Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

James Russell Trimble, who was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes committed when he was 17 years old, filed a motion for a reduction of his sentence under Maryland's Juvenile Restoration Act (JUVRA). This act allows individuals convicted as minors and who have served at least 20 years to seek a sentence reduction. Trimble argued that his age at the time of the offense and his rehabilitation efforts warranted a reduced sentence.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied Trimble's motion, finding that his age at the time of the crime did not support a sentence reduction, and that he continued to pose a danger to the public. The court also did not credit the testimony of Trimble's expert, who argued that Trimble's antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) had remitted. The court emphasized the brutal nature of the crime and the lasting impact on the victim's family.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. The appellate court found that the circuit court had adequately considered all the required factors under JUVRA, including Trimble's age, rehabilitation efforts, and expert testimony. The appellate court also noted that the circuit court was not required to give special consideration to any particular factor, including rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that under JUVRA, the circuit court has broad discretion to determine whether an individual is a danger to the public and whether the interests of justice will be served by a reduced sentence. The court is required to consider ten enumerated factors but is not required to give special consideration to any particular factor. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court had properly exercised its discretion in denying Trimble's motion for a reduced sentence. View "Trimble v. State" on Justia Law

Amondre Clark filed a successful petition for writ of habeas corpus after several of his convictions were vacated on October 20, 2023. The Division of Correction did not execute the next valid sentences and apply credit for time served under the vacated convictions. Instead, the Division tolled his next valid consecutive sentences, waiting to see if the State’s reprosecution would result in a new conviction. On April 17, 2024, Clark pled guilty to one charge and was sentenced to a new "time served" sentence. However, the Division did not release him, treating the new sentence as a "replacement sentence" for one of the vacated sentences and tacking on the consecutive sentences it had tolled.Clark filed a petition for habeas relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, arguing that the Division incorrectly interpreted CP § 6-218(c) and (d). The habeas court agreed, ordering his immediate release. The Division appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, but the Supreme Court of Maryland granted Clark’s petition for a writ of certiorari.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that under CP § 6-218(d), when a criminal defendant’s term of confinement consists of multiple sentences and one or more convictions underlying those sentences is vacated, the defendant is entitled to receive credit for time served when the conviction is vacated, commencing on the date of the first invalidated sentence. The court also held that if a defendant is reprosecuted or retried and a new conviction results, CP § 6-218(c) applies to any leftover credit after credit has been given under CP § 6-218(d). The new sentence should be in last place in a chain of consecutive sentences, and the sentencing judge may make the new sentence consecutive or concurrent to any then-existing sentences.The court vacated the judgment of the habeas court and remanded the case to the habeas court with instructions to vacate the sentence entered on April 17, 2024, and remand the matter to the sentencing court to exercise its discretion with a full understanding of the status of the valid sentences. View "Bivens v. Clark" on Justia Law

Dallas Fenton was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen-year-old child, including eight counts of third-degree sexual offense, one count of sexual solicitation of a minor, and one count of indecent exposure. He was sentenced to ten years for one of the third-degree sexual offenses (Count 1) and another ten years for a different third-degree sexual offense (Count 8), to be served consecutively.The Division of Correction (DOC) informed Fenton that he would not receive diminution of confinement credits for the sentence on Count 8 because he had been previously convicted of a similar offense (Count 1). Fenton's grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office (IGO) was dismissed, and the Circuit Court for Washington County partially granted and partially denied his petition for judicial review, ruling that he was entitled to good conduct credits but not other types of diminution credits for Count 8.The Appellate Court of Maryland held that Fenton was not prohibited from accruing diminution credits for Count 8, as the statute only applied if the previous conviction occurred before the commission of the offense for which the sentence was being served. The court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for recalculation of Fenton's credits.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, holding that under Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-702(c), diminution credits are precluded only if the offense was committed after a previous conviction for the same offense. The court concluded that Fenton was entitled to diminution credits for Count 8, as he had not been "previously convicted" at the time of the offense. View "Dept. of Pub. Saf. & Corr. Serv. v. Fenton" on Justia Law

Robert L. Fooks was convicted by the Circuit Court for Wicomico County for violating Section 5-133(b)(2) of the Public Safety Article, which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of a common law crime and sentenced to more than two years in prison. Fooks, who had a prior conviction for constructive criminal contempt and a sentence exceeding four years, argued that this statute violated his Second Amendment rights.The Circuit Court denied Fooks's motion to dismiss the firearms-related counts, and he entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts, reserving his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue. The Appellate Court of Maryland upheld the statute's constitutionality, affirming Fooks's convictions. Fooks then sought review from the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Section 5-133(b)(2) is consistent with the Second Amendment. The court noted that the statute is effectively a prohibition on firearm possession by felons, which the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly identified as presumptively lawful. The court also found that such prohibitions are consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, which has long included disarming individuals deemed to present a special danger, including those who have committed serious crimes. The court concluded that the statute is constitutional both on its face and as applied to Fooks. View "Fooks v. State" on Justia Law

Stephen Zimmerman pled guilty to second-degree assault and was sentenced to ten years, with all but the time served in pretrial detention suspended, and placed on three years of supervised probation. In October 2022, Zimmerman was charged with violating his probation. The District Court of Maryland in Frederick County found him in violation, revoked his probation, and imposed a seven-year custodial sentence. Zimmerman appealed de novo to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, which also found him in violation and imposed the same seven-year sentence. Zimmerman’s motion for a new trial was denied, and he subsequently filed a pro se “Motion for Appeal.”The Appellate Court of Maryland docketed Zimmerman’s motion as an application for leave to appeal and directed the State to respond. The State moved to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court of Maryland, arguing that the Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction. The Appellate Court granted the motion, reasoning that further appellate review of a circuit court decision issued in its appellate capacity must be pursued in the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Appellate Court of Maryland lacked jurisdiction to consider Zimmerman’s appeal. Under § 12-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of a circuit court entered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over District Court cases. Therefore, any further review must be sought by petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision to transfer the case and instructed Zimmerman to file a proper petition for writ of certiorari within 30 days if he sought further review. View "Zimmerman v. State" on Justia Law

Seamus Coyle was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Due to a conflict of interest, the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) assigned a panel attorney to represent Coyle in his direct appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which affirmed his convictions. The panel attorney discussed filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with Coyle and the OPD and was authorized to file the petition but failed to do so. Coyle then petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied Coyle’s petition for postconviction relief, finding that the issues raised on appeal were neither novel nor important from a public policy standpoint and that there was no possibility that the Supreme Court of Maryland would have granted certiorari. Coyle’s application for leave to appeal was granted, but the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, concluding that Coyle did not have a right to counsel for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari and thus was not deprived of due process.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that, based on the plain language of the Maryland Public Defender Act, where an attorney is authorized by the OPD to represent an indigent defendant in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari, the attorney must provide effective assistance of counsel. The Court concluded that the panel attorney’s conduct in failing to file the petition fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and constituted deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. The Court held that prejudice is established because the defendant was deprived of the opportunity to have the petition considered. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed, and Coyle was permitted to file a belated petition for a writ of certiorari. View "Coyle v. State" on Justia Law

Harry Davis, Jr. was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of second-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, two counts of second-degree assault, and one count of openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon. He was sentenced to 72 years in prison. After sentencing, the judge informed Davis of his right to appeal and to file a motion for modification of sentence within 90 days but did not advise him of his right to counsel for filing such a motion. Davis filed an appeal, which was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Maryland. No motion for modification of sentence was filed on his behalf.Davis later filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion for modification of sentence. The Circuit Court denied the petition, stating that there was no evidence Davis had asked his counsel to file the motion. Davis appealed, and the Appellate Court granted his application for leave to appeal and certified questions to the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a defendant can establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to file a motion for modification of sentence by demonstrating that counsel failed to consult with the defendant about filing the motion and that this failure was unreasonable. The Court overruled previous decisions that suggested a per se rule either requiring or not requiring a request from the defendant. The Court concluded that Davis’s trial counsel’s failure to consult with him about filing a motion for modification of sentence constituted deficient performance and that Davis was prejudiced by losing the opportunity to have the motion considered. The Court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded the case, allowing Davis to file a belated motion for modification of sentence. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Fred Cromartie was convicted of second-degree assault and other offenses following an altercation in a parking lot, which was recorded by surveillance cameras. The State alleged that Cromartie was one of the shooters, and his defense was self-defense. During the trial, the defense invoked Maryland Rule 5-615 to exclude witnesses from the courtroom while others testified. The State designated Detective Courtney Moore, a witness, as its representative, allowing him to remain in the courtroom.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County allowed the State's designation over the defense's objection. The jury convicted Cromartie of several charges but acquitted him of others. Cromartie appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in allowing the State to designate Detective Moore as its representative and that Moore's testimony constituted improper lay opinion identification testimony.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. The court did not resolve whether the circuit court erred in permitting the State to designate Detective Moore as its representative because any such error was deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that Moore's testimony was not improperly influenced by other testimony he heard before testifying and that his presence did not improperly bolster the State's case.Regarding the lay opinion testimony, the court concluded that Cromartie did not preserve his argument that Moore's testimony identifying individuals in the video was improper. The court noted that the identity of the individuals was not in dispute and had already been established, including by the defense. Additionally, the defense did not request a continuing objection or object to subsequent similar questions and answers.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. View "Cromartie v. State" on Justia Law

Fred Cromartie was convicted of second-degree assault and other offenses following an altercation in a parking lot, which was recorded by surveillance cameras. The State alleged that Cromartie was one of the shooters, and his defense was self-defense. During the trial, the defense invoked Maryland Rule 5-615 to exclude witnesses from the courtroom while others testified. The State designated Detective Courtney Moore, a witness, as its representative, which the court allowed over the defense's objection.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County permitted Detective Moore to sit at the State's counsel table during the trial. The jury heard testimony from Jalen Hayes, who identified Cromartie and others in the video, and from Detective Moore, who testified about his investigation and the crime scene. The jury convicted Cromartie of second-degree assault, possessing a firearm after a disqualifying crime, and carrying a loaded handgun, but acquitted him of other charges.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to determine if the circuit court erred in allowing the State to designate Detective Moore as its representative and if his testimony constituted improper lay opinion under Rule 5-701. The court did not resolve the first issue, finding any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as Detective Moore's testimony was not improperly influenced by other testimony. On the second issue, the court found that Cromartie did not preserve his objection to Detective Moore's identification testimony and that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment. View "Cromartie v. State" on Justia Law

In 1992, Abras Sandy Q. Morrison was convicted in the Circuit Court for Carroll County of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and related conspiracy charges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, with additional concurrent sentences for the other charges. The prosecutor had filed a notice of intent to seek a life without parole sentence more than thirty days before the trial. The court considered the facts, including Morrison's detailed confession and the pre-sentence report, before imposing the sentence.Morrison's convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Court of Maryland in 1993. He later filed two petitions for postconviction relief, which were denied by the circuit court in 1999. His application for leave to appeal was also denied. In 2023, Morrison filed a pro se petition for postconviction DNA testing under CP § 8-201, seeking to test a hair and a blood-stained towel, claiming the results could produce mitigating evidence regarding his sentence. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing, and Morrison appealed.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that there was no reasonable probability that DNA testing of the hair would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to Morrison's claim of wrongful sentencing. The court noted that Morrison's detailed confession and other evidence established his participation in the crime, and DNA testing would not negate his culpability. The court concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying the petition for DNA testing. View "Morrison v. State" on Justia Law