Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count each of first degree rape, second degree rape, second degree assault, and false imprisonment. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it excluded from evidence a police report that contained a prior allegedly inconsistent statement of the complaining witness; (2) even if the trial court erred in failing to strike testimony of an expert forensic nurse, the error was harmless; and (3) under the facts of this case, Petitioner’s conviction for false imprisonment should be merged into his conviction for first degree rape. Remanded. View "Brooks v. State" on Justia Law

In Doe I, the Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of the provisions in the Maryland sex offender registration statute that the Court deemed punitive violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. At issue in this appeal was whether sex offenders’ federal obligations require them independently to register and whether circuit courts have the authority to order the State to remove sex offender registration information from federal databases. The Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the registration obligations placed directly on individuals by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, circuit courts have the authority to compel the State to remove sex offender registration information from Maryland’s sex offender registry when the inclusion of such information is unconstitutional as established in Doe I. View "Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of murder in the first degree. The case proceeded to trial. During the jury’s deliberations and at 5 p.m. on the Friday before a three-holiday weekend, the foreperson of the jury submitted a note to the trial judge claiming that a fellow juror stated that she was willing to change her original position of voting “not guilty” if she could go home and not return to the courthouse. One-half of an hour later, the judge reminded the jurors of their proper duties. The following Tuesday, the jury found Defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge should have granted a mistrial based on the allegations in the note. The court of special appeals disagreed with Defendant and affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge, in dealing with the note, (1) did not abuse her discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial and in refusing to give a modified Allen instruction; and (2) did not violate Maryland Rule 4-326(d) by recessing for the long weekend after giving additional instructions to the jurors. View "Nash v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Ghana who arrived in the United States four years prior to his conviction, was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, second degree rape, and third degree sexual offense. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying him an interpreter for his criminal trial. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) appellate review of a trial court’s decision whether to appoint an interpreter is a process in which the reviewing court must first determine whether the trial judge’s factual findings were clearly erroneous and then, if the findings were not clearly erroneous, consider whether the trial judge abused her discretion in making the determination regarding whether to appoint an interpreter; and (2) in this case, after applying the relevant standard, the trial judge acted within his discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for an interpreter. View "Kusi v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a homicide detective with the Baltimore City Police Department, was involved in an incident with the Baltimore City Police, which resulted in Petitioner being charged with seven violations of four administrative rules. A hearing board found Petitioner guilty of two of the charges. Petitioner sought judicial review, alleging that his hearing was unfair because the Department failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of section 3-104(n)(ii) of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”). The circuit court reversed the Police Commissioner’s final order imposing the hearing board’s recommended sanction because the Department failed to disclose the information. The intermediate appellate court reversed, determining that because the information would not have tended to exonerate Petitioner of the administrative charges, it did not fall within the definition of “exculpatory.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Legislature did not intend to import Brady v. Maryland and its progeny into the administrative LEOBR process by including the term “exculpatory” in section 3-104(n). View "Ellsworth v. Baltimore Police Dep't" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were charged with criminal offenses, and both defendants waived their right to a jury trial. After bench trials, Defendants were found guilty and sentenced. Each defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. Relevant to this consolidated appeal, the courts of special appeals held that the trial courts sufficiently satisfied the announcement requirement under Md. Rule 4-246(b). The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) so long as a trial judge determines that a jury trial waiver is made both “knowingly” and “voluntarily,” or uses synonyms that represent the same concepts, the court will have complied fully with Rule 4-246(b); (2) in both cases under review, the trial judges failed to comply with Rule 4-246(b); and (3) to the extent that Valonis v. State could be read to hold that a trial judge’s alleged noncompliance with Rule 4-246(b) is reviewable by the appellate courts despite the failure to object at trial, that interpretation is disavowed. Remanded for new trials. View "Nalls v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of first, third, and fourth degree burglary, theft under $1000, and malicious destruction of property having a value of less than $500. Defendant appealed, challenging the trial judge’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial judge sufficiently satisfied the announcement requirement under Md. Rule 4-246(b). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) because the trial judge’s announcement did not state that Defendant’s jury trial waiver was both knowing and voluntary, the judge did not comply with Rule 4-246(b); and (2) the appropriate sanction for the judge’s noncompliance with Rule 4-246 was reversal. View "Szwed v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with two counts each of possession of cocaine and distribution of cocaine. On the day of trial, Petitioner waived his right to a jury. Petitioner then pled not guilty as to one of the distribution charges. After a plea colloquy, the trial court found the plea to be “knowing and voluntary.” Petitioner was found guilty of distribution of cocaine after a bench trial. Petitioner appealed, contesting the validity of the court’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s announcement after the plea colloquy that Petitioner’s actions were “knowing and voluntary” was sufficient to establish that the judge analyzed the disposition and appearance of Petitioner in order to determine Petitioner’s actual understanding and voluntariness for both the jury waiver and the plea. View "Morgan v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner, a dentist, was convicted of various sexual crimes against a minor patient. In the circuit court, while self-represented, Petitioner filed a petition for DNA testing, requesting that the clothes the victim wore on the day of her rape be tested. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed, arguing that, under Maryland Rule 4-707(b), he was entitled to appointed counsel at the hearing on the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Rule 4-707(b) does not entitle an indigent petitioner to be appointed counsel for the purposes of a petition under Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 8-201; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not considering whether to appoint counsel for Defendant for purposes of the petition under section 8-201; and (3) the circuit court applied the correct standard in ruling on the petition under section 8-201. View "Fuster v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of armed carjacking and other crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by giving an “anti-CSI effect” jury instruction. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in giving the “anti-CSI effect” jury instruction, as Defendant never misstated the law; but (2) the abuse of discretion in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was of no significance to the verdict. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law