Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Ryan Preston was found guilty of criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, Preston argued (1) that the statutory provisions defining deadly force and discussing defense of premises were unconstitutionally vague, and (2) the trial court did not adequately instruct the jury on the charge of criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the definition of deadly force was not unconstitutionally vague as it interacted with the definition of defense of premises in this case, and (2) the trial court's jury instructions did not constitute obvious error.

Defendant Malcolm LaVallee-Davidson killed a man by putting a gun to his head and pulling the trigger during consensual sexual activity. At trial, Defendant argued that he did not know that the gun was loaded. The trial court convicted him of manslaughter. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed obvious error in its jury instructions and that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant caused the death of the victim either recklessly or with criminal negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the court's jury instructions correctly explained the mistake-of-fact statute and contained neither error nor obvious error, and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant caused the death of the victim and acted either recklessly or with criminal negligence.

Benjamin Cook pleaded guilty to gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact. The superior court imposed an aggregate sentence of twelve years' imprisonment followed by thirty years of supervised release pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1231. Cook appealed, contending that the court abused its discretion (1) in determining a maximum and final sentence pursuant to the sentencing analysis required by Me. Rev. Stat. 71-A, 1252, and (2) in imposing a thirty-year term of supervised release because its separate analysis concerning that component of the sentence was insufficient. On appeal, the Supreme Court announced for the first time the analysis a sentencing court is required to undertake before imposing a term of supervised release pursuant to section 1231. In this case, because the superior court did not have the benefit of the full analysis announced and only briefly articulated the case-specific factors leading it to impose a thirty-year term of supervised release, the Court vacated the term of supervised release and remanded for resentencing. The Court affirmed the sentences in all other respects.

Timothy Burns was convicted of theft of unauthorized taking, a Class C offense, following a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) because the jury could not have rationally found from the evidence that Burns was guilty of theft of property with a value of less than $1000 and because a theft by unauthorized taking is a Class C offense when the property stolen is valued between $1000 and $10,000, the court's failure to instruct the jury concerning the amount necessary to elevate a theft to a Class C offense was harmless; (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish Burns' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury rationally could have found from the evidence presented at trial that Burns was guilty of the theft of the check involved in this case, and the jury could only have found that the amount stolen was the amount of the check; and (3) the superior court did not err by sentencing Burns to twenty-two months' incarceration.

Paul Davis was struck and seriously injured by a truck driven by Edwin Rodriguez. Rodriguez was driving while intoxicated soon after he and Davis exited a chartered bus at the conclusion of a business promotion trip. Rodriguez later pleaded guilty to reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and DUI. Davis filed claims against the business that organized the trip, its employee, the chartered bus company, and its employee (Defendants) for common law negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. At issue on appeal was whether Defendants owed Davis a common law duty of care. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the chartered bus company and the employee who drove the bus did not owe Davis a duty to ensure his safety by preventing Rodriguez from driving his truck after the bus trip ended, and (2) the business that organized the trip and its employee did not have a fiduciary duty to Davis because the employee organized and led the excursion.

Defendant Stanley Ward was convicted of kidnapping, attempted murder, and robbery and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of fifty years, all but forty-five years suspended. Ward challenged the sentences on the grounds that (1) the length of the sentences, both individually and collectively, violated his constitutional protection against cruel or unusual punishment; (2) when the court found the facts necessary to impose consecutive sentences, resulting in a longer period of incarceration than the statutory maximum for any of his convictions individual, it violated his constitutional right to trial by jury; and (3) the court erred in its application of Me. Rev. Stat. 1256 in imposing consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Ward's collective and individual sentences did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment; (2) the superior court's imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate Ward's right to trial by jury; and (3) the superior court properly determined that the statute did not bar the imposition of consecutive sentences under these circumstances.

Appellant Theodore Stanislaw pleaded guilty to nine counts of unlawful sexual contact and assault, among them three counts of Class B unlawful sexual contact. On each of the three Class B offenses, the superior court sentenced Stanislaw to nine years of imprisonment, to be served consecutively. Stanislaw appealed, arguing that the court erred in setting the basic period of incarceration at nine years because it did not consider other possible means of committing the same crimes. The Supreme Court vacated the sentences and remanded. The Court held the lower court misapplied the first step of the three-step sentencing analysis codified at 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. 1252-C by not objectively considering the nature and seriousness of the unlawful sexual contact offenses in determining the basic period of incarceration. The lower court failed to provide any rationale for its determination that Stanislaw's offenses, which did not include aggravating factors such as the use of violence, warranted sentences just one year less than the maximum allowed.

Following a jury trial, appellant Michael Skarbinski was convicted on several counts, all of which arose from appellant's filing requests for tax refunds claiming no taxable income for three years when appellant had received substantial income. The supreme judicial court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err when it instructed the jury on principles of tax law, and the court's instructions did not infringe upon the jury's role as fact-finder; (2) the court did not err in instructing the jury that if appellant believed the tax laws to be unconstitutional or illegal, or otherwise disagreed with them without an objectively reasonable good faith belief, his belief was not a defense to the charges; (3) the State's closing argument was not inflammatory and it did not improperly interject irrelevant issues into the case; and (4) the jury could have found each element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.

Defendant Philip Galarneau, III appealed his conviction as a âhabitual offenderâ for âoperating while under the influence.â In 2008, without a lawyer, Defendant pled not guilty to the charges in the district court. On the same day, an information containing the same charges was filed in the Superior Court where the State sought to revoke Defendantâs probation from a 2007 assault conviction. The district court charges were dismissed, and Defendant made his appearance at the probation revocation hearing at Superior Court. Defendant was appointed a lawyer-for-the-day. Defendantâs case was called, the court read the charges against him and asked both Defendant and his attorney whether he was advised of his rights. The court confirmed on record that Defendant waived his right to a trial, that he was pleading guilty to habitual offender and OUI charges, and that he admitted violating his probation. The Court sentenced Defendant to approximately two years for all the charges against him. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that his sentence and conviction were unconstitutionally imposed because the court did not inform Defendant of his right to counsel at the district court. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, finding that Defendant was represented by a lawyer-for-the-day during his initial appearance at Superior Court, and that the court confirmed Defendant was advised of his rights. The Court affirmed Defendantâs conviction and sentence.

In October, 2002, a trial court entered a judgment on a jury verdict finding Defendant Jeffrey Cookson guilty on two counts of intentional murder for the deaths of his ex-girlfriend and her best friend. The court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive life sentences. During the trial, witness David Vantol confessed privately to Defendantâs attorney and a private investigator that he had committed both murders. Immediately after the jury returned its verdict against Defendant, defense counsel disclosed the confession to the court and prosecutor. Later that day, Vantol lead police to a spot in the woods where he had buried miscellaneous articles of clothing, and a gun that testing would reveal was the murder weapon. Vantol continued to confess to the murders, but police did not believe him. They asked him to take a polygraph test, but he failed it. Frantic that no one believed him, Vantol threatened to harm himself. Later he would be admitted to the hospital. While there, Vantol recanted his confessions, and told investigators the items he provided were unrelated to murders. The State kept the items in its possession. Defendant filed motions with the court to have DNA testing done on the clothing and other items still in the Stateâs possession. The Superior Court denied Defendantâs motion regarding the clothing testing, but only gave an analysis of the applicable statute that was the basis of its denial. The court ultimately concluded that Defendant failed to meet the chain-of-custody requirement of the statute. The court did not engage in any analysis or provide any other reasoning for its decision. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Courtâs decision and remanded the case back to the court so that it may issue findings on all points raised by Defendantâs post-conviction DNA motion.