Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At issue was the manner in which Md. Const. art. IV, 22, which provides for an in banc appeal from a “decision of determination of any point or question” by a circuit court judge, is intended to operate.The State in this criminal case filed a request for an in banc review of an order of the circuit court judge granting Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude certain documents and testimony under Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978). The State sought in banc review, but the request was untimely filed. After a hearing, an in banc court reversed the trial judge’s ruling. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that “a litigant may not appeal to an in banc panel when the litigant could not note an appeal to [the Court of Special Appeals] successfully.” The Court of Appeals affirmed after analyzing relevant case law and the current version of section 22 in conjunction with Maryland Rule 2-551. The court further outlined the proper procedures a party must follow to reserve the point, question, or judgment for review and held that a decision by the in banc court constitutes a final judgment of that court. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

At issue was the manner in which Md. Const. art. IV, 22, which provides for an in banc appeal from a “decision of determination of any point or question” by a circuit court judge, is intended to operate.The State in this criminal case filed a request for an in banc review of an order of the circuit court judge granting Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude certain documents and testimony under Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978). The State sought in banc review, but the request was untimely filed. After a hearing, an in banc court reversed the trial judge’s ruling. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that “a litigant may not appeal to an in banc panel when the litigant could not note an appeal to [the Court of Special Appeals] successfully.” The Court of Appeals affirmed after analyzing relevant case law and the current version of section 22 in conjunction with Maryland Rule 2-551. The court further outlined the proper procedures a party must follow to reserve the point, question, or judgment for review and held that a decision by the in banc court constitutes a final judgment of that court. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded this criminal case with instructions to vacate the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of second-degree murder and related charges and to remand the case to that court for a new trial. The court held that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to permit Defendant to cross-examine a State’s witness, pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4), as to whether, in return for his testimony, he expected or hoped for a benefit from the State in connection with pending criminal charges he was facing. View "Manchame-Guerra v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming Defendant’s conviction of second-degree assault. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his 1990 battery conviction. The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to impeach character witnesses with evidence of Defendant’s twenty-five-year-old battery conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant’s 1990 battery conviction because (1) the 1990 conviction was not irrelevant as a matter of law because the conviction had some bearing on Defendant’s character for peacefulness; and (2) Maryland Rule 5-404 unambiguously does not provide a fifteen-year limitation for rebuttal evidence. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

Because the State’s authority to nol pros applies only to charges, the State may not use its nol pros authority to alter a final judgment such as a conviction and sentence.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the State had the authority to enter a nol pros of a charge that resulted in a conviction and sentence. Defendant was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to violate the controlled dangerous substance laws. Defendant appealed. Before the court of special appeals heard oral arguments, the State nol prossed the charge underlying Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The court of appeals ruled that the State lacked the authority to nol pros a charge underlying a conviction and sentence and ultimately reversed the judgment based on insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) after a defendant has received a final judgment in the form of a conviction and sentence, the State may not enter a nolle prosequi to alter the final judgment; and (2) the State lacked the authority in this case to nol pros in order to alter the final judgment or to eliminate the appellate process initiated by Defendant. View "State v. Simms" on Justia Law

The law enforcement officers that stopped Defendant in this case had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop when they witnessed what appeared to be criminal activity immediately before the stop. Alternatively, even assuming the stop was unlawful, the evidence recovered from Defendant would be admissible because the attenuation doctrine would apply.The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals to the extent that it held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant. Alternatively, the court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court and adopted the reasoning of the concurring opinion with respect to the application of the attenuation doctrine. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to suppress should have been denied. View "Sizer v. State" on Justia Law

In this criminal case concerning the State’s obligation to disclose to a defendant’s counsel information regarding a State’s witness’s pretrial identification of a co-defendant and whether the State was required to make such a disclosure under the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals held (1) Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), by its plain language and history, does not require disclosure of pretrial identifications of co-defendants; and (2) a pretrial identification of a co-defendant is relevant information regarding pretrial identification of the defendant under Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) where the pretrial identification of the co-defendant is the equivalent of a pretrial identification of the defendant as the person responsible for the crime. Accordingly, in this case, the State was obligated to disclose during discovery a witness’s pretrial identification of Defendant’s co-defendant as the person who was not the shooter. View "Green v. State" on Justia Law

The suppression court did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress the images of his fifteen-year-old girlfriend that the police found while executing the warrant to search Petitioner’s cell phone because the warrant-issuing judge had a substantial basis for issuing the warrant to search Petitioner’s cell phone.Petitioner was convicted of possession of child pornography based in large part on photographs and a video of Petitioner’s girlfriend that the police found on his cell phone while executing a warrant to search it. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress the photographs and video, concluding that the affidavit in support of the warrant provided a substantial basis who issued the warrant to find probable cause to search the cell phone. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was a substantial basis for the judge who issued the warrant to find probable cause that Petitioner’s cell phone contained evidence of suspected criminal behavior. View "Moats v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress of evidence obtained during a search of his cell phone seized by police incident to an arrest, holding that the affidavit in support of the warrant supplied a substantial basis for the judge who issued the warrant to find probable cause to issue it. The court also took this opportunity to explain that, even if the affidavit in support of the warrant did not provide a substantial basis for the warrant-issuing judge to find probable cause to search Defendant’s cell phone, Defendant was not entitled to suppression of the evidence by application of the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule outlined in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). View "Stevenson v. State" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant who is not competent to stand trial may not be continued in pretrial detention unless the government takes steps to provide treatment to restore the defendant to competency or to have the defendant civilly committed. Maryland law allows a court to determine whether a defendant is competent; if a defendant is incompetent with the potential to be restored to competency, the court may commit the defendant for appropriate treatment, Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article 3-104. The state Department of Health (MDH) adopted a policy on admission to state psychiatric hospitals to manage the demand for the limited beds available. That policy has resulted in a waiting list for admission, which has included criminal defendants who have been found incompetent and committed for treatment. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City adopted a practice of requiring admission of a defendant to a hospital within one day of the issuance of the commitment order. When MDH failed to comply, defendants challenged the MDH policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, noting that the statute does not set a deadline for admission, nor does it authorize a court to do so; a delay in admission does not violate the statute, although it may violate the commitment order. Depending on the circumstances, a delay may violate the state due process guarantee. View "Powell v. Maryland Department of Health" on Justia Law