Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1976, Petitioner Merle Unger was indicted for felony murder, armed robbery, and using a handgun in the commission of the felony. During the trial, the trial judge told the jury that all of the judge's instructions as to the law were advisory. In 1996, Unger filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the judge's instructions at his 1976 trial violated his right to due process of law because they empowered jurors to ignore the law. The post-conviction trial court granted a new trial. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that because Unger did not object to the advisory instructions given in his case, he waived his right to receive postconviction relief. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the trial judge's instructions at Unger's trial, telling the jury that all of the court's instructions on legal matters were "merely advisory" were clearly in error, at least as applied to matters implicating federal constitutional rights.

After his convictions for attempted second-degree murder, attempted armed carjacking, and first-degree assault, Petitioner Chaz Bazzle appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and (2) allowing a witness to testify as to the certainty of his eyewitness identification. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence did not generate an instruction on voluntary intoxication because it was insufficient to allow a jury to rationally conclude that Petitioner was so intoxicated that he was unable to form the intent necessary to constitute his crimes; and (2) Petitioner failed to preserve his objection to the witness's testimony because the trial court, by stating that it would overrule the objection unless grounds were provided, triggered the requirement that Petitioner provide grounds or lose the opportunity to raise the objection on appeal.

Petitioner Daniel McNeal was convicted by a jury of possessing a handgun after conviction of a disqualifying crime but, in the same trial, acquitted of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. McNeal appealed, arguing that the Court of Appeals' opinion in Price v. State, which held that clearly and legally inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal cases were prohibited in Maryland, prohibited these factually inconsistent jury verdicts. The court of special appeals upheld McNeal's guilty verdict because the inconsistency between an acquittal for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun and a conviction for possession of a handgun after prior conviction of a disqualifying crime was based on the jury's conclusions of fact, not of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that its opinion in Price, which applies to verdicts that are legally inconsistent, does not apply to jury verdicts in criminal cases that are merely inconsistent factually, illogical, or "curious."

Petitioner Michael McCloud applied for a handgun permit but was denied because in 2006 he had been convicted in the District of Columbia of attempting to carry a pistol without a license. In denying Petitioner's application, the state police relied on the Maryland attorney general's opinion advising that an out-of-state conviction can disqualify an applicant from obtaining a handgun permit. The permit denial was reversed by the state police's handgun permit review board, which held that the opinion did not apply to Petitioner's situation. The denial was reinstated by the circuit court. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the court of special appeals did not err in adopting the views expressed in the attorney general's opinion to determine what constitutes a disqualifying crime; (2) accordingly, Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 5-101(g)(3) and 5-133(b)(1), which define a disqualifying crime, include out-of-state convictions; and (3) when determining whether such a conviction is a disqualifying crime, an agency must look to the maximum penalty for the equivalent offense in Maryland.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner McKenzie Nicolas was convicted of resisting arrest and second degree assault stemming from a confrontation with two officers at Petitioner's home. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the appellate record does not establish that the trial court received the jury communication in order to trigger the requirements of Md. Rule 4-326(d); but (2) the court of special appeals erred in holding that Petitioner's convictions for second degree assault do not merge into his conviction for resisting arrest for sentencing purposes where the record is ambiguous as to whether the jury convicted Petitioner of second degree assault based on acts different than those underlying his conviction for resisting arrest. Remanded.

Petitioner Ocie Black was convicted of child sexual abuse, second degree sex abuse, and third degree sex abuse and sentenced to thirty-two years incarceration. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in failing to disclose a jury note to him and his trial counsel. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a jury note with no date or time stamp found in the appellate record does not establish that the trial court received the jury communication at issue in order to trigger the requirements of Md. Rule 4-326(d), which governs communications between a jury and the trial court; and (2) therefore, the trial court's responsibilities under the rule were never triggered.

Montgomery County law enforcement officers, situated at a "listening post" in Montgomery County, and operating under an ex pare order issued by a judge of the county circuit court under the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, intercepted a mobile phone communication from a target mobile phone, caller, and receiver located in Virginia. As a result of the intercepted communication, the police seized from the caller, Tyrone Davis, controlled dangerous substances when he returned to his Maryland residence. Davis moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the wiretap order did not authorize interception of the extraterritorial communication. The hearing judge denied Davis's motion to suppress, citing federal case law defining the location of an "interception" as where the mobile communication was first intercepted or redirected and where it was first heard by law enforcement officers. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed after adopting the federal standard for determining the proper jurisdiction and scope for an ex parte wiretap order, holding that as long as the "listening post" where an officer first hears the intercepted communications is within the geographical jurisdiction of the court issuing the order, the interception is proper under the Maryland statute.

While incarcerated, Petitioner Daniel Genies masturbated in sight of a female correctional officer, while smiling and making eye contact with her, despite her orders to stop. Genies was subsequently charged with committing the common law offense of indecent exposure and violating Md. Code Ann. Corr. Servs. 8-803, which prohibits an inmate with intent to harass a correctional officer from indecently exposing private parts of the inmate's body in the officer's presence. A jury acquitted Genies of the statutory offense but convicted him of the common law offense. The court of special appeals affirmed. Genies appealed, arguing that the statutory, specific intent crime preempted the field, with respect to indecent exposure by an inmate to a correctional officer, and thus the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of common law indecent exposure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in failing to dismiss the common law charge because section 8-803 was intended to serve as a discrete offense, supplementing rather than supplanting the common law, so both prevailed; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Genies's motion for a new trial without a hearing.

Petitioner Muhammad Abdul-Maleek was convicted in the district court of theft. Petitioner exercised his right to appeal and was afforded a de novo trial by jury in the circuit court. The jury likewise convicted Petitioner of left, and the circuit court imposed a more severe sentence than that imposed by the district court. Petitioner appealed, asserting that the circuit court impermissibly based his sentence on the fact that he exercised his right to appeal and receive a de novo jury trial. The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, holding that Petitioner was entitled to resentencing because the court's comments at sentencing could cause a reasonable person to conclude that the sentence was based in part on Petitioner's exercise of his right to a de novo trial on appeal. Remanded for resentencing.

Appellant Alonzo King was arrested in 2009 on first- and second-degree assault charges. Pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act, King's DNA was collected, analyzed, and entered into Maryland's DNA database. King was convicted on the second-degree assault charge but, pending his trial on that charge, his DNA profile generated a match to a DNA sample collected from a sexual assault forensic examination conducted on the victim of an unsolved 2003 rape. This hit provided the sole probable cause for a subsequent grant jury indictment of King for the rape. A later-obtained search warrant ordered collection from King of an additional reference DNA sample, which also matched the DNA profile from the 2003 rape. King was subsequently convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the portions of the DNA Act authorizing collection of a DNA sample from a mere arrestee were unconstitutional as applied to King, as the State had no probable cause or individualized suspicion supporting obtention of the DNA sample collection for King's first- and second-degree assault charges.