Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a second jury trial, John Irwin was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen. The appeals court later vacated Defendant's conviction and granted him a new trial, finding that the use of Irwin's prearrest silence as evidence of consciousness of guilty was a constitutionally impermissible comment on his privilege against self-incrimination. After the Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi, Irwin sought compensation for an erroneous felony conviction. A superior court judge denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss Irwin's judgment and allowed partial judgment on the pleadings, finding that Irwin was an eligible claimant under the erroneous convictions statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the doctrine of present execution, an interlocutory appeal in this case was appropriate; and (2) Irwin was not eligible to pursue his compensation claim because Irwin's conviction was not overturned on grounds tending to establish his innocence, and thus, he was not an eligible claimant under the statute. Remanded. View "Irwin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of a public employee contributory retirement system, pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child. Plaintiff resigned his position of twenty-seven years upon being charged. The retirement board denied Plaintiff's application for voluntary superannuation retirement based on a finding of forfeiture due to moral turpitude. The superior court reversed, and the appeals court affirmed. The board subsequently issued a check to Plaintiff representing his superannuation retirement benefits retroactive to the date of his resignation but did not include any interest. Plaintiff sought interest on the payment. The superior court concluded that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 6C applied and ordered that interest be paid on the payment at a rate of twelve percent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to a twelve percent interest rate pursuant to section 6C or Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 6H; and (2) under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 20(5)(c)(2), where a retirement board makes a legal error in denying retirement benefits that is corrected by a court, the plaintiff is entitled to an interest rate determined by the board's actuary. View "Herrick v. Essex Reg'l Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

While in the vicinity of a college, a campus police officer, appointed as a special State police officer pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 22C, 63, observed Defendant driving recklessly. The officer stopped Defendant's vehicle just beyond the heart of campus. Defendant was later placed under arrest and charged with operating while under the influence of alcohol, among other charges. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, contending that the campus police officer did not have the authority to stop him beyond the boundaries of the college campus. A motion judge granted the motion, concluding that the offense and stop essentially occurred off campus and that circumstances did not permit the stop to be made in the "environs surrounding the campus." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the campus police officer observed Defendant commit a criminal offense in or upon lands used by the college; (2) the traffic stop was either in or on those same lands or within the environs of the college; and (3) thus, the stop was permissible under section 63. View "Commonwealth v. Smeaton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault by means of a dangerous weapon and several firearms charges. At trial, the Commonwealth proceeded under the theory that Defendant, who did not possess the gun used in the offense, was guilty of the charged offenses as a joint venturer. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that his firearms convictions should be reversed because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his coventurer had not been issued a license to carry a loaded firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where a defendant is charged with a possessory firearms offense on a theory of joint venture, the defendant must raise the defense of license before trial, and Defendant in this case failed to do so; and (2) the remainder of Defendant's claims failed. View "Commonwealth v. Humphries" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial judge erred in giving a consciousness of guilt instruction pertaining to flight where Defendant proceeded on a theory of self-defense and claimed his flight was the result of fear brought on by the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judge properly acted within her discretion in giving an instruction on consciousness of guilt over Defendant's objection, where the judge instructed the jury that Defendant could not be convicted based on consciousness of guilt alone and did not use words tending to endorse as true any inference. View "Commonwealth v. Morris" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape of a child with force and indecent assault and battery of a child under fourteen. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the superior court judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his apartment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, the police possessed sufficient factual information when they determined that a person who appeared to have authority had given consent to enter Defendant's apartment, and therefore, Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the warrantless entry into the home; and (2) there was no merit to Defendant's other claims of error. View "Commonwealth v. Santos" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in suppressing Defendant's statements he made to police after he was arrested but before he received the Miranda warnings, as Defendant's statements were voluntary and not made as a result of any police prompting or coercion; (2) the remarks made by the prosecutor during his closing argument were either not improper or no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred due to the remarks; and (3) the trial court's jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter and use of excessive force in self-defense were in error, but under the circumstances, there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arising from the errors. View "Commonwealth v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of various sexual offenses and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Prior to Defendant's scheduled release, the Commonwealth sought to commit Defendant as a sexually dangerous person. Defendant was temporarily committed and stipulated to probable cause. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a timely petition for trial. Defendant moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that the trial had not commenced within sixty days. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled as a matter of right to interlocutory relief because he had an adequate alternative remedy by way of an appeal. View "Flood v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant and Joseph Morgan were tried separately for the crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial judge (1) properly admitted the victim's statements to the 911 operator because the statements were excited utterances and were nontestimonial insofar as they were solicited for the primary purpose of enabling the police to assist in an ongoing emergency; (2) properly admitted the victim's statements to a responding police officer as dying declarations, concluding that the statements were not subject to the constraints of the confrontation clause; (3) did not err in declining to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to preclude the Commonwealth from arguing that the victim's intoxication did not affect his ability to identify Defendant as one of the shooters where the Commonwealth had previously argued at Morgan's trial that the victim's identification of Morgan had been unreliable because the positions taken by the Commonwealth at the two trials with respect to the reliability of the victim's identifications were distinct and not mutually exclusive. View "Commonwealth v. Middlemiss" on Justia Law

Defendant was incited for murder in the first degree and various counts of masked armed robbery. Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(2), Defendant notified the Commonwealth that he intended to offer expert testimony concerning his mental state at the time of the alleged crime. The Commonwealth subsequently moved for a court-ordered psychiatric examination of Defendant, requesting disclosure of the custodians of Defendant's medical and psychiatric records and production and seeking the production of all such treatment records to the court. The motion judge denied the portion of the motion requesting disclosure of the custodians and production of Defendant's medical and psychiatric records. The Supreme Court reversed the motion judge's order insofar as it denied the Commonwealth's motion for access to Defendant's medical and psychiatric records on behalf of the Rule 14(b)(2)(B) examiner, holding that the examiner's review of the treatment records was necessary to conduct a meaningful examination and to produce the requisite reports. View "Commonwealth v. Hanright" on Justia Law