Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A Boston police officer witnessed Sylvain engaging in a sexual act with a prostitute. As the officer approached, Sylvain removed plastic baggies from his coat pocket and placed them in his mouth. Believing that the baggies contained "crack" cocaine and fearing overdose, the officer attempted to intercede. Although Sylvain ingested the drugs, a search of his jacket revealed an additional baggie of crack cocaine. The incident took place within 1,000 feet of a child care center. Sylvain, a noncitizen lawfully residing in the U.S., pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, subjecting him to automatic deportation. After the conviction the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the rule announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) regarding a criminal defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to accurate advice about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, was not a "new" rule and applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Sylvain sought to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that his attorney erroneously advised him that there would be no deportation consequences. The motion was denied. While Sylvain's appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. United States (2013), holding that Padilla did announce a "new" rule and does not apply retroactively to collateral challenges. The Massachusetts Supreme Court remanded, holding that, as a matter of Massachusetts law, the right enunciated in Padilla was not new and, consequently, defendants whose state law convictions were final after April 1, 1997, may attack their convictions collaterally on Padilla grounds. View "Commonwealth v. Sylvain" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's 11-year-old stepdaughter told the Sexual Assault Investigation Network (SAIN) that the plaintiff had engaged in sexual conduct with her since she was four years old. Before trial on the resulting charges, the plaintiff sexually assaulted a 16-year-old. He pleaded guilty to indecent assault and battery on a person over 14, G.L. c. 265, 13H. The Sex Offender Registry Board notified the plaintiff of his duty to register and of its preliminary classification of him as a level three sex offender. The plaintiff requested administrative review and moved to continue the hearing until the case regarding his stepdaughter's allegations was resolved. The board denied the motion and considered a summary of the stepdaughter's SAIN interview. Plaintiff’s attorney told the hearing examiner that criminal trial counsel was guarding the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment rights and that the plaintiff, therefore, would not testify or present evidence. The hearing examiner found that the plaintiff presented high risk to re-offend and a high degree of dangerousness, and ordered registration as a level three sex offender. Plaintiff was later found not guilty with respect to his stepdaughter, except the charge of open and gross lewdness. The plaintiff sought review of his final classification, G.L. c. 6, 178M. A trial judge affirmed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, acknowledging that a convicted offender, awaiting trial on separate sexual offense charges, has a difficult dilemma where a classification hearing is held before the criminal trial. The board acted within its discretion in weighing the public safety interest in obtaining prompt final classification against the offender's interest in not potentially compromising his criminal trial strategy. The board now has discretion to reconsider the classification, but the acquittal is insufficient alone to show that the allegations were false. View "Soe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant, who admitted shooting his wife, but claimed “heat of passion,” was convicted of murder in the first degree with deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument based on failure to exclude a juror based on the juror's dual citizenship. The court properly admitted statements made by the victim, concerning marital trouble, as proof of the defendant's motive because he was made aware of the victim’s state of mind. Testimony by a friend that the victim had called her, "scared" and crying, and said that “she thought he was going to hit her" was properly admitted as an excited utterance. Admission of autopsy photographs was not unduly prejudicial. Admission of evidence concerning defendant's viewing of pornographic Web sites and of electronic communications describing sexual practices did not constitute impermissible character evidence of the defendant as an aggressor. Introduction of defendant’s firearms, with evidence of his training and certification as a firearms instructor was relevant to whether the murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. The prosecutor’s comments that the victim's disclosure of infidelity was not the sort of provocation that would cause a reasonable adult male to lose his capacity for self-restraint because there were other options, properly made the distinction between a killing committed with "heat of passion" and one committed with premeditation; the jury instruction on “heat of passion” was appropriate.View "Commonwealth v. Tassinari" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the premeditated murder of his mother. Six years later, he sought a new trial, alleging that he had not been competent to stand trial. Defendant submitted an affidavit from a forensic psychologist, indicating "long standing mental disease … schizoaffective disorder with prominent paranoid delusions.” A neuropsychologist administered tests and submitted an affidavit indicating that the defendant has demonstrated symptoms of a delusional disorder since childhood and that he functions intellectually in the low average to borderline retarded range. Trial counsel stated that he had not pursued a competency defense because the defendant denied committing the murder. The Commonwealth did not present evidence. During a hearing, the defendant shouted “racist bitch” at the judge, who had also been the trial judge. The judge ordered a competency evaluation. The court’s forensic psychologist reported that the defendant presented a "complicated diagnostic picture" and was likely incompetent in a complex proceeding such as an evidentiary hearing; she recommended medications, noting that defendant had previously benefited from psychopharmacological intervention. The defendant began taking prescribed medication. His condition improved. The court denied a new trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated, finding that the defendant made an adequate showing to warrant an evidentiary hearing. View "Commonwealth v. Chatman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual offenses. Before Defendant completed his sentences, the Commonwealth filed a petition to commit him as a sexually dangerous person. A superior court judge granted Defendant's motion to have his counsel be present during interviews conducted by qualified examiners. One of the two examiners refused to conduct the interview with counsel in the room and submitted to the court her report based on her review of Defendant's records. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Commonwealth's petition, claiming that the examiner's report was not based on an "examination" pursuant to Mass. Gen. Law. ch. 123A, 13(a). The superior court granted the motion, concluding that dismissal was required. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, dismissal of the Commonwealth's petition was not warranted where one of the qualified examiners personally interviewed Defendant as part of his examination and filed with the court a report expressing his opinion that Defendant was a sexually dangerous person. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Felt" on Justia Law

A grand jury returned twenty-two indictments against Defendant, including indictments charging murder in the first degree and various counts of masked armed robbery. The charges arose out of a robbery of a department store perpetrated by Domenic Cinelli. The Commonwealth proceeded against Defendant as a joint venturer and coconspirator. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss (1) indictments relating to Cinelli's escape-related offenses as not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) the portion of the murder indictment that included any theory of murder other than felony-murder. The motion judge dismissed the challenged indictments and the portion of the murder indictment that included theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the grant of Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments that charged Defendant with the assault and battery and firearm crimes perpetrated by Cinelli during his escape, holding (i) Defendant may be liable for Cinelli's escape-related crimes where the Commonwealth proves that he participated in, and intended, such crimes; and (2) reversed the grant of Defendant's motion to dismiss the prevented the Commonwealth from proceeding at trial on all three theories of murder, holding that sufficient evidence supported the indictment. View "Commonwealth v. Hanright" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was indicted for distributing cocaine and for being a second or subsequent offender in violation of section Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32A(d). In 2012, before Defendant's trial had commenced, the Legislature enacted the Crime Bill, which amended the enhanced penalty provision of section 32A(d) by reducing the mandatory minimum sentence. Twenty days later, Defendant was found guilty. The judge imposed a mandatory minimum prison sentence as permitted by the Crime Bill. The Commonwealth requested that the judge correct the sentence so as to comply with the sentencing provisions as they existed on the date Defendant committed the offense. The judge denied the request, concluding that the Crime Bill made the sentencing reductions applicable to persons sentenced after the effective date of the new act even if the offense was committed before the effective date of the act. The Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth's petition for relief, holding that to interpret the statute amending the mandatory minimum sentence in section 32A(d) not to apply to Defendant would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature. View "Commonwealth v. Galvin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to police, as (i) Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, (ii) Defendant's statements were voluntarily made, and (iii) Defendant was not intentionally deprived of his statutory right to make a telephone call until he was booked; and (2) the judge slightly erred in instructing the jury on murder in the first degree committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, but the error did not prejudice Defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Walker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four charges of possession of firearms and ammunition. At issue on appeal was which two of four convictions must be vacated because they were duplicative. Defendant argued that the two convictions on lesser included offenses should be vacated even though they carried higher penalties, and the Commonwealth argued that the convictions carrying lesser penalties should be vacated. The Supreme Court (1) vacated two of the convictions and sentences as duplicative and remanded for a judge to decide which conviction in each set of paired convictions should be vacated; and (2) affirmed Defendant's motions to suppress and for a mistrial, holding (i) the vehicle stop during which the firearm was seized was lawful, and (ii) testimony given at trial indicating that the police were conducting narcotics surveillance when an officer observed Defendant with a gun was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Rivas" on Justia Law

Defendants Cory Moody and David Newman were separately indicted for violations of the Controlled Substances Act arising from their alleged involvement in an organized group engaged in drug trafficking. Prior to trial, Defendants filed motions to suppress the fruits of several search warrants issued under the Massachusetts wiretap statute authorizing the interception of calls and text messages sent over their cell phones. Defendants argued that the interceptions were beyond the scope of authority provided under the state wiretap statute and thus were preempted by the federal wiretap statute. The motion judge denied Defendants' motions as to their cell phone calls but granted the motions as to the interception of Defendants' text messages. The judge then reported a question to the appeals court, and the Supreme Court answered by holding that a superior court judge possesses the authority under the Massachusetts wiretap statute to issue warrants permitting the interception of cell phone calls and text messages. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Moody" on Justia Law