Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Robert L. Fooks was convicted by the Circuit Court for Wicomico County for violating Section 5-133(b)(2) of the Public Safety Article, which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of a common law crime and sentenced to more than two years in prison. Fooks, who had a prior conviction for constructive criminal contempt and a sentence exceeding four years, argued that this statute violated his Second Amendment rights.The Circuit Court denied Fooks's motion to dismiss the firearms-related counts, and he entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts, reserving his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue. The Appellate Court of Maryland upheld the statute's constitutionality, affirming Fooks's convictions. Fooks then sought review from the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Section 5-133(b)(2) is consistent with the Second Amendment. The court noted that the statute is effectively a prohibition on firearm possession by felons, which the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly identified as presumptively lawful. The court also found that such prohibitions are consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, which has long included disarming individuals deemed to present a special danger, including those who have committed serious crimes. The court concluded that the statute is constitutional both on its face and as applied to Fooks. View "Fooks v. State" on Justia Law

Stephen Zimmerman pled guilty to second-degree assault and was sentenced to ten years, with all but the time served in pretrial detention suspended, and placed on three years of supervised probation. In October 2022, Zimmerman was charged with violating his probation. The District Court of Maryland in Frederick County found him in violation, revoked his probation, and imposed a seven-year custodial sentence. Zimmerman appealed de novo to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, which also found him in violation and imposed the same seven-year sentence. Zimmerman’s motion for a new trial was denied, and he subsequently filed a pro se “Motion for Appeal.”The Appellate Court of Maryland docketed Zimmerman’s motion as an application for leave to appeal and directed the State to respond. The State moved to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court of Maryland, arguing that the Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction. The Appellate Court granted the motion, reasoning that further appellate review of a circuit court decision issued in its appellate capacity must be pursued in the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Appellate Court of Maryland lacked jurisdiction to consider Zimmerman’s appeal. Under § 12-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of a circuit court entered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over District Court cases. Therefore, any further review must be sought by petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision to transfer the case and instructed Zimmerman to file a proper petition for writ of certiorari within 30 days if he sought further review. View "Zimmerman v. State" on Justia Law

Seamus Coyle was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Due to a conflict of interest, the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) assigned a panel attorney to represent Coyle in his direct appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which affirmed his convictions. The panel attorney discussed filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with Coyle and the OPD and was authorized to file the petition but failed to do so. Coyle then petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied Coyle’s petition for postconviction relief, finding that the issues raised on appeal were neither novel nor important from a public policy standpoint and that there was no possibility that the Supreme Court of Maryland would have granted certiorari. Coyle’s application for leave to appeal was granted, but the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, concluding that Coyle did not have a right to counsel for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari and thus was not deprived of due process.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that, based on the plain language of the Maryland Public Defender Act, where an attorney is authorized by the OPD to represent an indigent defendant in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari, the attorney must provide effective assistance of counsel. The Court concluded that the panel attorney’s conduct in failing to file the petition fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and constituted deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. The Court held that prejudice is established because the defendant was deprived of the opportunity to have the petition considered. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed, and Coyle was permitted to file a belated petition for a writ of certiorari. View "Coyle v. State" on Justia Law

Harry Davis, Jr. was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of second-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, two counts of second-degree assault, and one count of openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon. He was sentenced to 72 years in prison. After sentencing, the judge informed Davis of his right to appeal and to file a motion for modification of sentence within 90 days but did not advise him of his right to counsel for filing such a motion. Davis filed an appeal, which was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Maryland. No motion for modification of sentence was filed on his behalf.Davis later filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion for modification of sentence. The Circuit Court denied the petition, stating that there was no evidence Davis had asked his counsel to file the motion. Davis appealed, and the Appellate Court granted his application for leave to appeal and certified questions to the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a defendant can establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to file a motion for modification of sentence by demonstrating that counsel failed to consult with the defendant about filing the motion and that this failure was unreasonable. The Court overruled previous decisions that suggested a per se rule either requiring or not requiring a request from the defendant. The Court concluded that Davis’s trial counsel’s failure to consult with him about filing a motion for modification of sentence constituted deficient performance and that Davis was prejudiced by losing the opportunity to have the motion considered. The Court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded the case, allowing Davis to file a belated motion for modification of sentence. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Fred Cromartie was convicted of second-degree assault and other offenses following an altercation in a parking lot, which was recorded by surveillance cameras. The State alleged that Cromartie was one of the shooters, and his defense was self-defense. During the trial, the defense invoked Maryland Rule 5-615 to exclude witnesses from the courtroom while others testified. The State designated Detective Courtney Moore, a witness, as its representative, allowing him to remain in the courtroom.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County allowed the State's designation over the defense's objection. The jury convicted Cromartie of several charges but acquitted him of others. Cromartie appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in allowing the State to designate Detective Moore as its representative and that Moore's testimony constituted improper lay opinion identification testimony.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. The court did not resolve whether the circuit court erred in permitting the State to designate Detective Moore as its representative because any such error was deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that Moore's testimony was not improperly influenced by other testimony he heard before testifying and that his presence did not improperly bolster the State's case.Regarding the lay opinion testimony, the court concluded that Cromartie did not preserve his argument that Moore's testimony identifying individuals in the video was improper. The court noted that the identity of the individuals was not in dispute and had already been established, including by the defense. Additionally, the defense did not request a continuing objection or object to subsequent similar questions and answers.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. View "Cromartie v. State" on Justia Law

Fred Cromartie was convicted of second-degree assault and other offenses following an altercation in a parking lot, which was recorded by surveillance cameras. The State alleged that Cromartie was one of the shooters, and his defense was self-defense. During the trial, the defense invoked Maryland Rule 5-615 to exclude witnesses from the courtroom while others testified. The State designated Detective Courtney Moore, a witness, as its representative, which the court allowed over the defense's objection.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County permitted Detective Moore to sit at the State's counsel table during the trial. The jury heard testimony from Jalen Hayes, who identified Cromartie and others in the video, and from Detective Moore, who testified about his investigation and the crime scene. The jury convicted Cromartie of second-degree assault, possessing a firearm after a disqualifying crime, and carrying a loaded handgun, but acquitted him of other charges.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to determine if the circuit court erred in allowing the State to designate Detective Moore as its representative and if his testimony constituted improper lay opinion under Rule 5-701. The court did not resolve the first issue, finding any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as Detective Moore's testimony was not improperly influenced by other testimony. On the second issue, the court found that Cromartie did not preserve his objection to Detective Moore's identification testimony and that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment. View "Cromartie v. State" on Justia Law

In 1992, Abras Sandy Q. Morrison was convicted in the Circuit Court for Carroll County of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and related conspiracy charges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, with additional concurrent sentences for the other charges. The prosecutor had filed a notice of intent to seek a life without parole sentence more than thirty days before the trial. The court considered the facts, including Morrison's detailed confession and the pre-sentence report, before imposing the sentence.Morrison's convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Court of Maryland in 1993. He later filed two petitions for postconviction relief, which were denied by the circuit court in 1999. His application for leave to appeal was also denied. In 2023, Morrison filed a pro se petition for postconviction DNA testing under CP § 8-201, seeking to test a hair and a blood-stained towel, claiming the results could produce mitigating evidence regarding his sentence. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing, and Morrison appealed.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that there was no reasonable probability that DNA testing of the hair would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to Morrison's claim of wrongful sentencing. The court noted that Morrison's detailed confession and other evidence established his participation in the crime, and DNA testing would not negate his culpability. The court concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying the petition for DNA testing. View "Morrison v. State" on Justia Law

A woman was charged with murder and child abuse resulting in the death of her newborn after delivering the baby at home without her husband's knowledge. She claimed the baby was stillborn, while the State argued the baby died of asphyxiation at her hands. The woman had conducted internet searches about terminating her pregnancy months before the delivery and did not seek prenatal care.A jury in the Circuit Court for Howard County convicted the woman of second-degree murder and child abuse resulting in death, sentencing her to 30 years for murder and a concurrent 20 years for child abuse. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence of internet searches and lack of prenatal care relevant to her intent and motive.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to determine the relevance and prejudicial impact of the internet searches and lack of prenatal care. The Court held that the internet searches were irrelevant to show intent to kill or harm a newborn, as contemplating a legal abortion does not support an inference of intent to harm a person. Similarly, the Court found that the decision to forgo prenatal care was not probative of intent to harm a live child, as women forgo prenatal care for various reasons unrelated to criminal intent.The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial, emphasizing the need to carefully weigh the probative value against the potential prejudicial effects of such evidence. View "Akers v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Isiah Hollins, who was convicted of second-degree assault following an altercation with Alexander Alvarenga at a McDonald's restaurant in Rockville, Maryland. On November 16, 2021, Hollins, a supervisor, and Alvarenga, an employee, engaged in a fight during which Hollins stabbed Alvarenga multiple times with a knife. Hollins was charged with attempted first-degree murder and related assault charges but argued self-defense, claiming Alvarenga was the initial aggressor due to his violent character.In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Hollins sought to introduce evidence of Alvarenga's propensity for violence, including prior assault convictions and past fights, to support his self-defense claim. The trial court denied Hollins's request to cross-examine Alvarenga about a recent unrelated incident and refused to give a non-pattern jury instruction regarding Alvarenga's violent character. The jury acquitted Hollins of attempted first-degree murder and first-degree assault but convicted him of second-degree assault. Hollins was sentenced to ten years in prison, with two years suspended, and five years of probation.Hollins appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which affirmed his conviction. The appellate court agreed that the trial court erred in refusing the jury instruction solely because it was not a pattern instruction but concluded that the evidence did not support the instruction. Hollins then petitioned for a writ of certiorari.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the requested jury instruction on the basis that it was not a pattern instruction. The court found that there was "some evidence" that Alvarenga had a character trait for violence, which could allow the jury to infer that he was the initial aggressor. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Hollins v. State" on Justia Law

In 2000, Adnan Syed was convicted of the murder of Hae Min Lee and sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years. In 2022, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City moved to vacate Syed’s conviction, citing new evidence and alleged Brady violations. Young Lee, the victim’s brother, was given less than one business day’s notice of the vacatur hearing, which he attended remotely. The court granted the motion to vacate and ordered the State to either retry Syed or enter a nolle prosequi (nol pros) within 30 days. The State later entered a nol pros, effectively dismissing the charges against Syed.Young Lee appealed the vacatur order, arguing that his rights as a victim’s representative were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The Appellate Court of Maryland vacated the circuit court’s order, reinstated Syed’s convictions, and remanded for a new hearing, holding that the entry of the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal and that Lee had the right to reasonable notice and to attend the hearing in person.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the entry of the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal. The Court concluded that a victim has the right to be heard at a vacatur hearing under CP § 11-403, which applies to hearings where the alteration of a sentence is considered. The Court also held that Lee’s rights were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings, starting from the point immediately after the State’s Attorney filed the motion to vacate. View "Syed v. Lee" on Justia Law