Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a dispute as to the proper application of La. Const. art. I, sec. 17 as applied to this case. Specifically, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether a defendant loses the right to waive a trial by jury when the initial trial date was set within forty-five days of a pretrial proceeding and the district court indicated to the defendant a waiver was permissible. Defendant Gerald Chinn was charged by bill of information with three counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated criminal damage to property. Following a series of preliminary motions, a status conference was convened, and at that time, the State requested that the trial be set for a date forty-three days away. Defense counsel agreed to the trial date with the caveat that her client be allowed to waive his right to trial by jury. Following a brief colloquy with the defendant, the district court accepted the defendant’s jury-trial waiver, but the State objected. Finding that the court of appeal erred in ruling the defendant should not be allowed to waive his right to trial by jury under the unique facts of this case, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the ruling of the district court permitting the defendant to waive his right to trial by jury.

Defendant Terrance Carter was indicted in 2006 for the first degree murder of Corinthian Houston. After initially pleading not guilty, Defendant changed his plea to a dual plea of not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. The district court denied his motion to suppress his statements following a hearing conducted in 2008. After finding aggravating circumstances of aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated arson, and a victim under the age of 12 years, the jury returned with a unanimous recommendation that Defendant be sentenced to death. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence of death, asserting twenty-five assignments of error and three supplemental assignments of error. The Supreme Court addressed the "most significant" of the alleged errors. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's first-degree murder conviction and the imposition of the death sentence.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeal erred in finding that the amendments to the state sex offender registration statutes did not apply to Defendant Jimmy Smith, because application of those amended statutes would violate the prohibition set forth in the ex post facto clause of the state and federal constitutions. Defendant was convicted of two sex offenses prior to the enactment of the amendments to the sex offender registration statutes but before his initial registration period had expired. The amendments at issue increased the duration an offender is obligated to register and created a new requirement for sex offender designation codes on drivers' licenses and identification cards. The court of appeal found the 1999 amendment to former La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1(H) (providing for a lifetime requirement to register for multiple offenders, did not apply to persons convicted of a sex offense prior to July 1997) and that the restriction code to be placed on an offender's driver's license or identification card requirements added by the legislature in 2006 did not apply to Defendant in this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the 1999 amendment to former La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1 applied to Defendant as a multiple sexual offender. Furthermore, the Court found no violation of the ex post facto clause in the application of the sex offender registration statutes to Defendant. The Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal, and reinstated the district court's judgment denying Defendant's petition for injunctive and declaratory relief and ordering him to register as a lifetime sex offender.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the district court erred in sua sponte declaring that the jury waiver procedure described in the Louisiana Constitution (Article 1, section 17A) was unconstitutional for "depriving [Defendant] of his due process guaranteed under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution." Defendant Timothy Bazile was indicted for second degree murder. His trial was set for October, 2011. At a September hearing, Defendant indicated he wished to waive his right to a jury trial, and the State objected. The State argued that Defendant's waiver was less than forty-five days from the trial date, and pressed to continue with a jury trial. The district court expressed doubt as to whether the federal constitution allowed the State to tell a defendant he couldn't have a jury trial "even on the day it's set for trial." Defense ultimately asked for a continuance, and a bench trial was reset for a few days later than the original trial date. The court found that La. Const. art. I, sec. 17(A) "effectively allowed the state to 'force' a defendant into deciding whether to be tried by a judge or jury. However, 'the decision to have a bench trial or jury trial rests with the defendant." The State appealed the district court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the constitutionality of the jury waiver procedure was never raised by Defendant, the Court found that the district court erred in declaring the jury waiver procedure unconstitutional.

In 2006, a Morehouse Parish grand jury indicted Defendant Lee Roy Odenbaugh, Jr., for the 2006 first degree murders of Jessie Mae Porter and Sondra Porter Odenbaugh and attempted first degree murder of Jessica Cooper. After the penalty phase, the jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death for each first degree murder count, finding Defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. Defendant appealed his conviction and death sentence on the basis of thirty-six assignments of error. After careful review of all of Defendant's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence.

Defendant Michael Anthony Wright was convicted by a jury of aggravated incest and sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment at hard labor. Finding the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence which was inadmissible pursuant to Louisiana Code of Evidence article 412.2, and in denying the Defendant's related motions for mistrial, the court of appeal reversed the conviction, vacated the sentence and remanded the matter for a new trial. The Supreme Court granted the State's writ application to review the correctness of the court of appeal's decision. Upon review, the Court vacated the decision of the court of appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to allow evidence of the alleged victim's age to be submitted to the jury. Because the court of appeal found the admission of other crimes evidence constituted reversible error, it did not address defendant’s remaining assignment of error.

In 2006, Defendant Felton Dorsey and Randy Wilson were indicted by a Caddo Parish grand jury for the first degree murder of Joe Prock and attempted first degree murder of Bobbie Prock. The state subsequently dismissed the latter charge against both by amendment. A few months later, the State gave notice of its intention to seek the death penalty at Defendant's trial, alleging five aggravating factors. In 2009, the State filed an amended notice of intent to seek the death penalty, reducing the alleged aggravating factors to: (1) Defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson, aggravated escape, armed robbery or simple robbery; (2) Defendant knowingly created a risk of death or bodily harm to more than one person; and (3) Defendant offered, has been offered, has given, or has received anything of value for the commission of the offense. In his appeal, Defendant asserted twenty-six assignments of error from trial. After a thorough review of the law and evidence, the Supreme Court found none of the assignments of error constituted reversible error and therefore, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence.

Defendant Todd Jones made a graphic sexual request of a teenage boy. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendantâs conduct was sufficient to constitute attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court found that in the specific context of this crime, the request was an "act" committed "for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object" such that the attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27, is satisfied. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and reinstated the jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile.

A New Orleans bank robbery in 1984 ended with the death of a Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's deputy. A unanimous jury found Defendant Thomas Sparks, Jr. guilty of first-degree murder in the deputy's death. At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury unanimously returned a death sentence. Defendant raised twenty-three assignments of error on appeal. After a thorough review of the law and evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's murder conviction, and conditionally affirmed the imposition of the death sentence. The Court remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether Defendant received effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.