Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A police officer was dispatched to investigate a two-car collision, where she determined that one of the cars involved in the collision was owned by Respondent, Dana Carpenter. After a post-crash investigation, the officer requested Carpenter to submit to a chemical breath test, and Carpenter refused. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) suspended Carpenter's license for refusal to submit to the breath test. The circuit court reversed the suspension, determining that the police officer did not possess reasonable grounds to detain Carpenter. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that, pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Transp. 16-205.1(b)(2), the ALJ's determination that the police officer had reasonable grounds to detain Carpenter was supported by substantial evidence and was not premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. Remanded with directions to affirm the decision of the ALJ.

After three separate trials for several criminal offenses, Appellant Benoit Tshiwala was sentenced to an aggregate of seventy years in prison. Appellant subsequently filed an application for review of his sentences, and a three-judge review panel reduced the total period of imprisonment to thirty-nine years. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was denied. Appellant then instituted the present action by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Md. R. Crim. P. 4-345(a), alleging that the three judges who denied reconsideration were not authorized to rule on the motion. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Tshiwala's claim was not cognizable under a motion to correct an illegal sentence because Tshiwala's claim did not involve an "illegal sentence" within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a).

Plaintiffs, each of whom was arrested for a crime that qualified as a serious offense and requested an attorney to represent him or her at the initial appearance, sought a declaration that they and the class of indigent persons they represented had the right, under the federal and state constitutions and the Public Defender Act, to be represented by the public defender at bail hearings, which were conducted as part of the initial appearance before commissioners at the central booking jail. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, entered a declaratory judgment, and denied Plaintiffs' request for an injunction to enforce the rights declared. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the bail hearing that occurs at the initial appearance before a Commissioner is a stage of the criminal proceeding under the Act; and (2) consequently, if a defendant qualifies for public defender representation, a bail hearing may not occur at the initial appearance unless the defendant has been afforded appointed counsel or waived the right to counsel.

Petitioner Gary Smith was convicted at a jury trial of depraved heart second-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. The principle issue at trial was whether the decedent was murdered or committed suicide. Smith appealed, contending, inter alia, that the trial court erroneously excluded certain defense evidence relating to the decedent's state of mind. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the excluded evidence was too remote and not reliable. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting prosecution evidence of the decedent's 'normal' state of mind but refusing to admit equally relevant defense evidence of the decedent's 'depressed' state of mind. Remanded for a new trial.

Petitioner Gerald Titus was convicted by a jury of obstructing and hindering a police officer in the performance of his duty, driving under the influence of alcohol per se, driving while impaired by alcohol, and giving a false or fictitious name to a uniformed police officer. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner's conviction for obstructing and hindering, holding that the evidence presented by the State at trial with regard to this offense was insufficient to prove the necessary elements beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no evidence at trial to show how Petitioner's conduct actually obstructed or hindered a law enforcement officer in performing his duties.

Defendant Mario Gutierrez was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence following the shooting death of the victim. At trial, witnesses testified that the incident was related to Defendant's affiliation with a street gang. The trial court permitted testimony of a gang expert who generally described the violent customs of the gang. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) expert testimony about the history, hierarchy, and common practices of a street gang is permissible where fact evidence establishes that the crime charged was gang-related and the probative value of the testimony is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice to the defendant; and (2) the circuit court in this case did not abuse its discretion in permitting the gang expert to testify because ample fact evidence established a connection between the victim's shooting death and the street gang, and although the unfair prejudice of one of expert's statements outweighed its probative value, the error was harmless.

Petitioner Christopher Mansfield was tried in a bench trial at the circuit court on five counts charging statutory sex-related offenses. At the close of the evidence, the trial judge, sua sponte and over Petitioner's objection, declared a mistrial, explaining that her knowledge of Petitioner's prior convictions and the partiality it engendered made a mistrial manifestly necessary. Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that there was not manifest necessity for the granting of the mistrial where the trial judge had knowing of Petitioner's prior convictions well before the trial began. The motions judge and the court of special appeals upheld the decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under these circumstances, when it is the court that is the trier of facts, and the court's impartiality, whether due to a personal bias or prejudice toward a criminal defendant or an inability to resolve disputed factual allegations, is impaired, manifest necessity does not exist when the reasonable alternative of recusal existed prior to jeopardy attaching. Remanded.

Appellant Norman Derr was convicted of multiple sexual offenses in circuit court. On appeal, Derr challenged the admission of forensic evidence introduced at trial through the testimony of an expert witness who did not take part in or observe the physical testing of the evidence or independently determine the test results. At issue on appeal was whether the admission of the evidence and the testimony of the expert witness violated Derr's constitutional right to confrontation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a testimonial statement may not be introduced into evidence without the in-court testimony of the declarant, unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness; and (2) the trial judge in this case erred in admitting the results of scientific testing through a surrogate analyst who did not, on the basis of the record, perform or observe the actual testing.

A jury convicted Petitioner Robert Thomas of carrying a handgun. Petitioner appealed, contending that the trial court erred in not allowing him to impeach a State's witness's testimony with evidence of either the witness's prior conviction or the conduct underlying that conviction. The court of special appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing either form of impeachment evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding the trial court (1) did not err or abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Petitioner to make impeachment use of the witness's prior conviction, but (2) committed reversible error in denying Petitioner's request to make impeachment use of the conduct underlying the prior conviction. Remanded for a new trial.

In 1974, Appellant Douglas Arey was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. In 2002, Arey filed a petition for postconviction DNA testing of evidence related to his conviction. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that the evidence related to Arey's conviction no longer existed. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Arey's petition, holding (1) the circuit court's ruling that the State had performed a reasonable search for biological evidence relating to Arey's conviction was premature; and (2) the circuit court erred in ruling on Arey's petition for testing only two days after the State submitted an affidavit from a key witness because the court's ruling did not give Arey a reasonable opportunity to respond to the factual allegations contained in that affidavit prior to dismissal. Remanded.