Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Three separate sets of repairs were made to a waste hauler purchased by Consolidated Waste from Standard Equipment. Consolidated Waste filed a complaint in circuit court, seeking to recoup the cost of the second round of repairs and claiming that the first and second set of repairs, performed by Standard Equipment, were made in such a way as to constitute a breach of contract and negligence. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Standard Equipment. After appealing to the court of special appeals, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion (1) by excluding evidence of the third round of repairs, performed by a different company, as a reasonable trial judge could have determined that the danger of prejudice outweighed substantially any probative value of the evidence; and (2) by utilizing a verdict sheet supplied by Standard Equipment.

After a jury trial, Kendall Northam was convicted of second degree murder and first degree assault. During the proceedings, Northam, who was represented by an assistant public defender, filed a pro se motion for change of venue that included a request for a court-appointed attorney. The motion was denied. On appeal, the court of special appeals held that Northam was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the circuit court had failed to comply with the requirements of Md. R. Crim. P. 4-215(e) by failing to permit Northam to explain the reasons for his request to discharge defense counsel. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed, holding that Northam waived his right to appellate review of the claim on the ground that he was not permitted to explain the reasons for requesting permission to discharge defense counsel.

Petitioner Leroy Evans appealed his conviction for the unlawful obliteration, removal, change, or alteration of a manufacturer's identification mark or number on a firearm pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 5-142, asserting that Section 5-142 does not contain a penalty provision, and therefore, penalizing him for altering a manufacturer's identification mark on a firearm was unlawful. The court of special appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and held that the omission of a penalty provision in or related to Section 5-142, which prohibits obliterating, removing, changing, or altering the manufacturer's identification mark or number, renders Section 5-142 incapable of sustaining a criminal conviction. Accordingly, the Court reversed petitioner's conviction and remanded the case.

In the circuit court, a jury convicted petitioner Justin Hannah of the attempted murder of his former girlfriend's new boyfriend. After petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the court of special appeals, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding that the admission of defense evidence that petitioner did not own or have access to a gun did not justify the admission into evidence of rap lyrics produced by petitioner two years before the offense which dealt with guns and violence. The Court concluded that the erroneous introduction of petitioner's writings did not constitute harmless error, and thus petitioner was entitled to a new trial.

Petitioner Lamar Harris was charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Court proceedings had stalled in the preliminary stages due to a disagreement about the propriety of the trial judge's pretrial rulings ordering discovery of certain records and testimony pertaining to Harris's court-ordered competency evaluation and in-patient treatment at hospital. Harris sought review on the merits regarding the trial judge's denial of Harris's motion for a protective order resulting from service of subpoenas on one of Harris's treating physicians and the hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding (1) the issue of whether privileged information was improperly disclosed at the competency determination phase may be addressed after Harris is convicted; and (2) because Harris may seek an appellate determination of the propriety of the discovery orders after a final judgment, there was no reason to expand the pool of exceptions to the court's final judgment rule.

After a jury trial, petitioner Ricky Savoy was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and carrying a handgun. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court's instruction to the jury on the standard of proof violated due process by reducing the state's burden of proof to below the constitutionally-required standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner made no objection to the instruction at trial and argued to the court of special appeals that the erroneous instruction was a structural error that is per se reversible, even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection. He argued, alternatively, that the intermediate appellate court should reverse the judgments on the basis of plain error, as permitted by Maryland Rule 4-325(e). The intermediate appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) that the intermediate appellate court erred when it held that the reasonable doubt instructions did not constitute structural error or violate petitioner's fundamental right to a fair trial; and (2) this case was appropriate for the exercise of plain error review.

Respondent Frank Loane filed a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his driver's license should not be suspended after he refused to submit to a chemical breath test upon being stopped by a police officer for failing to obey lane directions. Respondent argued that his license could not be suspended unless the MVA first proved where the stop occurred, whether on a highway or private property used by the public in general, in accordance with Md. Code Ann. Transp. II 16-205.1. The ALJ rejected respondent's argument that the MVA failed to prove the location and then suspended respondent's driver's license for 120 days pursuant to the statute. Respondent filed a petition for judicial review of the ALJ's decision. The circuit court determined there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding and reversed and remanded the case. The MVA filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the statute does not require the MVA to prove at the show cause administrative hearing that the officer stopped respondent on a highway or private property used by the public in general. Remanded.

Petitioner Raymond Lupfer was convicted of second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence. During the trial, the prosecution elicited testimony regarding the fact that Lupfer remained silent after he was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. Petitioner appealed. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, explaining that a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence is permissible where the silence is introduced for the limited purpose of rebutting an impression created by the defendant that defendant cooperated fully with the police. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that because Lupfer did not open the door sufficiently under the open door doctrine with his statements at trial regarding his pre-arrest actions and intentions, the state was not entitled to elicit testimony regarding his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence. The Court concluded that when the prosecution elicits such evidence to rebut an implication that the defendant merely intended, at some undetermined point in the future, to cooperate with police, the probative value of such evidence is dwarfed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Petitioners Donna and Hilton Silver owned three horses found by police in terrible health. One horse had to be euthanized, and the other two were sent to a rescue farm for rehabilitation. The state charged the Silvers with three counts of animal cruelty. At a de novo trial in circuit court, the state pursued only the charge relating to the horse that died. At trial, the circuit court heard evidence regarding the condition of the other two horses and convicted the Silvers each of one count of animal cruelty. As a condition of probation, the court ordered the Silvers to pay restitution to the rescue farm. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court was not permitted to order restitution for the other horses with regard to whom the defendants were not convicted of a crime and vacated that order. The Court affirmed the rest of the circuit court's judgments, holding (1) the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Silvers' motion to strike and instead granted them a short continuance and opportunity to examine belatedly delivered discovery documents; and (2) the lower court did not err in admitting photographs of the surviving horses.

Petitioners Policarpio Perez and Adam Canela were convicted of murder and related offenses in circuit court. During the course of the trial, jury members sent more than thirty notes to the court, seeking clarification of testimony and asking questions relating to the case. Of those notes, six were not disclosed to counsel for the defense or the state, or to the petitioners. Petitioners appealed, challenging the failure of the trial judge to disclose jury notes in accordance with Md. Rule 4-326(d). The state agreed that the trial judge erred in not disclosing the notes. At issue was whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the court of special appeals erred in applying a weakened harmless error test to the erroneous non-disclosure to counsel of the six substantive jury notes. The Court concluded that it was not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial judge's failure to disclose the receipt of the jury notes to counsel did not influence the jury's verdict.