation when the grounds for revocation or modification are new, unresolved criminal charges against the probationer. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court is not required to delay probation revocation or modification hearings awaiting resolution of the criminal charges that arise during the probationary period; (2) when the probationer is faced with probation revocation or modification and a criminal court trial based on the same conduct that forms the basis of new criminal charges, the probationer's testimony at the probation revocation hearing is protected from use at any later criminal trial in Kentucky state courts; and (3) the probationer's testimony at the revocation hearing can be used for impeachment purposes or rebuttal evidence in the trial of the new charges. View "Barker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were tried and convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out in 2008 in which they stole money and threatened to kill the home's inhabitants, two of whom they ultimately shot and one of whom they threatened to rape and sodomize. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding that Owens's convictions for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment of one of the home's inhabitants must be reversed, as (i) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree assault, and (ii) the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment.

Appellant appealed his convictions in two separate cases. In the first case, Appellant was found guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of marijuana, feeing or evading, and being a persistent felony offender (PFO). In the second case, Appellant was convicted of escape, trafficking, and PFO. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance, vacated his sentence for that conviction, and remanded for a new trial, holding that Appellant's waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and therefore, the trial court erred by denying his request to proceed pro se; and (2) affirmed Appellant's remaining convictions and corresponding sentences.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years' imprisonment enhanced to thirty years by virtue of Defendant's status as a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) by denying Defendant's motion to suppress eyewitness identification evidence; (2) by not allowing Defendant during voir dire to inform the jury of the potential range of PFO enhanced penalties; (3) by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial when, during voir dire, the Commonwealth suggested that Defendant had concealed evidence of the crime; (4) by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial when the Commonwealth referred to scientific studies of which there was no evidence; and (5) by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, not just a new penalty phase, when during the original penalty proceedings, an improper argument by the Commonwealth necessitated a mistrial.

A jury convicted Defendant of theft by unlawful taking over $10,000 and three counts of first-degree criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence but vacated the trial court's amended judgment and remanded to the trial court to reinstate the final judgment as originally entered, holding (1) Defendant's convictions did not violate double jeopardy; (2) the trial court did not err by ordering Defendant to pay restitution that exceeded $100,000 because the $100,000 statutory cap was not applicable to the trial court's restitution order; but (3) the trial court lacked authority to amend the final judgment more than ten days after its entry.