Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services found Appellee Patrick O'Conner's children in filth, unsanitary living conditions, and misery in Appellee's home, Appellee was indicted by a grand jury for three counts of first-degree criminal abuse. Specifically, the grand jury charged that Appellee intentionally abused his three children, each of which were under the age of twelve at the time, by placing them in a situation that could have caused physical injury or which was cruel confinement or cruel punishment. Appellee was convicted as charged. The court of appeals reversed, declaring there was insufficient evidence to indicate that Appellee's criminal actions were intentional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals did not properly defer to the jury its proper fact-finding role in this case, as the jury had sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that Appellee was guilty of first-degree criminal abuse. Remanded for reinstatement of the trial order and judgment.

Following a bench trial, Appellant Raymond Clutter was convicted of murder and tampering with physical evidence and was found to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Clutter appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it permitted a witness to testify about information provided by Clutter's then-attorney in pre-trial discussions with a law enforcement agent for the Commonwealth, arguing that the information constituted statements made during plea discussions and thus was inadmissible under Ky. R. Evid. 410(4). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, as Rule 410(4) did not apply to bar the admission of the testimony.

Appellant Patricia Buster entered a conditional guilty plea to four counts of complicity to first-degree rape. Appellant's conditional guilty plea preserved her right to appeal the adverse ruling of the trial court on her motion to suppress her written confession given to police officers. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress and vacated her conviction, holding that Appellant did not voluntarily waive her Miranda rights, as the police officers did not respect Appellant's invocation of her rights under the analysis set forth in Michigan v. Mosley. Remanded so that Appellant could withdraw her guilty plea.

A circuit court jury found Appellant Derryl Blane guilty of several drug-related offenses and of being a first-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO). The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more, holding that the trial court erred when, after granting Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school, it permitted the Commonwealth to amend the indictment to trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more; (2) reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree PFO as to Count I of the indictment, as the facts necessary to convict Appellant of being a first-degree PFO as to Count I were incapable of being proved; (3) affirmed Appellant's remaining convictions; and (4) remanded for a new penalty phase, as the penalty phase introduction of the original dismissed charges from Appellant's prior convictions was erroneous.

Appellant Robert Smith was convicted of first-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to thirty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Smith's conviction and sentence, holding that the first-degree robbery instruction violated the unanimous verdict requirement by including a theory not supported by the evidence, but because there was no possibility that any juror voted to convict Smith under the unsupported theory the error was harmless; and (2) vacated a surplus provision included in the judgment that stated, "Defendant's court costs and fines are credit time served," as the statement had no readily determinable meaning and served no purpose. Remanded for entry of a new judgment excluding the provision.

A jury found Appellant Johnny Smith guilty of first-degree robbery and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Appellant received a thirty-year prison sentence, was assessed court costs and fines, and was ordered to pay restitution. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions and the PFO determination, holding that Appellant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated and that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict; (2) affirmed the trial court's restitution order; and (3) reversed the trial court's order requiring Appellant to pay court costs and fines. Remanded for a determination of whether Appellant was a "poor person" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 453.190(2), and whether he would be unable to pay court costs now or in the foreseeable future.

Desean Maynes pled guilty to third-degree burglary pursuant to a plea agreement. The trial court approved the agreement subject to the condition that Maynes pay the statutory costs of $130 to the circuit court clerk. Maynes objected to the imposition of costs, arguing that having found him an indigent defendant in need of a public defender, the court was required to waive costs. The trial court rejected those arguments, and the court of appeals affirmed. After considering the applicable statutes, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court was authorized under Kentucky law to impose court costs, as (1) the appointment of counsel to a criminal defendant does not preclude an order requiring the defendant to pay court costs according to his ability to do so; (2) upon a defendant's conviction, Ky. Rev. Stat. 23A.205 requires imposition of court costs unless the defendant qualifies as a "poor person"; and (3) because Maynes entered a plea agreement whereby he was to be released from custody, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Maynes pay the statutorily mandated court costs pursuant to section 23A.205.

Appellant Billy Mash was convicted in the circuit court of one count of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant's motion to set aside the jury panel and set a new trial, as Appellant did not establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section of the community requirement; (2) allowing the Commonwealth to use a peremptory strike against the one African-American juror on the panel, as the trial court conducted the proper analysis under Batson v. Kentucky; (3) denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict, as there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (4) denying Appellant's request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the first degree, as there was no evidentiary foundation for an instruction on sexual abuse.

Appellant Michael Knox entered pleas of guilty to eight counts of second-degree robbery. The plea agreement provided that, until the sentencing hearing, Knox would be released on home incarceration subject to the conditions of a hammer clause. Based on alleged violations of the hammer clause, the trial judge sentenced Knox to a total term of imprisonment of twenty years rather than the ten years agreed to by the Commonwealth. Knox appealed, arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion by committing to the imposition of a sentence based solely on the hammer clause and not upon other relevant information. The Supreme Court reversed Knox's sentence, holding (1) a judge's commitment to impose a sentence based upon a defendant's breach of a hammer clause condition, coupled with the imposition of that sentence without proper consideration of the other relevant factors, is an abuse of judicial discretion; and (2) the trial judge in this case abused his discretion by imposing a sentence prescribed in the hammer clause without considering any alternative sentence or any other relevant facts and circumstances.

Appellant James Jackson was charged with felony drug trafficking and several misdemeanors, including possession of a handgun by a minor, in the juvenile court. The district court certified him as a youthful offender and transferred him to the circuit court where he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced as an adult. Jackson appealed, seeking to collaterally attack his conviction on the grounds that the transfer was improper and, as a result, the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction over him or his case. The Supreme Court concluded that the transfer was proper and the circuit court had jurisdiction, as the district court's transfer order was legally sufficient on its face and no other jurisdictional defects appeared on the record.