Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute and committing this violation within 1,000 feet of a preschool facility in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32J. While Defendant's case was pending, on August 2, 2012, the Governor signed into law a crime bill that amended chapter 94C section 32J by reducing the radius of the school zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet. Defendant moved to dismiss the school zone violation, claiming that the crime bill applied to all cases alleging a school zone violation that had not been adjudicated before August 2, 2012. The Supreme Court held that the portion of the crime bill that reduces the radius of the Drug-Free School Zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet applied to all cases alleging a school zone violation for which a guilty plea had not been accepted or conviction entered as of August 2, 2012, regardless of whether the alleged violation was committed before August 2, 2012. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Bradley" on Justia Law

In 1996, Defendant pled guilty to various offenses, including uttering a false instrument, larceny, and receiving stolen property. Fifteen years later, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, contending that the plea judge did not conduct a sufficient colloquy regarding his rights to a trial by jury. The plea judge that accepted Defendant's guilty pleas allowed Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas after declining to apply a presumption of regularity to the proceeding because the judge lacked confidence that his plea colloquy had been adequate. The Supreme Court vacated the judge's order, holding that the judge's belief that certain plea colloquies he conducted over a period of years may have been inadequate was insufficient to dispel the presumption of regularity or to support the withdrawal of Defendant's pleas. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Cartagena" on Justia Law

After a police officer stopped Defendant's vehicle and conducted two field sobriety tests, the officer arrested Defendant. Defendant pleaded guilty to several alcohol-related driving offenses. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of additional alcohol-related driving offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, holding (1) the trial judge erred in admitting the officer's opinion that Defendant's "ability to drive was diminished" by his consumption of alcohol, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting the officer's opinion that Defendant was "probably impaired"; and (3) where the indictment charging Defendant identified the statute that Defendant allegedly violated but failed to allege an essential element of proof in describing the offense, due process did not require vacating the Defendant's conviction arising from his guilty plea where he had fair notice of the crime charged and failed to show that he did not understand that he was pleading guilty to the crime. View "Commonwealth v. Canty" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped and subsequently arrested at a sobriety checkpoint conducted by the state police. Thereafter, Defendant was charged with operating under the influence of alcohol, third offense. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence related to his arrest, arguing that the officer who made the initial stop of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint - the screening officer - failed to comply with the applicable guidelines for that checkpoint. The district court judge allowed the motion. On appeal, the parties agreed that the judge based his decision to allow the motion to suppress on an erroneous finding of fact. The point of dispute was whether the screening officer had the authority to question Defendant before directing him to a secondary screening area. The Supreme Court vacated the order allowing the motion to suppress, holding that a factual finding must be made as to whether the officer's questions were proper or improper according to the guidelines applicable to the particular sobriety checkpoint at which Defendant was stopped. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Gray" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for armed robbery and being a habitual offender. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the admission of his prearraignment statements that were made more than six hours after his arrest. A superior court judge allowed Defendant's motion to suppress after citing Commonwealth v. Rosario, which establishes a rule that a statement made by a person under arrest, if made beyond six hours after the arrest, will be inadmissible in evidence absent a valid waiver of the person's right to timely presentment to a court for arraignment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the six-hour rule set out in Rosario applied to all of Defendant's statements at issue here because the statements were the product of police questioning to which the Rosario rule applied. View "Commonwealth v. Fortunato" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a Class B controlled substance, cocaine. During trial, a ballistics certificate and two certificates of drug analysis were admitted into evidence without testimony from the analysts who had prepared them. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the certificates were admitted without a showing of the unavailability of the analysts or a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. The appeals court affirmed the firearms conviction but reversed the drug conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed both convictions, holding that the improper admission of the certificates at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Defendant conceded that he possessed both the gun and cocaine and agreed that the jury be instructed that the Commonwealth had proven all elements of both charges beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Ramsey" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted a distribution of a class B controlled substance and committing a drug offense within a school zone. Before trial, Defendant's counsel orally stipulated that the substance at issue was cocaine. Both Defendant and the Commonwealth treated this as a fact during trial, but the jury did not become aware of the stipulation until the judge spoke of it during his final charge to the jury. On appeal, Defendant argued, inter alia, that because the stipulation was never presented to the jury, the Commonwealth failed to prove the substance was cocaine. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's distribution of a controlled substance conviction, holding (1) even if there were error in the manner the stipulation was handled in this case, no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice occurred; (2) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the stipulation was not memorialized in a writing or made the subject of a specific colloquy between the judge and Defendant; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the jury that Defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine. View "Commonwealth v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

On ten separate indictments, Defendant was convicted of rape of a child, indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, and indecent assault and battery on a child over the age of fourteen. Defendant's sentences included concurrent periods of incarceration and community parole supervision for life (CPSL). Later, the superior court judge allowed Defendant's motion to correct his sentences by vacating the illegally imposed requirement of CPSL. So as to effectuate the intent of the original sentencing judge, the judge then vacated and restructured the entire sentencing scheme, converting two of the concurrent sentences of incarceration into probationary terms. Defendant appealed his resentencing, arguing that it violated double jeopardy protections. The Supreme Court held (1) although the lawful components of Defendant's sentences were in a sense final, the judge's decision to modify the interdependent sentences did not violate Defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy; and (2) because an increase in the aggregate punishment would subject Defendant to double jeopardy, the case must be remanded for resentencing. View "Commonwealth v. Cumming" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally prescribing controlled substances in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32A(a) and 32B(a), among other crimes. Defendant appealed, raising the issue of whether a physician "dispenses" rather than "distributes" a controlled substance pursuant to chapter 94C, 32A(a) and 32B(a) when the substance is delivered pursuant to an alleged prescription to a person who does not lawfully possess it. At Defendant's trial, the Commonwealth proceeded only on the theory that Defendant dispensed controlled substances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jury effectively convicted Defendant of distribution even though they were told they were being instructed on dispensing. After Defendant's habeas corpus petition was denied, Defendant filed a motion for release from unlawful restraint challenging the Court's decision in Brown I. The motion was denied without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding (1) there was no merit to Defendant's argument that the distribution conviction violated his right against double jeopardy; (2) the Court did not deny Defendant the right to appeal from the distribution conviction; and (3) Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree for the shooting death of Brittany Perez. Eight bullets were fired at an apartment's front room window where Perez was standing, and four of the bullets struck and killed Perez. The window was covered by venetian blinds and dark curtains. Defendant was seen fleeing the scene of the shooting. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, holding that the trial judge erred in deciding not to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, where the jury reasonably could have found that Defendant did not know the room was occupied when he fired the rifle at the window. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Horne" on Justia Law