Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the trial court's order ordering Appellant to complete the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) but reversing the trial court's determination that Appellant was not subject to post-incarceration supervision, holding that the trial court did not err in issuing its final judgment.Appellant entered an Alford plea to two counts of criminal attempt to commit first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor and one count of third-degree terroristic threatening. The trial court imposed a ten-year prison sentence, ordered Appellant to complete the SOTP, but determined that Appellant was not subject to post-incarceration supervision. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that Appellant was not subject to post-incarceration supervision. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Appellant was eligible for post-incarceration supervision. View "Richardson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction and sentence and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a proposed witness, Alvin Couch, was available for trial.Defendant was convicted of several drug-related offenses and sentenced him to a total of ten years' imprisonment. During trial, Defendant sought to introduce a certified video record of Couch's plea of guilty to manufacturing the drugs at issue. During trial, Defendant represented that he had subpoenaed Couch to testify at trial, but the trial court found no order existed compelling Couch's attendance at trial, and therefore, Couch did not qualify as an unavailable witness under Ky. R. Evid. 804(a)(5). The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that defense counsel's representation that a subpoena had been delivered was sufficient to demonstrate a good faith effort had been made to procure Couch's presence at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Couch was available for trial. View "Commonwealth v. Roark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of thirteen counts of robbery in the first degree, one count of assault in the first degree, and one count of burglary in the first degree, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant asserted that the trial court erred by failing to provide him with conflict-free counsel and by admitting into evidence certain statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no conflict of counsel under the facts of this case because the matters were not substantially related and because the Commonwealth nullified any risk of conflict; and (2) any error in the trial court's failure to suppress was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder but vacated the jail fees imposed against him, holding that the trial court failed to present evidence that a jail fee reimbursement policy had been adopted by the county jailer with the approval of the county's governing body in accordance with Ky. Rev. Stat. 441.265(2)(a).Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to exclude eight gruesome photographs under the Ky R. Evid. 403 balancing test; (2) the jury instructions did not violate Defendant's right to a unanimous verdict; (3) Defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated when a detective was permitted to testify about blood alcohol test results from Defendant's certified medical records; but (4) the trial court erred by imposing jail fees against Defendant. View "Capstraw v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree manslaughter and to being a persistent felony offender in the first degree, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to exclude a deceased eyewitness's preliminary hearing testimony.At issue on appeal was whether the testimony of a witness taken at a preliminary hearing could be used at Defendant's trial where the witness became unavailable due to her death. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to exclude the preliminary hearing testimony, concluding that, under the circumstances, Defendant was not denied a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness and that the testimony had the hallmarks of reliability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to exclude the preliminary hearing testimony from trial. View "Shields v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of wanton murder, two counts of assault in the first degree and other offenses, holding that the circuit court did not err in its evidentiary rulings.After leading law enforcement officers and three law enforcement agencies on a two-county chase Defendant crashed his truck into a vehicle occupied by four teenagers. The driver and front-seat passenger died, and the other two passengers suffered significant injuries. On appeal, Defendant argued that the officers involved in the chase violated their respective agencies' policies and procedures regarding high-speed pursuits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion by excluding police pursuit policies and procedures from evidence; and (2) did not commit reversible error by allowing a deputy to be cross-examined about the reprimands in his personnel file. View "Welsh v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of three counts of first-degree, second-offense, trafficking in a controlled substance and sentencing him to thirty-two years in prison, holding that the trial court did not reversibly err.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it inadvertently read the "second offense" portion of his indictment to the venire as jury selection began and when it admitted into evidence photos of Defendant taken at jail after his arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's request for a mistrial and in allowing post-arrest photos of Defendant to be admitted into evidence. View "Lewis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree sodomy and his sentence of twenty years in prison, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to strike two jurors for cause during voir dire and argued that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the Commonwealth to make an allegedly improper assertion about him during closing arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to strike the two jurors was not an abuse of discretion; and (2) the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were not reversible error. View "Robinson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of cocaine discovered after a dog sniff of the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, holding that the stop was extended, and that extension was not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion.Defendant was charged with first-degree possession of cocaine. He pled not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that he was illegally detained and that the police did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to call the dog. The trial court determined that it was a valid stop and that the evidence should not be suppressed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the traffic stop was extended; (2) the Commonwealth failed to establish simultaneous missions that permitted the seizure; and (3) the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of establishing reasonable, articulable suspicion. View "Commonwealth v. Clayborne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's motion for relief from his conviction, holding that the circuit court did not err.After a second trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of complicity to murder, first-degree robbery and first-degree burglary. Defendant later brought a Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42, RCr 10.02, Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 60.02 and CR 60.03 motion for relief, arguing that the United States Supreme Court's decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1500, governed his claim that his trial counsel conceded guilt against his expressed desire to maintain actual innocence of the charged crimes. The circuit court denied the motion on the grounds that it was both substantively and procedurally improper. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly ruled that Epperson v. Commonwealth, No. 2017-SC-000044-MR, 2018 WL 3920226 (Ky. Aug. 16, 2018), was controlling law of the case; and (2) the circuit court correctly ruled that the motion was an impermissible successive collateral attack. View "Epperson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law