Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Several individuals charged with crimes in Maryland were found by circuit courts to be incompetent to stand trial and dangerous due to mental disorders. Under Maryland law, such defendants must be committed to a designated health care facility for treatment, and the Maryland Department of Health is required to admit them within ten business days of receiving the court’s order. In these cases, the Department failed to meet that deadline, resulting in extended detention for the affected individuals in local facilities rather than treatment centers.After the Department’s delays, the defendants sought relief. The Circuit Court for Kent County and the Circuit Court for Baltimore County held hearings and imposed monetary sanctions on the Department under Maryland Criminal Procedure § 3-106(c)(4), which authorizes courts to impose sanctions to compel compliance with the statutory deadline. In four cases, defendants had not yet been transferred by the time of the hearings; in two cases, the Department had admitted the defendants before the hearings, but the courts still imposed sanctions. The Department argued that it was impossible to comply due to full facilities and long waiting lists, and that sanctions could not reasonably compel compliance. The Department also raised a separation of powers argument at one hearing but did not pursue it on appeal.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the imposition of sanctions, holding that the circuit courts did not abuse their discretion. It ordered recalculation of the sanction amounts in some cases and rejected the argument that the Department’s later compliance prevented sanctions.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that trial courts may impose monetary sanctions reasonably designed to compel the Department to admit defendants as soon as possible after the ten-day deadline, including where waiting lists exist. The Court also held that sanctions can be imposed even after a defendant is belatedly admitted. Finally, the Court found no separation of powers violation in the statutory sanctions mechanism. View "Dept. of Health v. Boulden" on Justia Law

Two men were convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on charges related to the 2019 murder of Donnell Brockington, who was surrounded and fatally shot multiple times by a group of six individuals. After the suspects fled, four, including the two respondents, were apprehended when their vehicle crashed. Police recovered several firearms, and DNA evidence linked both respondents to a Desert Eagle 9mm pistol found in the vehicle. At trial, a State firearms examiner testified that certain ammunition components were fired from that pistol, but neither respondent challenged the reliability of the examiner’s methodology or requested a Daubert hearing.After trial, the Supreme Court of Maryland decided Abruquah v. State, clarifying the limits on firearms identification testimony. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the respondents’ convictions on plain-error review, concluding that the firearms examiner’s unqualified testimony was exactly the kind prohibited by Abruquah. Additionally, one respondent challenged the trial court’s decision to close the courtroom during jury deliberations and partially restrict attendance during the verdict, arguing it violated the Sixth Amendment. The Appellate Court found these closures de minimis and rejected the public trial claim.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the admission of the firearms examiner’s unqualified opinion was not “clear or obvious” error for plain-error review purposes, since the law was unsettled both at trial and on appeal; Abruquah was a case-specific ruling, not a categorical ban on such testimony. The Court also concluded that the courtroom closures were not de minimis but were justified under Waller v. Georgia, given the trial court’s findings of escalating spectator misconduct and concern for juror safety. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment on the convictions, affirmed its ruling on the public trial issue, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Thornton" on Justia Law

A man was charged with multiple counts of distributing and possessing child pornography based on evidence linking his internet activity and social media account to illegal transmissions. The investigation began after the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children reported that child sexual abuse material was sent from a particular Kik account associated with an IP address. Police obtained records from Verizon, which identified the defendant as the subscriber of that IP address at a specific home address, and from Kik, which provided chat logs and a legend explaining their format. At trial, a detective explained these records, identifying images and matching file transmissions to the defendant’s account and home IP address. The detective also described, using the legend, how to read the chat logs, and discussed the nature of IP addresses.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County admitted the Verizon and Kik records as business records and allowed the detective’s testimony as lay testimony. The defendant was convicted on multiple counts and sentenced to a lengthy term of incarceration, with some time suspended. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, relying on prior cases to hold that the detective’s explanations were within the understanding of an average layperson and did not require expert qualification.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether the trial court erred by admitting the detective’s testimony as lay rather than expert testimony. The court held that testimony about the contents of the Verizon records and reading the Kik logs with the legend was properly admitted as lay testimony, as the inferences were within common knowledge. However, the court found that testimony distinguishing between types of IP addresses and describing one as “static” required expert qualification but concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment. View "Jun v. State" on Justia Law

On the morning of November 8, 2022, a motor vehicle collision occurred in Gaithersburg, Maryland, in which the petitioner fatally struck two pedestrians. Law enforcement arrived at the scene around 7:30 a.m. and informed the petitioner that he was not free to leave. He was placed in the back of a police cruiser at 7:43 a.m., where he remained for slightly over an hour while officers investigated the incident. A Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) arrived at 8:51 a.m., detected signs of alcohol impairment, and conducted field sobriety tests. The petitioner was formally arrested at 9:13 a.m. and transported to the police station for a breath test at 10:15 a.m., which revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.24. He was indicted on ten counts related to the collision and ultimately convicted on all counts based on an agreed statement of facts.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied the petitioner’s motions to suppress evidence, finding that the investigatory detention did not transform into a de facto arrest and that the breath test was conducted within the statutory two-hour window after apprehension, as defined in Willis v. State. The court found that reasonable suspicion existed for the detention, and no forceful tactics were used by officers. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed these rulings, agreeing that the detention was reasonable and that the breath test results were admissible under Maryland law.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that placing an individual in a police cruiser for a reasonable period during a swiftly developing investigation does not per se convert a lawful investigatory detention into a de facto arrest. The Court further held that “apprehension” for purposes of Maryland’s two-hour breath test statute occurred at 8:51 a.m., when police had reasonable suspicion and acted on it; thus, the breath test at 10:15 a.m. was timely and admissible. View "Singh v. State" on Justia Law

Police received a call from a resident in a townhouse community who was personally acquainted with a local police officer, Sergeant Muollo. The caller, who contacted the officer directly on his cell phone rather than through the usual police line, reported that an unfamiliar black sedan with multiple occupants had been parked on her street for an extended period, with cell phones visibly in use inside the car, and expressed her suspicion that the occupants might be engaged in illegal activity, possibly breaking into vehicles. The officer, considering the caller credible due to their longstanding relationship, responded to the location, observed the described car, and, along with backup, blocked the vehicle’s exit. As the officer approached, the car moved slowly forward, which the officer interpreted as an attempt to turn around. He then activated his emergency lights, approached, and detected the odor of marijuana and observed contraband, leading to the arrest of the driver, who was also found in possession of a firearm.In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. The circuit court denied the motion, finding the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the informant’s tip, the general level of crime in the area, and the movement of the vehicle when police approached. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, concluding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion, citing the tip from a known resident, the officer’s corroboration of the car’s presence, and testimony that the area experienced significant crime.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car. The tip provided no basis for suspecting criminal activity beyond the car’s unfamiliarity and presence, and the officer’s corroboration only confirmed innocuous facts. The court further found the testimony about the area being high-crime was insufficiently particularized and not based on information known to the officer at the time of the stop. The judgment was reversed. View "Kopp v. State" on Justia Law

On the morning of November 8, 2022, an individual struck and fatally injured two pedestrians while driving. Police arrived at the scene, determined he was the driver, and informed him he could not leave. He was escorted to the back of a patrol car at approximately 7:43 a.m., where he remained for a little over an hour while officers conducted their investigation, including calling in a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE). At 8:51 a.m., the DRE smelled alcohol on him, conducted sobriety tests, and formally arrested him at 9:13 a.m. A subsequent breath test at 10:15 a.m. revealed a high blood alcohol concentration. He was charged with multiple offenses and ultimately convicted on all counts based on an agreed-upon statement of facts.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied his motions to suppress evidence, finding that his detention prior to formal arrest was reasonable and did not amount to a de facto arrest. The court also found that the breath test was conducted within the statutory two-hour window, as he was not “apprehended” for purposes of the statute until the DRE detected alcohol. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed these rulings, holding that his detention was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and that the breath test results were admissible.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts. It held that placing the individual in a patrol car during a rapidly developing investigation did not itself transform a lawful investigatory detention into a de facto arrest. The Court further held that, under Maryland law, an individual is “apprehended” for purposes of the two-hour testing window when police have reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence and act on it. Since this did not occur until 8:51 a.m., the breath test at 10:15 a.m. was timely, and the convictions were affirmed. View "Singh v. State" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with multiple crimes, including murder, related to a 2016 incident. Before his first trial, the parties agreed to exclude evidence of firearms, ammunition, or marijuana found at the defendant’s residence, as these items were not relevant to the charges. In the first trial, the jury convicted the defendant on some counts and was hung on others, resulting in a mistrial on the unresolved charges. At retrial on the remaining counts, a prosecution witness unexpectedly mentioned the excluded evidence despite the prior agreement. The defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing this reference was improper. The trial court granted the mistrial, and the State did not oppose it.After the second mistrial, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges, contending that Maryland’s common law double jeopardy protections should bar a third prosecution if the State’s reckless conduct caused the mistrial. The defendant argued that the State was reckless in failing to adequately instruct the witness not to mention the excluded evidence and in its questioning. The Circuit Court for Charles County denied the motion, finding the State’s conduct was neither intentional nor reckless. The defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that Maryland common law did not attach double jeopardy protections in these circumstances and, even if it did, the State’s conduct was not reckless.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. Without deciding whether Maryland law bars retrial after a mistrial caused by reckless State conduct, the Court assumed for argument’s sake that such a standard might apply. The Court held that the circuit court’s factual finding—the State did not act recklessly—was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, allowing the retrial to proceed. View "Santana v. State" on Justia Law

A defendant was initially tried on multiple charges related to a 2016 murder. At the first trial, the parties had agreed to exclude evidence regarding firearms, ammunition, and marijuana found in a search of the defendant’s home, as these items were not relevant. The jury convicted the defendant on some counts but could not reach a verdict on four charges, leading the Circuit Court for Charles County to declare a mistrial on those counts. At the retrial of the remaining charges, a prosecution witness unexpectedly referenced the previously excluded evidence during testimony. The defense objected, moved for a mistrial, and the State did not oppose. The court granted the motion.The defendant later moved to dismiss further prosecution, citing Maryland’s common law prohibition against double jeopardy, and argued that the State’s reckless conduct had prompted the mistrial. The Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that the State’s actions were neither intentional nor reckless. The defendant appealed, but the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that Maryland’s common law double jeopardy protections did not apply since no factual findings had been made on the criminal charges at issue, and even if they did, the State’s conduct was not reckless.The Supreme Court of Maryland assumed, without deciding, that Maryland’s common law double jeopardy rule would bar retrial if a mistrial were caused by the State’s reckless conduct. Reviewing the Circuit Court’s factual finding for clear error, the Supreme Court held that there was competent evidence supporting the lower court’s determination that the State was not reckless. As a result, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, allowing the prosecution to proceed. View "Santana v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, Montgomery County, Maryland, enacted amendments to its County Code in 2021 and 2022 regulating firearms. The amendments expanded the definition of “place of public assembly,” prohibited the possession of firearms (including “ghost guns”) in or within 100 yards of such places, and removed exceptions for state-issued handgun permit holders. The amendments also imposed new restrictions concerning minors’ access to firearms and regulated ghost guns and their components. The petitioners, two businesses and eight individuals, claimed these provisions were preempted by state law, not a valid local law, and amounted to an unconstitutional taking.After removal to federal court and a partial remand, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled in favor of the challengers, finding the county’s provisions preempted by state law, not a local law, and an unconstitutional taking, and issued declaratory and injunctive relief. The Appellate Court of Maryland remanded for further analysis of preemption and takings issues, particularly concerning the expansion of “place of public assembly.”The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case, holding that new issues may only be properly added by amending the complaint, not through summary judgment motions. The Court determined that Criminal Law § 4-209(b)(1) authorizes charter counties to regulate firearms in limited contexts (with respect to minors, law enforcement, and within 100 yards of certain public places), and that this authority was not abrogated by other state preemption statutes. The Court found Montgomery County’s regulation valid for parks, places of worship, schools, libraries, courthouses, legislative assemblies, recreational and multipurpose exhibition facilities, and polling places, but invalid for hospitals, health centers, long-term care, childcare facilities, government buildings as broadly defined, and generalized gatherings. The Court also clarified the scope of local regulation regarding minors and found no unconstitutional taking occurred. The judgment of the Appellate Court was vacated and remanded with instructions for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Engage Armament v. Montgomery Cnty." on Justia Law

Miguel Angel Santana was charged with several offenses related to a 2016 murder. At his first trial in the Circuit Court for Charles County, a pretrial agreement excluded certain evidence about firearms, ammunition, and marijuana. The jury convicted him on two counts but hung on four others, resulting in a mistrial on those four counts. At the retrial on the remaining counts, a State witness referenced the excluded evidence during testimony, leading Santana’s counsel to move for a mistrial, which the court granted. Before a third trial could begin, Santana moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that Maryland common law should prevent retrial if the State’s reckless conduct caused the mistrial.The Circuit Court for Charles County denied Santana’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the State’s actions did not amount to recklessness, as the prosecutors had prepared the witness for his testimony and did not intend or expect him to reference the excluded evidence. The court concluded that the State's conduct, while unfortunate, was neither intentional nor reckless. Santana appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, holding that Maryland’s common law double jeopardy protections did not apply because no factual findings on the criminal charges had been made and, even if the protections did apply, the circuit court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to consider whether Maryland’s common law double jeopardy prohibition bars retrial after a mistrial caused by reckless State conduct, and whether the State acted recklessly here. The court assumed, without deciding, that Maryland law could bar retrial for reckless conduct, but held that the circuit court’s finding that the State was not reckless was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, permitting retrial to proceed. View "Santana v. State" on Justia Law