Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for several drug offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by police officers from his person, alleging that his detention in handcuffs while in a car that he had been driving was searched constituted an unlawful arrest and that the evidence obtained by the officers were the fruits of that arrest. The motion to suppress was denied. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the police officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and ask him to leave the vehicle based upon their belief that Defendant may have been armed and dangerous; and (2) the use of handcuffs per se does not ordinarily transform a Terry stop into an arrest, and the continued use of handcuffs by the police officers in this case constituted a Terry stop because of an ongoing concern for officer safety. View "Chase v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on several drug-related counts, which resulted in a two-day jury trial. During jury deliberations, the trial court received a jury note stating that the jury was deadlocked on a particular count (Count 1). Arrangements were made to bring Defendant to the courtroom, but Defendant had been transported to a hospital due to a medical emergency. The court summoned the jury foreperson to discuss the deadlock, and in Defendant’s absence, the judge accepted a partial verdict from the jury. Defendant was found guilty on three counts, and the trial court declared a mistrial on Count 1 on the ground of “manifest necessity.” The trial court subsequently ordered a new trial, concluding that it erred in receiving the partial verdict in Defendant’s absence. The judge, however, denied defense counsel’s motion to dismiss Count 1. The Court of Special Appeals reversed as to Count 1, concluding that, due to Defendant’s involuntary absence, manifest necessity did not exist to declare a mistrial as to Count 1, and therefore, retrial was barred by double jeopardy principles. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge erred in declaring a mistrial in Defendant’s involuntary absence without first continuing the case; and (2) double jeopardy barred a retrial of Count 1. View "State v. Hart" on Justia Law

After a deputy sheriff stopped Petitioner for a traffic violation, the officer inserted his head into the passenger side window of Petitioner’s vehicle. The officer detected the odor of marijuana, and Petitioner was placed under arrest. Petitioner filed a motion to suppress, arguing that an unconstitutional search occurred when the officer inserted his head into the passenger window. The circuit court denied Petitioner’s suppression motion. The court then found Petitioner guilty of possession of marijuana. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress because the evidence was unclear regarding the timing of the officer’s detection of the odor of marijuana, and in the absence of a finding that the officer detected the odor of marijuana before he inserted his head into the window, the State failed to satisfy its burden to show that the search was lawful. View "Grant v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor household member and several other sex offenses. Petitioner was sentenced to terms of imprisonment and required to serve supervised probation upon release with the condition that he have no unsupervised contact with minors. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in prohibiting unsupervised contact with his minor son during probation. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in imposing “a reasonable and narrowly-tailored condition of probation” that prohibited unsupervised contact with all minors, including Petitioner’s son. View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent, an instructor at a martial arts school, engaged in sexually explicit communications with his student - a fifteen-year-old girl who regularly attended his class. The communications occurred while Respondent and the student were in separate locations, usually their respective homes. The Department of Social Services concluded that Respondent had engaged in child sexual abuse under the Child abuse and Neglect Law. Under the statute, a department of social services may make a finding of indicated child sexual abuse of an individual commits the abuse while the individual has “temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of the child.” An administrative law judge (ALJ) disagreed with the Department’s conclusion, finding that Respondent did not have “care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of” the student when the inappropriate behavior occurred. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence support the ALJ’s determination that Respondent’s out-of-class behavior did not constitute child sexual abuse under the current statutory definition. View "Dep’t of Social Servs. v. B.A." on Justia Law

In 2010, Respondent, a citizen of Ecuador, pled not guilty on an agreed statement of facts and was found guilty of second-degree child abuse. In 2013, Respondent filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him regarding the immigration consequences he could face as a result of conviction. The coram nobis court denied the petition. The Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that Respondent established that trial counsel did not provide him with the correct “available advice” about the risk of deportation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that trial counsel did not perform in a constitutionally deficient manner in advising Respondent as to the immigration consequences of a conviction for second-degree child abuse. View "State v. Sanmartin Prado" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of neglect of a minor. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty days’ incarceration. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address the questions of whether Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 3-602.1, the criminal neglect of a minor statute, was unconstitutionally vague and whether the evidence was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for criminal child neglect. Remanded with directions to reverse the judgment of the circuit court. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

In 2003, Petitioner entered an Alford plea to second degree rape. Thereafter, Petitioner filed several motions for DNA testing. In 2005, the petition was granted, but the results of the testing yielded inconclusive results. In 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for DNA testing alleging that that testing a piece of underwear and additional material collected on laboratory microscope slides would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. The circuit court denied the petition pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 8-201. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that none of Petitioner’s assertions in his 2015 petition would have produced evidence which would have exculpated him of second degree rape under the standard of section 8-201(c), and therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying the petition. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

In cases consolidated for this appeal, defendants were found guilty but not criminally responsible at the time of the commission of the offense and were committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The court granted conditional releases on various occasions but each conditional release was subsequently revoked, resulting in recommitment to DHMH for treatment. The Maryland Court of Appeal held that the Circuit Court erred in determining that the statutory scheme, Criminal Procedure Article 3-114, for granting or revocation of the conditional release of a committed person violated the separation of powers provision found in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court also erred in revoking defendant’s conditional release and ordering his continued commitment for institutional inpatient care and treatment after the ALJ had found that defendant was eligible for conditional release and had recommended the same. The court held that under CP 3-114 the substantial evidence standard applies to a circuit court’s review of an ALJ’s findings of facts and recommendations. View "Stoddard v. State" on Justia Law

Cambridge Police Officer Mothersell stopped petitioner at 1:00 a.m. after observing him speeding and failing to stop at a stop sign. Mothersell – the only witness at the suppression hearing – said that, when he approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he detected a minor odor of alcohol coming from petitioner’s breath and person, even though petitioner was several feet away, in the driver’s seat. Mothersell observed that petitioner’s speech was slurred and hard to understand and that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Petitioner said that he had been at the Point Break bar. Mothersell had petitioner exit the car so he could perform field sobriety tests, which petitioner did not complete successfully. Petitioner was placed under arrest. A backup officer arrived. Mothersell placed petitioner in the rear seat of his squad car to advise him of his rights, while the backup officer searched petitioner's car and found the cocaine inside the front seat center armrest. Mothersell said that the sole purpose for the search was to locate any “other alcohol, open containers, anything pertaining to the DUI arrest.” The court denied a motion to suppress; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the ensuing conviction. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. In this case there was an articulable basis for suspicion: the arresting officer’s prior experiences of finding open containers inside the passenger compartment. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law