Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the appropriate remedy for a defendant when he is prohibited, in violation of La. C.Cr.P. art. 799.1, from using a peremptory challenge to back strike a provisionally selected juror. Agreeing with the court of appeal’s determination that the error is one which is subject to harmless error analysis, the Court nevertheless find the court of appeal misapplied the harmless error standard of review in this case. Because, after review, the Court could not conclude with certainty that the guilty verdicts rendered in this case were surely unattributable to the district court’s error in prohibiting the defendant from using a back strike to peremptorily challenge a provisionally selected juror, the Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, vacated defendant’s convictions and sentences, and remanded this matter to the district court for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Lewis" on Justia Law

While driving his vehicle in a highly intoxicated state, defendant Craig Oliphant struck and killed a pedestrian and subsequently pled guilty to the charge of vehicular homicide. The District Court ultimately sentenced defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor, with the first fifteen years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and designated the offense a crime of violence. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, reversed the portion of the sentence designating vehicular homicide a crime of violence, vacated the twenty-five-year sentence, and remanded the matter for resentencing. Defendant appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court granted this writ to provide guidance to the lower courts regarding whether the offense of vehicular homicide fit the general definition of a "crime of violence" under La. Rev. Stat. 14:2(B). The Court found that the offense of vehicular homicide is a crime of violence as the offense involves the use of physical force and the substantial risk that force will be used against another person in the commission of the offense as well as the use of a dangerous weapon. Finding no error in the District Court’s designation, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, vacated defendant’s sentence, and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing. View "Louisiana v. Oliphant" on Justia Law

In 1993, respondent Isaiah Overstreet, Jr., who was then 32 years old, quit his job, began living in his car, and started preaching on the grounds of college campuses. On April 25, 1994, at about 6 a.m. police were dispatched to a Southeastern dormitory where respondent, after failing to force his way into one room, entered another, forced a student onto her bed, and struggled with her before fleeing. At 11:30 p.m. on the same day, police were dispatched to Louisiana State University where respondent had grabbed a student as she waited for campus transit, dragged her into the bushes, pinned her to the ground, and attempted to remove her clothing before fleeing. Also on that day, respondent tried to gain entry to another dormitory by breaking a window and pulling the handle on a fire door. Respondent was charged by bill of information with aggravated burglary and two counts of attempted aggravated rape. Respondent was evaluated to determine his competency to proceed to trial. Experts agreed that respondent was delusional and unable to assist in his defense. After several stints in treatment centers, respondent was ultimately treated with low doses of anti-psychotic medication and his symptoms generally went into remission. Respondent denies any memory of the attacks and has consistently refused to participate in sex offender assessment or treatment. He filed a motion to be released, but because of his refusal to participate, a review panel of the court recommended against his release.Respondent was informed by treatment center staff that if he was transferred to a group home, he would be required to register as a sex offender. Respondent filed a motion for declaratory judgment in which he asked the district court to determine whether he was classified as a sex offender and subject to the registration requirement. This case came before the Supreme Court because the district court ultimately ruled that La. R.S. 15:541(7) and 15:542 (laws requiring registration for sex offenders) were unconstitutional as applied to a person who pled and was found not guilty by reason of insanity to a sex offense. Having reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the district court because respondent failed to sufficiently particularize any basis for finding the statutes unconstitutional. View "Louisiana v. Overstreet" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant Jeremy Patterson and co-defendant Tyrone Reynolds were charged by grand jury indictment with one count of second degree murder. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether, following a district court ruling prohibiting the defendant from exercising a peremptory challenge to back strike a provisionally selected juror in violation of La. C.Cr.P. art. 799.1, the court of appeal appropriately applied a harmless error analysis to conclude that the error in denying the back strike was not harmless. Finding the court of appeal correctly applied a harmless error analysis to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Louisiana v. Patterson" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant Mazen Hamdan was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The bill of information stated that defendant was previously convicted in Orleans Parish of possession of heroin and possession of methadone, which were used in the trial for the underlying weapon offense. A jury found defendant guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to serve 10 years of imprisonment at hard labor. On the day of the sentencing hearing, the state filed a habitual offender bill of information alleging that defendant’s sentence should be enhanced due to his prior guilty plea in federal court to interstate transportation of stolen property. Defendant filed a motion to quash the habitual offender bill in which he contended that the predicate offense alleged by the state had no felony equivalent in Louisiana. Defendant also alleged that the charging instrument in the federal prosecution did not indicate whether he actually possessed the stolen property or simply arranged for its transportation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider the criteria by which the courts of this state are to evaluate a criminal defendant’s previous conviction in a foreign jurisdiction during a habitual offender adjudication: "[w]hether a predicate offense does not necessarily include conduct criminal under Louisiana law, the conviction cannot lead to an enhanced penalty. In determining whether the predicate offense satisfies this criteria, courts are not confined to an examination of the applicable laws and the charging instrument of the foreign jurisdiction. Rather, when . . . there is information from the foreign proceeding available in the record that clearly establishes that the crime for which the defendant was convicted in a foreign jurisdiction would be a felony if committed in this state, courts are required to consider all of the available information in the record in deciding whether the foreign crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony.” The Court held that the trial court legally erred in quashing the state’s habitual offender bill. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, vacated the trial court’s judgment granting defendant’s motion to quash, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Hadman" on Justia Law

Respondent Manuel Ortiz was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1995 for the killing of his wife. The State urged jurors to find that Respondent was involved in a murder-for-hire scheme motivated by his desire to collect on an insurance policy taken out on the wife. Post-conviction relief proceedings stretched out over years. One of the allegations Respondent raised on appeal involved prosecutorial misconduct by a former assistant district attorney. The litigation took place against the background of the assistant DA's subsequent but unrelated legal difficulties which resulted his disbarment and imprisonment on federal charges. The district court ultimately denied respondent the post-conviction relief he sought, effectively rejecting specific claims that the assistant DA had suppressed certain exculpatory evidence and suborned perjury, but vacated Respondent's death sentence. Both Respondent and the State appealed the district court's decision. With no evidence that any prosecutorial decision made before or during the guilt or sentencing stages of trial stemmed in whole or part from any pecuniary interest in the insurance proceeds relating to the victim's death (including the decision to charge Respondent with his wife's murder), the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in vacating Respondent's death sentence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated respondent's death sentence. View "Louisiana v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the court of appeal erred in ordering the return of $144,320 to Tina Beers after finding the State did not establish probable cause for forfeiture of her currency under the Seizure and Controlled Dangerous Substances Property Forfeiture Act of 1989 (the Act). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the State proved there was probable cause for the forfeiture. Furthermore, the Court found that the court of appeal erred by reversing the decision of the district court to strike Tina Beers' claim to the money. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the court of appeal and reinstated the decision of the district court. View "Louisiana v. $144,320.00 Tina Beers, 132 Woody Lane, Silver City, NC 27344" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted a certified question presented by the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. The question presented sought "binding instructions from the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding the correct usage of a defendant's name (and other close relatives) in cases in which the victim is a minor related to the defendant." The Supreme Court concluded that the controlling statutory authority mandated confidentiality of the victim's identity in certain cases, but does not extend this protection to any other persons. View "Louisiana v. R. W. B." on Justia Law

In 2006, a grand jury indicted Defendant Michael Garcia for first-degree murder of Matthew Millican (Matt). During his arraignment defendant pled not guilty. During trial on the merits, the presentation of the State’s case unfolded in a chronological fashion with five witnesses testifying to other unadjudicated crimes, including threats, aggravated battery, rape, and murder perpetrated by defendant while armed with a machete against victims in Michigan and Florida, followed by four witnesses who had exclusive knowledge of Matt’s murder. Thereafter, the defense called four guilt phase witnesses and then rested. After hearing closing arguments, receiving the District Court’s instructions, and deliberating defendant’s guilt for eleven minutes, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. After trial on the penalty phase, the jury unanimously returned a verdict of death. The District Court denied defendant’s motion for new trial and sentenced defendant to death in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Defendant directly appealed his conviction and death sentence, raising eighty-five assignments of error. The Supreme Court addressed the "most significant" errors in its opinion, and the remaining errors were addressed in an unpublished appendix. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Court affirmed defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and the imposition of the death sentence. View "Louisiana v. Garcia" on Justia Law

This criminal matter presented the res nova issue of whether a second arrest without a conviction for the charge of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (DWI) constitutes "a second violation of R.S. 14:98," which triggers the provisions of La. Rev. Stat. 32:667(I)(1)(a) (mandating the installation of an ignition interlock for the accused's refusal to submit to a chemical breath test following his arrest.) Plaintiff's license was suspended as a result of his refusal to take a breath test after his second arrest for DWI. When plaintiff was acquitted of this second DWI charge, he filed a rule to show cause why his license should not be immediately reinstated. Defendant-in-rule, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles (OMV), agreed plaintiff was entitled to have his license reinstated, but contended an ignition interlock device must be installed on his vehicle under La. Rev. Stat. 32:667(I)(1)(a) because of his refusal to submit to chemical testing after being arrested a second time for DWI. The District Court reinstated plaintiff's license without requiring an ignition interlock device, and the court of appeal affirmed, interpreting 'a second violation" as requiring a prior conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the second arrest on the charge of DWI was merely an allegation of a second violation, and did not constitute "a second violation of R.S. 14:98" in and of itself. The Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments reinstating plaintiff's license without restriction. View "Boudreaux v. Louisiana Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr." on Justia Law