Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Calixte Fleury was convicted of aggravated trafficking, unlawful trafficking, unlawful possession of scheduled drugs, and operating under the influence. On September 18, 2020, Fleury was driving on I-95 when he crashed his vehicle. A responding sergeant found Fleury with a bag of pills containing fentanyl and tramadol, and later discovered more fentanyl and cash on Fleury. Fleury's blood alcohol content was 0.093 grams per 100 milliliters. He was indicted and later charged with multiple counts, including aggravated trafficking and unlawful trafficking of scheduled drugs.The trial court (York County, Martemucci, J.) held a jury trial, resulting in guilty verdicts on all four criminal counts. The court found in favor of Fleury on the criminal forfeiture count. Fleury was sentenced to seven years with all but four years suspended for aggravated trafficking, three years for unlawful trafficking, and 30 days for operating under the influence, with some sentences running concurrently. The court merged the unlawful possession count with the unlawful trafficking count.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. Fleury argued that the application of a repealed definition of "traffick" was unconstitutional. The court disagreed, stating that the repealed statute was rationally related to controlling opioids and its application was not unconstitutional. The court also noted that the amended statute did not apply retroactively to Fleury's case.However, the court found that the trial court should have merged the aggravated trafficking count with the unlawful trafficking and possession counts for sentencing. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, affirming the convictions in all other respects. View "State of Maine v. Fleury" on Justia Law

Kulmiye Idris was convicted of gross sexual assault after a jury trial in Androscoggin County. The incident occurred on April 2, 2022, when Idris and the victim, who were close friends, attended a party. The victim consumed approximately twelve drinks and went to bed at a friend's house. She later woke up to Idris engaging in vaginal intercourse with her and told him to stop, but he did not stop until he was finished. The next morning, the victim confronted Idris via text, and he apologized, stating he did not remember the incident. The victim reported the assault to the police and underwent a forensic examination, which confirmed the presence of Idris's DNA.The Androscoggin County Grand Jury indicted Idris on one count of gross sexual assault. Idris pleaded not guilty, but after a two-day trial, the jury found him guilty. The court sentenced him to eight years in prison, with all but four years suspended, and four years of probation. Idris appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding the mens rea requirement for the offense.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the trial court's instruction to the jury to use a "recklessly" standard for the mens rea was not prejudicial, even though the correct standard should have been "criminal negligence." The court found that the jury's verdict would have been the same under the correct standard, as there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The court affirmed the judgment and called upon the Legislature to clarify the mens rea requirements for offenses under section 253. View "State of Maine v. Idris" on Justia Law

Keara M. Bernier was convicted of aggravated assault after a jury trial in Aroostook County. The incident occurred on June 6, 2022, when Bernier struck the victim, her partner, in the head with an aluminum baseball bat during an argument at their shared home. The victim did not seek medical attention immediately but reported the incident to the police the next day. Bernier was indicted in July 2022 and, after a jury trial in September 2023, was found guilty and sentenced to seven years in prison, with all but six months suspended, and three years of probation.At trial, Bernier argued that the trial judge's comments during her testimony questioned her veracity, thus denying her a fair trial. She also contended that the court erred in its jury instructions regarding the use of deadly force in self-defense, specifically that it failed to instruct the jury that she had no duty to retreat if she was in her dwelling place and was not the initial aggressor.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found no obvious error in the trial judge's comments, determining that the judge's instructions to Bernier to answer questions truthfully were aimed at keeping her focused and were not indicative of bias. However, the court agreed with Bernier that the jury instructions on the use of deadly force were incomplete. The instructions failed to include the statutory exception that Bernier had no duty to retreat if she was in her dwelling place and was not the initial aggressor.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated Bernier's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the omission of the dwelling-place exception in the jury instructions constituted an obvious error affecting Bernier's substantial rights. View "State of Maine v. Bernier" on Justia Law

Aubrey Armstrong was convicted of felony murder and robbery following a bench trial in July 2018. He was sentenced to thirty years for felony murder and a concurrent thirty-year term for robbery, with all but twenty-nine years suspended and four years of probation. Armstrong appealed, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that his simultaneous convictions for felony murder and robbery violated the double jeopardy clause. The court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings to merge the counts and impose a sentence on the merged count. On remand, the trial court dismissed the robbery count and resentenced Armstrong to thirty years for the merged count. Armstrong's subsequent appeals were denied.Armstrong filed his first petition for post-conviction review on April 10, 2023, which was summarily dismissed for failing to allege any cognizable grounds for relief. He then filed a second petition on June 29, 2023, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The PCR court dismissed this petition as untimely, as it was filed beyond the one-year deadline. Armstrong appealed and sought a certificate of probable cause, which was granted by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that Armstrong waived his argument regarding the timeliness of his petition by not raising it in the lower court. The court vacated the order granting a certificate of probable cause and dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted. The court did not address whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to petitions for post-conviction review, as Armstrong failed to present this argument to the PCR court. View "Armstrong v. State of Maine" on Justia Law

Julio Cesar Hernandez-Rodriguez was convicted of two drug offenses after a trial court denied his motion to suppress statements made to Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (MDEA) agents. Hernandez-Rodriguez argued that his statements to one agent should be suppressed because he was subject to unwarned custodial interrogation and that his statements to another agent should be suppressed due to his limited English proficiency, which he claimed prevented him from making a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights.The trial court found that Hernandez-Rodriguez was in custody during his interactions with the agents and that he had not waived his Miranda rights while speaking with the first agent. However, the court concluded that his statements to the first agent were admissible because they were not the product of interrogation. The court also found that Hernandez-Rodriguez had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights when speaking with the second agent, despite his limited English proficiency. Hernandez-Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression rulings.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in not suppressing Hernandez-Rodriguez’s statement identifying a substance as cocaine in response to the first agent’s question, as it was the product of custodial interrogation. However, the court upheld the trial court’s finding that Hernandez-Rodriguez had validly waived his Miranda rights when speaking with the second agent. Given the error in admitting the statement about the cocaine, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case, allowing Hernandez-Rodriguez the opportunity to withdraw his plea. View "State of Maine v. Hernandez-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Richard W. Kelley was convicted of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs after a stop and search of a friend's vehicle in which he was a passenger. Law enforcement conducted the search as part of an investigation into the vehicle's owner for drug trafficking, using a search warrant and two tracking warrants to monitor the vehicle's location. Kelley moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the warrants, arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.The trial court (Penobscot County, A. Murray, J.) denied Kelley's motion to suppress on the grounds that he lacked standing to challenge the search. Kelley argued that the court should not have addressed his standing because the State had stipulated that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. However, the court concluded that standing is a threshold issue that must be addressed regardless of the State's stipulation. Kelley was subsequently convicted based on his conditional guilty plea.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the State's stipulation regarding Kelley's standing was not binding on the court. The court further held that Kelley lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, as he did not have a property or possessory interest in it, nor did he have an interest in the property seized. Therefore, Kelley did not have standing to challenge the search warrants. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Billy L. Beaulieu was charged with criminal OUI (Class C) under Maine law. He filed a motion to dismiss the charges, claiming immunity under Maine’s Good Samaritan statute, which provides immunity from prosecution if a call for assistance for a suspected drug-related overdose is made at the location of a medical emergency. Beaulieu argued that the statute’s requirements were met because a driver who saw his car beside an interstate highway exit asked the police to check on the vehicle, suspecting a medical event.The Cumberland County trial court denied Beaulieu’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the witness was concerned about a medical event and reported it to the police, who then checked on Beaulieu. However, the court concluded that the situation did not meet the statutory requirements for immunity because the call was not for a suspected drug-related overdose, and there was no medical emergency.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the Good Samaritan statute’s plain language requires the call for assistance to be specifically for a suspected drug-related overdose and that the location must be a medical emergency. The court found that the witness’s concern about a general medical event did not satisfy the statute’s requirements. Additionally, there was no evidence of a medical emergency at the scene. Therefore, Beaulieu was not entitled to immunity under the Good Samaritan statute, and the denial of his motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Beaulieu" on Justia Law

Dennis W. Lowery was convicted of gross sexual assault after a jury trial in Cumberland County. The incident occurred on December 19, 2021, when Lowery entered the victim's room at a Portland inn without her knowledge or permission and sexually assaulted her while she was asleep. The victim identified Lowery to the police, who found him nearby. DNA evidence linked Lowery to the crime.The trial court denied Lowery's motions to dismiss and for a new trial, which were based on alleged discovery violations by the State. Lowery argued that the State failed to disclose information about certain witnesses and evidence handlers in a timely manner. The court allowed the testimony of these witnesses, reasoning that Lowery was aware of their roles and had the opportunity to cross-examine them. The court also denied Lowery's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the gross sexual assault charge but granted it on a burglary charge due to a defect in the indictment.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in handling the alleged discovery violations, as Lowery was not prejudiced to the extent that it deprived him of a fair trial. The court also found no obvious error in the admission of evidence regarding Lowery's pre-arrest silence, as Lowery did not invoke his right to remain silent before being questioned by the police. The court concluded that the trial court's actions were appropriate and did not violate Lowery's due process rights. View "State of Maine v. Lowery" on Justia Law

Richard W. Kelley was convicted of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs after a stop and search of a friend's vehicle in which he was a passenger. Law enforcement conducted the search as part of an investigation into the vehicle's owner for drug trafficking, using a search warrant and two tracking warrants to monitor the vehicle's location. Kelley moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the warrants, arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.The trial court (Penobscot County, A. Murray, J.) denied Kelley's motion to suppress on the grounds that he lacked standing to challenge the search. Kelley argued that the court should not have reached the question of his standing because the State had stipulated that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. However, the court concluded that standing is a threshold issue that must be addressed, and Kelley did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the State's stipulation regarding Kelley's standing was not binding on the court and that Kelley lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. The court noted that Kelley did not own the vehicle, had never driven it, and had only stored personal items in it for a short period. Therefore, Kelley did not have standing to challenge the search warrants, and the judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Ramel L. Sheppard was convicted of domestic violence aggravated assault after a jury trial in which the victim did not testify. The conviction was based in part on the victim's hearsay statement to a police officer identifying Sheppard as her attacker. Sheppard appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statement as an excited utterance and that its admission violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution.The trial court (Androscoggin County) admitted the victim's statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, finding that the statement was made spontaneously and while the victim was still under the stress of the assault. The court also determined that the statement was nontestimonial, as it was made in the context of an ongoing emergency and not for the primary purpose of creating evidence for prosecution. The jury found Sheppard guilty on two counts, but the court later merged one count into the other and sentenced Sheppard to seven years' imprisonment, with all but forty months suspended, and three years of probation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim's statement as an excited utterance, as the statement was made spontaneously and under the stress of the assault. The court also held that the statement was nontestimonial, as it was made in the context of an ongoing emergency and not for the primary purpose of creating evidence for prosecution. Therefore, the admission of the statement did not violate Sheppard's rights under the Confrontation Clause. View "State of Maine v. Sheppard" on Justia Law