Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on two indictments charging murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder. The jury also found Defendant guilty of several related offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court erred in admitting certain statements Defendant made to police, but the statements' admission did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (2) the prosecutor's failure to timely disclose that a key witness had been unable to identify Defendant at voir dire violated Defendant's constitutional rights, but Defendant was not prejudiced by the delay; and (3) defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress the admission of evidence obtained by Massachusetts police based on a pawn ticket that had been seized by New Jersey police after Defendant's arrest. View "Commonwealth v. Santana " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and related offenses for shootings that took place on a subway train. The Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the shootings had been committed as part of a joint venture. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) there was sufficient evidence of joint venture; (2) the trial court did not prejudicially err in refusing to severe Defendants' trials; (3) the trial court correctly instructed the jury on joint venture and murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity of cruelty; (4) the prosecutor made an improper statement during closing arguments, but the improper remark did not make a difference in the jury's conclusions; and (5) the trial court did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence of Defendants' gang affiliation. View "Commonwealth v. Akara" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and of larceny of a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and declined to exercise its power to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E with respect to the conviction of murder in the first degree, holding (1) the trial court did not err in partially denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of Defendant's apartment; (2) the prosecutor did not include improper remarks in his opening statement; (3) the trial judge did not err in refusing to strike an answer by a Commonwealth witness concerning the meaning of "inconclusive" DNA test results; (4) the judge did not err in refusing to allow the Defendant's counsel to cross-examine a witness about specific acts of prior misconduct; (5) the prosecutor made an improper remark in closing arguments, but the remark was harmless; (6) evidence that the death was a homicide was properly introduced; and (7) because the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty. View "Commonwealth v. Almonte" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, requiring him to register as a sex offender. Defendant was placed on probation by a superior court judge. Upon Defendant's motion seeking relief from the requirement that he register as a sex offender, the sentencing judge concluded that Defendant had demonstrated that he did not pose a risk of reoffense or a danger to the public and relieved him of the registration requirement. Almost three years later, a second superior court judge found Defendant in violation of his probation and, on that basis, ordered Defendant to register with the Sex Offender Registry Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the terms of the Sex Offender Registry Act, the second judge was without authority to require registration as a sex offender as a condition of probation or to revoke the prior grant of relief from registration. View "Commonwealth v. Ventura" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen years and rape of a child under the age of sixteen years. Defendant unsuccessfully moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that his conduct underlying the conviction of indecent assault and battery was not separate and distinct from his conduct constituting statutory rape because the moving of the victim's clothing was necessary to the rape. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen and affirmed his conviction of rape of a child under sixteen, holding that Defendant's actions underlying the two convictions were not separate and distinct. View "Commonwealth v. Suero" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to rape of a child and indecent assault and battery. When Defendant, who was homeless, failed to appear at the local police department to verify his registration information, the Commonwealth charged him by complaint with failing to verify his registration information. Defendant pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial judge sentenced Defendant to thirty days committed with no community parole supervision for life (CPSL). The Commonwealth subsequently filed a petition asking the county court to compel the judge to sentence Defendant to CPSL as mandated by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 178H. A single justice of the Supreme Court allowed the petition and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. On appeal, the Commonwealth agreed that the case was insufficient to support the imposition of CPSL but argued that by pleading guilty, Defendant waived his right to raise any argument about the sufficiency of the complaint on that point. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the single justice, holding that Defendant did not waive his argument concerning the insufficiency of the complaint on the CPSL issue by pleading guilty. View "Commonwealth v. Batista" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault with intent to murder and several firearms offenses. The appeals court affirmed. Defendant appealed, asserting, among other things, that the prosecutor misstated evidence and unjustifiably demeaned the defense, Defendant, and defense counsel in his closing argument, thereby depriving Defendant of a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) the prosecutor's repeated use of the term "street thug," his reference to the "entire defense" as a "sham," and his accusation that defense counsel assisted in the presentation of lies constituted excessive argument, and therefore, these aspects of the prosecutor's closing argument were improper; and (2) Defendant was prejudiced by the improprieties in the prosecutor's closing argument. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of operating while under the influence of alcohol, fifth or subsequent offense, and possession of a class D substance greater than one ounce. Defendant appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a vehicle stop conducted by a Merrimac police officer in the neighboring city of Amesbury. At issue was whether the police officer acted unlawfully by carrying his authority outside his municipal boundaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the stop was authorized under the terms of the mutual aid agreement between the municipalities, and that agreement complied with the requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, 8G. View "Commonwealth v. Bartlett " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder with deliberate premeditation, murder with deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, armed assault with intent to murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in admitting a hearsay statement of a deceased victim; (2) the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence in his closing argument; (3) defense counsel provided effective assistance; (4) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on the excessive use of force in self-defense; and (5) the trial judge's omission of an instruction on knowledge of a weapon on the joint venture theory of deliberately premeditated murder did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Britt" on Justia Law

Six years after his convictions were affirmed and four years after the denial of his motion for a new trial was affirmed, Defendant filed a motion for relief from unlawful sentence, alleging that the trial judge perceived Defendant's trial testimony as perjurious and then improperly considered his testimony in imposing sentence. A different judge denied the motion, as the trial judge had retired. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentences and remanded the matter for resentencing, holding that the trial judge erred by considering Defendant's testimony in imposing sentence, and because sentencing was thus improper, Defendant must be resentenced. View "Commonwealth v. Gomes" on Justia Law