Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

During the course of an argument at the victim's Chelsea home, Dupont scratched the victim’s face and neck with her fingernails, leaving wounds on his cheek. Dupont was convicted of assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. 207(1)(A) and sentenced to 20 days in jail, with a fine of $300. Dupont sought a new trial, asserting that the victim had “committed perjury” and that “[n]o rational jury could have convicted [her] of Assault in this matter after hearing that testimony.” She later added: “The Defendant did not get the opportunity for a fair, open and public trial as the courtroom doors were locked at some point during the trial.” Dupont did not submit an affidavit, nor did she offer any testimony at the motion hearing. The court denied Dupont’s motion. Dupont filed a “Motion to Reconsider” and submitted the trial transcript showing that the court stated, just before closing arguments and jury instructions, “Bring the jury in, please. And if we could have the doors in the back of the Courtroom closed as well so that no one is interrupted during either the closings or the instructions.” Dupont also submitted the affidavit of an attorney stating that he attempted to enter the courtroom at some point during that afternoon, but the door was locked. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld denial of the motion, noting the lack of any supporting record. View "State of Maine v. Dupont" on Justia Law

At jury selection for Frisbee’s trial on charges of unlawful sexual contact, Frisbee’s attorney saw a former client, who had no connection to the matter, in the courtroom. The spectator had spent 11 months in prison for threats against Frisbee’s attorney and his family. In addition, both the judge and the State’s Attorney had previously prosecuted the spectator, who had just been released from prison for criminal threatening involving potential juror 116, later empaneled on the case. The spectator was glaring, making gestures, and smirking. The court instructed the marshals to remove the spectator. Jury selection continued without incident. During trial the spectator reappeared, closer to juror 116. The court ordered a recess and discussed the matter with the State and Frisbee’s attorney, who reported that the spectator had been seen with a weapon. The court directed security to take the spectator through security screening and interviewed juror 116, who stated that she was “very distracted.” The court excluded the spectator from the trial. The next day, the court learned that the spectator had been in the building and had approached jurors, asking them to take a copy of a book that he had written. Frisbee’s attorney requested that the jury be sequestered. The court questioned each juror; all except juror 116 stated that they had not been distracted and all of stated that the spectator in no way would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. The court denied the request. Later, the court and the parties learned that the spectator had left his notebook at the courthouse, with a threatening statement. Frisbee unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Frisbee’s conviction and sentence, finding that he had received a fair trial. View "State of Maine v. Frisbee" on Justia Law

Brown, a 95-year-old resident of North Yarmouth, lives on his farm and keeps bees. Karen helped Brown and also raised her own bees and harvested honey there. Brown's family was concerned about Karen’s influence over Brown and her inclusion in his will. Brown’s grandson called Karen to tell her that “things were going to change.” Karen became concerned about valuable harvested honey that she had stored at Brown’s farm. Brown’s family members and Karen and her husband, Merrill, met at the farm. Brown’s daughter called 9-1-1. Merrill and Kelley, Brown’s son-in-law, had a confrontation on the driveway. Merrill tried to push Kelley but stumbled backward, then pulled out a handgun and shot Kelley three times. Kelley died at the hospital from his wounds. Merrill was convicted of murder, 17-A M.R.S. 201(1)(A). The court sentenced Kimball to 25 years’ imprisonment. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in declining to give a jury instruction addressing the affirmative defense of adequate provocation; admitting evidence that Merrill had been drinking on the day at issue; and limiting evidence concerning the relationships between Kimball’s family members and the victim’s family members. View "Maine v. Kimball" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of the crime of escape from arrest. Defendant was sentenced to fourteen days in jail. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was “arrested” before she fled the custody of a police officer by climbing out the bedroom window of her boyfriend’s home. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Defendant committed the crime of escape from arrest because there was sufficient evidence to prove she was under arrest before she fled out the bedroom window. View "State v. Dorweiler" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to theft by deception and aggravated forgery. Defendant’s crimes arose from her wrongful procurement of public benefits through material misrepresentations. Defendant was sentenced to two years in prison and ordered to pay restitution to the Department of Health and Human Services in the amount of $15,224. Defendant appealed, challenging the sentencing court’s finding that Defendant was not incapable of paying the ordered restitution. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because Defendant challenged only the propriety, and not the legality, of the sentence of restitution, the appeal must be dismissed for failure to raise any illegality that was apparent on the face of the record. View "State v. Davenport" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of theft by deception for submitting hundreds of fraudulent claims to MaineCare, totaling more than $40,000. After a sentencing hearing, the sentencing court sentenced Defendant to four years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $20,000 in restitution. Defendant appealed, challenging the propriety of his sentence. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing court did not err in finding that Defendant was not incapable of paying the ordered restitution; and (2) the court’s decision to order $20,000 in restitution was not arbitrary, and therefore, there was no violation of Defendant’s right to due process of law. View "State v. Bradley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal operating under the influence (OUI), with one prior conviction (Class D). Defendant was sentenced to forty-five days in jail, a $700 fine, and a three-year license suspension. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of OUI. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence, which included the results of a blood alcohol level test provided by Defendant following a car crash, was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find each element of OUI beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Parkin" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea to the charge of operating under the influence with two prior convictions for operating under the influence. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a stop of his vehicle. The trial court concluded that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the arresting officer had an objectively reasonable belief that Defendant had violated Me. Rev. Stat. 29-A, which prohibits braking or accelerating that is “unnecessarily made so as to cause a harsh and objectionable noise.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. View "State v. Violette" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of thirteen hunting, fishing, and firearm-related offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction on five of the thirteen counts challenged by Defendant; (2) the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss two of the charges based on an accord and satisfaction that was offered to the court due to the lack of clarity regarding the validity of the accord and satisfaction offered; (3) Defendant was not prejudiced when he was not provided physical access to the actual fish in the State’s possession prior to trial; and (4) a misstatement of fact made by the State during its closing argument did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. McBreairty" on Justia Law

After entering conditional guilty pleas to several counts of an indictment and a bench trial on aggravating factors only, Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class A) and one count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgments of conviction, holding (1) in this case, the State was required to prove specific weights of actual heroin, not mixtures or compounds containing some amount of heroin; and (2) the State did not prove the weight of the actual heroin involved. Remanded. View "State v. Pinkham" on Justia Law