Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. Defendant was tried again and was again convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court vacated the murder conviction and remanded for entry of a verdict of murder in the second degree, holding that Defendant’s mental illness and impaired mental condition drove her behavior and materially affected the fairness of a conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and that the unusual circumstances of this case made a verdict of murder in the second degree more consonant with justice. View "Commonwealth v. Berry" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, holding (1) Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was not violated when the trial judge ordered that, before entering the court room, each spectator must sign in and give a source of identification to the court officer posted outside the court room; (2) the trial judge did not err by admitting into evidence grand jury testimony of a prosecution witness; (3) the admission of certain hearsay did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) the trial judge did not violate Defendant’s right to be tried by an impartial jury by failing to conduct a voir dire of all the jurors after one juror expressed concern that Defendant had access to the juror’s address in the juror’s confidential questionnaire. View "Commonwealth v. Maldonado" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial nearly three years after his initial arraignment, Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct and assault by means of a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions and dismissed the complaints against him, holding (1) Defendant was denied a speedy trial, and any failures by his trial counsel to perfect that claim constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the trial judge’s order of restitution to compensate a police officer whose glasses were damaged during his interaction with Defendant was constitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey and met the “causal connection” requirement for such awards under Commonwealth v. McIntyre. View "Commonwealth v. Denehy" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder on a theory of joint venture and sentenced to life in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial judge erred in finding that he was not a target of the investigation, and because he was a target, the Commonwealth was required to advise him of his Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to permit a jury to find Defendant guilty of murder in the first degree; (2) the trial judge did not err in determining that Defendant was not a target of the investigation at the time of his grand jury testimony, but a new prospective rule requires the Commonwealth to advise targets or potential targets of the grand jury’s investigation of their right not to incriminate themselves; and (3) Defendant was not entitled to a DiGiambattista instruction where it was not requested at trial. View "Commonwealth v. Woods" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the offense. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole on persons under the age of eighteen at the time they committed the murder violates the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, Defendant filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of the sentencing scheme for murder in the first degree as applied and sought a declaration that article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights bars the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment for juvenile homicide offenders. The Supreme Court held (1) Miller has retroactive application to cases on collateral review; and (2) the mandatory imposition of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole on individuals who were under age eighteen when they committed first degree murder violates the prohibition on cruel or unusual punishments in article 26, and the discretionary imposition of such a sentence on juvenile homicide offenders also violates article 26 because it is an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment. View "Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney" on Justia Law

Defendant committed murder when he was seventeen years old. Defendant was subsequently convicted in the superior court of murder in the first degree and related weapons charges. While Brown was awaiting trial, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. The statutory sentencing scheme in Massachusetts requires, however, that all defendants over the age of fourteen who are convicted of murder in the first degree must be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Consequently, Defendant's sentencing was stayed until the Maine Supreme Court could render an opinion regarding the issue. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of Miller and Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, in which the Court held that all life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders violate the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Consequently, the Court held that Defendant may not be sentenced to life without parole. Remanded for sentencing. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner was indicted on charges of murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and attempted armed robbery, among other charges. The Commonwealth filed a motion for a protective order to limit the discovery of witnesses' identifying information. A judge allowed the motion in part, ordering that witnesses' addresses and telephone numbers not be disclosed to Petitioner. Petitioner filed this petition for review pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211,3 arguing that the order deprived him of his constitutional rights, including his ability to prepare a defense. A single justice denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's issues could be adequately and effectively explored on direct appeal, if and when Petitioner was convicted. View "Madison v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

John Doe, a female, pleaded guilty to several federal charges stemming from her prior management of an escort service, including sex trafficking of children. A hearing examiner of the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) classified Doe as a level one sex offender after determining that Doe presented a low risk of reoffense and attendant degree of dangerousness. The superior court affirmed SORB's classification determination of Doe as a level one sex offender. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the matter to SORB, holding (1) it was arbitrary and capricious for SORB to classify Doe's risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness without considering the substantial evidence presented at the hearing regarding the effect of gender on recidivism; and (2) under the circumstances, the hearing examiner abused his discretion by denying Doe's motion for funds for an expert witness. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

On August 20, 2009, Defendant was charged with possession of a class B substance with intent to distribute and committing this violation within 1,000 feet of a preschool facility in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32J. While Defendant's case was pending, on August 2, 2012, the Governor signed into law a crime bill that amended chapter 94C section 32J by reducing the radius of the school zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss his school zone violation, alleging that the crime bill applied to all cases alleging a school zone violation that had not been adjudicated before August 2, 2012. The trial judge denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judge's order, holding that the portion of the crime bill reducing the radius of the school zone applies to all cases alleging a school zone violation for which a guilty plea had not been accepted or conviction entered as of August 2, 2012, regardless whether the alleged violation was committed before that date. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Pagan" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after his license had been suspended for operating while under the influence of alcohol (OUI). The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) the admission of certain documents from the registry of motor vehicles without live testimony from a registry employee violated Defendant's confrontation rights to the extent that the registry documents included an attestation of notice, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that Defendant violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 23, third par, which governs operating a motor vehicle after suspension of a license on the basis of an OUI, and therefore, the judge erred in imposing a sixty-day sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Lee" on Justia Law