Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed an administrative law judge's (ALJ) finding that Petitioner was responsible for indicated child neglect under Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law (Fam. Law) 5-701(s), holding that intent or scienter is not an element of child neglect under Fam. Law 5-701(s).Defendant forgot to drop his seventeen-month-old son off at daycare before going to work. The child was found in the car more than six hours later and pronounced dead at the scene. St. Mary's County Department of Social Services rendered a finding of indicated child neglect against Defendant. An ALJ concluded that the Department had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the finding of indicated child neglect was supported by credible evidence and consistent with the law. The circuit court affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether "neglect" under Fam. Law 5-701(s) requires proof of an element of scienter. The Court of Special Appeals held that the statute does not require scienter. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plain language of the statute excludes intent as an element of child neglect. View "Junek v. St. Mary's County Department of Social Services" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for robbery on the ground that the guilty verdict on the robbery charge was legally inconsistent with Defendant's acquittal on a second-degree assault charge, holding that the guilty verdict on the robbery count should be affirmed.A jury found Defendant guilty of robbery and theft but acquitted him of second-degree assault. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the conviction on the robbery count, concluding that the trial court erred in accepting inconsistent verdicts because the second-degree assault charge of which Defendant was acquitted was a lesser-included offense of the robbery. A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed, but the members who agreed with this disposition did so for different reasons. Two judges would apply a two-step analysis to hold that that the verdicts were not legally inconsistent and that the evidence satisfied the elements of robbery. Two other judges would analyze whether the verdict demonstrated that the jury disregarded the trial court's instructions on the law to conclude that the guilty verdict on the robbery count should not be reversed on the ground of inconsistency. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter, holding that there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter for selling heroin to the victim, who fatally overdosed.Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that Defendant's conduct was both the actual and legal cause of the victim's death. Therefore, the Court held that Defendant could be held to the most minimal level of criminal homicide culpability and that the trial court did not err in convicting Defendant of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In this case involving the correct interpretation of Maryland Rule 4-345(c), the Court of Appeals held that, for a "mistake in the announcement of a sentence" to be "evident" under the statute, the mistake must be clear or obvious and that, under Maryland Rule 4-345(c), the circuit court did not make an evident mistake in the announcement of Defendant's sentence for conspiracy to rob Demaris Glover with a dangerous weapon.A jury found Defendant guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to rob both Glover and William Rich with a dangerous weapon, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded with instructions to amend the sentence to reflect that the circuit court sentenced Defendant to twenty years of imprisonment, with all but time serve suspended, for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. The State appealed, arguing that, in the announcement of the sentence, the circuit court intended to say "ten years" instead of "time served" and that the court later corrected the mistake. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record of the sentencing proceeding did not demonstrate that the circuit court made an "evident" mistake in the announcement of Defendant's sentence. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals upholding the suppression hearing court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that evidence of an out-of-court identification procedure, through which the victim of an alleged assault identified Defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, contained sufficient indicia of reliability to withstand a motion to suppress.At the conclusion of a suppression hearing, the presiding judge concluded that the second photo array identification procedure at issue in this case was admissible because she found it reliable by clear and convincing evidence. Ultimately, the jury found Defendant guilty of attempted robbery, second-degree assault, and reckless endangerment. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the identification had sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome the procedure's suggestiveness. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the identification contained sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome the suggestive nature of the pretrial identification procedures. View "Small v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner coram nobis relief, holding that Petitioner waived the grounds underlying both claims supporting his petition.Petitioner pleaded guilty to third degree sexual offense and was required to register as a sex offender. In his second petition for a writ of coram nobis Petitioner argued that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. The circuit court denied relief. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed after reaching the merits of Petitioner's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on a different ground, holding that Petitioner's claims were waived. View "Hyman v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the postconviction court's grant of Defendant's petition for postconviction relief and remanded with instructions to remand the case to the postconviction court for further fact finding, holding that the record lacked the factual determinations necessary to rule on the state's motion to correct the record.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and other crimes. In his motion for postconviction relief, Defendant raised several claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The postconviction court granted Defendant's petition, finding that trial counsel provided deficient assistance by not objecting to an improper jury instruction. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The State appealed and, prior to oral argument, filed a motion to correct the record pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-414. The State's motion, if granted, would resolve the merits of the State's appeal by eliminating the sole ground for Defendant's postconviction relief. The Supreme Court held that a remand to the postconviction court was required because, given the nature of the parties' dispute and the facts available, the Court was not in the position to rule upon the State's motion to correct the record. View "State v. Christian" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming Defendant's convictions, holding that this Court had jurisdiction to reach the merits of this appeal and that the trial court erred in excluding a witness' prior convictions for committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering (VICAR offense) for impeachment purposes but that the exclusion of those convictions was harmless.Defendant was found guilty of retaliation against a witness and participation in a criminal gang. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court properly excluded a witness' prior VICAR offenses for impeachment purposes because those convictions involved violent crimes that were not relevant to credibility and were non-impeachable crimes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a witness' prior convictions for VICAR offenses are admissible for witness impeachment; and (2) although the trial court erred in excluding the witness' prior convictions for impeachment purposes, the court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Rosales v. State" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by asking compound "strong feelings" questions during voir dire and refusing to ask properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions..The Court of Criminal Appeals reaffirmed its holding in Pearson v. State, 86 A.3d 1232, 1235 (2014), that, on request, a trial court is required to ask a properly-phrased "strong feelings" question during voir dire and that it is improper for a trial court to ask the "strong feelings" question in compound form. The Court then held that, in this case, the circuit court abused its discretion by asking compound "strong feelings" during voir dire and that the circuit court did not cure its abuse of discretion by asking the jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions after the conclusion of voir dire and opening statements. View "Collins v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to admit text messages that Defendant sent to his wife's cell phone, holding that the confidential martial communications privilege does not attach to communications relating to child abuse.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree child abuse, and neglect of a minor child. On appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting text messages between Defendant and his wife because the State did not rebut the presumption of confidentiality. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) courts should narrowly construe privileges, including the marital communications privilege; (2) text messages between spouses are presumed to be confidential unless the party advocating for their admission can establish that they were not; (3) because individuals are under a legal duty to report child abuse, communications made to a spouse concerning child abuse cannot be reasonably presumed confidential; and (4) the text messages in this case were properly admitted against Defendant. View "State v. Sewell" on Justia Law