Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Meiko Prevo was arrested in April 2000 in East Baton Rouge Parish for felony crime against nature. Plaintiff ultimately pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of criminal mischief, a misdemeanor. She was sentenced to ninety days in jail, suspended, and placed on probation for a period of one year, which she successfully completed. Plaintiff was not required to register as a sex offender based on her conviction for misdemeanor criminal mischief. In September 2008, plaintiff was again arrested and charged with distribution of cocaine. She pleaded guilty, received a hard labor suspended sentence, and was placed probation for a period of five years with the State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety Division of Probation and Parole. Thereafter, plaintiff reported to her probation officer, David Phillips. Officer Phillips reviewed plaintiff’s criminal history which identified her as a sex offender based on a disposition for crime against nature in April 2000. He also relied on an East Baton Rouge Parish “conviction notification” which showed she was convicted of crime against nature. Based on this information, Officer Phillips advised plaintiff that she was required to register as a sex offender based on what he understood to be her earlier 2000 conviction, and if she failed to do so, she would be sent to jail to serve her five-year sentence. Plaintiff objected to being required to register as a sex offender. Plaintiff registered as a sex offender. On several occasions after registering, plaintiff continued to ask Officer Phillips to further investigate her case, claiming each time that she was not a sex offender and should not have to be registered. According to plaintiff, Officer Phillips took no action on her requests. Plaintiff obtained a copy of her criminal records, confirming she had been convicted of criminal mischief. Assigned a new probation officer, Mike Ware, plaintiff informed him that she had not been convicted of crime against nature and was erroneously required to register as a sex offender. Officer Ware investigated plaintiff’s allegations and obtained information from the East Baton Rouge Parish Clerk of Court showing plaintiff’s guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge of criminal mischief. Officer Ware informed plaintiff of his findings and began the process of having her removed from the sex offender registry. Plaintiff thereafter filed suit against several defendants, including the State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections Division of Probation and Parole, alleging that she was "coerced" to register as a sex offender and suffered significant injury as a result. After discovery, the State filed a peremptory exception arguing plaintiff’s petition sounded in tort and was subject to a one-year prescriptive period. A five-judge panel of the court of appeal, with two judges dissenting, reversed the judgment of the district court insofar as it granted the State’s exception of prescription. The State appealed and reversed, finding that the district court was correct in its judgment. View "Prevo v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

In 1998, an Orleans Parish jury found respondent Ronald Marshall guilty of armed robbery. Following a habitual offender hearing, the trial court adjudicated respondent a second felony offender and sentenced him to 49 and a half years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In 2010, respondent filed a second application for post conviction relief, asserting two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeal granted respondent's writ, in part, and denied, in part, concluding the trial court erred by summarily dismissing respondent's claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to discover his attorney's time sheets and to convey the plea offer. The court remanded those claims for consideration at an evidentiary hearing, concluding they were substantively different from respondent's earlier ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, therefore, neither repetitive nor successive. The court of appeal also ordered the trial court to grant respondent's motion to issue the subpoena duces tecum to obtain the time sheets. The state filed a writ application seeking review of the court of appeal's ruling, which was the subject of this opinion. Finding that respondent exhausted his right to state collateral review, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's denial of claims for post-conviction relief. View "Louisiana v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty as charged by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. By agreement with the state, defendant admitted the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information and was sentenced under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) as a second felony offender to 22 years imprisonment at hard labor with the first two years to be served without parole eligibility. The court of appeal reversed the conviction because it found the state presented insufficient evidence to prove defendant intended to distribute the cocaine. The court of appeal noted that a guest in defendant’s home, rather than defendant, was found in possession of two small rocks of crack cocaine. The court of appeal acknowledged that defendant admitted to police that he sold cocaine in small quantities but nonetheless determined that a jury could not reasonably infer defendant’s intent to sell those particular "rocks" from the evidence presented by the state. Finding that the evidence presented at trial indeed supported the conviction, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Defendant William Graham was indicted with one count of aggravated incest. After defendant rested his case at trial and it became apparent that the State had failed to carry its burden of proof on this charge, the District Court permitted the State to add as a responsive verdict a different offense (molestation of a juvenile) than the one which had been the focus of trial and which contained an element not necessarily required by the original charge. Although neither the State nor the defendant presented any evidence concerning this new element, the jury found the defendant guilty of one of count of molestation of a juvenile, and the trial court sentenced him to serve 50 years imprisonment at hard labor with the first 25 years to be served without parole eligibility. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. After review, the Supreme Court found that molestation of a juvenile was not a lesser included offense of the charge of aggravated incest and because defendant‘s trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when the District Court permitted the State to add "guilty of molestation of a juvenile" as a responsive verdict even though defendant had no opportunity to mount a defense concerning an additional essential element of this offense, the Court reversed and vacated defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a post-verdict judgment of acquittal. View "Lousiana v. Graham" on Justia Law

Defendant Toby Fruge was charged with the forcible rape of two women, R.A. (count 1) and J.H. (count 2), in two separate incidents that occurred approximately two years apart. The State’s petitioned the Supreme Court for review of those portions of the appellate court's decision that reversed the district court’s imposition of the maximum sentence for defendant’s simple rape conviction and remanded the case to the district court with instructions for resentencing. Upon review of the appellate court record, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, in part, reinstated defendant’s simple rape sentence, and remanded to the district court for execution of sentence. View "Louisiana v. Fruge" on Justia Law

Defendant Terrence Roberson was charged with armed robbery and attempted second-degree murder for offenses which allegedly occurred in 2012, when the defendant was sixteen years old. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Juvenile Court’s dismissal of defendant's case for expiration of the time period for adjudication provided in the Children’s Code prevented the District Attorney from later obtaining a grand jury indictment against defendant and bringing the case to District Court. In this case, the District Court quashed the defendant’s indictment on the basis of the Juvenile Court’s prior dismissal of the juvenile petition with prejudice. The Court of Appeal reversed the District Court’s grant of the motion to quash. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Louisiana v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Perkins argued on appeal of his conviction for possession of a "shank" by a convicted felon, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that ultimately convicted him. The district court sentenced defendant to fifteen years of hard labor, but the Court of Appeal reversed, finding the district court erred in its jury instructions. The State appealed the Court of Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable laws implicated by the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the district court and by vacating defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Perkins" on Justia Law

A jury convicted the defendant Eric Mickelson, of one count of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. In his direct appeal, defendant raised numerous assignments of error, including the failure of the district court to sustain his challenge for cause of a venire member and the lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court found no merit to defendant's argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence. However, "constrained by statutory requirements," the Court found the district court erred in failing to excuse a prospective juror for cause. Thus, the Court reversed and vacated the conviction and death sentence, and remanded for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Mickelson" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant with one count of simple burglary of a vehicle. The issue on appeal, presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the District Court's failure to observe the strictures of a rule jurisprudentially created by the Fourth Circuit in "Louisiana v. Knighten," (609 So.2d 950 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992)), constituted a violation of the defendant's equal protection and due process rights under "Batson v. Kentucky," (106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986)), requiring a reversal of the jury's guilty verdict. Following voir dire, defendant raised Batson challenges relative to three of the State's peremptory strikes. After hearing the State's proffered race-neutral reasons, the District Court denied defendant's Batson challenges. Citing the State's failure to follow the so-called "Knighten rule," the Court of Appeal reversed defendant's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court found the "Knighten rule" undermined the well-established Batson framework the Louisiana Court adopted and repeatedly applied. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal, reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence, and overruled Knighten insofar as it establishes the "Knighten rule." View "Louisiana v. Bender" on Justia Law

In 2012, the people voted to amend Article I, Section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution (effective December 10, 2012), which provided: "[t]he right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction of this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny." Prior to its amendment this article provided that, "[t]he right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person." Some arrested or convicted of crimes involving firearms have attempted to show that the laws under which they were charged did not withstand strict scrutiny and were thus unconstitutional. In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court rejected those arguments. "Our law proscribing the possession of firearms by convicted felons is not affected by the amendment and withstands a strict scrutiny analysis. Such laws are effective, time-tested, and easily understandable, and do not violate the constitution. Common sense and the public safety allow no other result." View "Louisiana v. Taylor" on Justia Law