Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought release from commitment as a sexually dangerous person. After being found indigent, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the judge authorize funds to retain the services of an independent qualified examiner to evaluate Petitioner and to assist in the preparation of his case. The judge approved the motion for funds in the amount of $2,500. Petitioner subsequently retained a licensed psychologist who agreed to conduct an evaluation of Petitioner and to testify at trial at the hourly rate approved by the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS): $190 an hour. After trial, Petitioner moved for the authorization of an additional $2,060 to compensate the psychologist. The trial judge allowed the motion in the amount of $1,500. The appeals court denied Petitioner's appeal, concluding that the judge did not err in limiting the expert's compensation to $4,000, which was "reasonable under the circumstances." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a judge is bound by CPCS's determination of an hourly rate but still retains the authority to determine whether the total amount billed is reasonable; and (2) the judge in this case acted in accordance with these limits in determining the reasonable amount of the expert's fee. View "In re Edwards" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police and his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress and concluding that the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant made a knowing, willing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights and that his statements were otherwise voluntarily made; and (2) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a pretrial motion to suppress a witness's identification of Defendant, as Defendant failed to demonstrate a likelihood that a motion to suppress this evidence would have been successful. View "Commonwealth v. Jules" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and two counts of illegal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in limiting cross-examination of the Commonwealth's principal witness; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting a police officer's testimony, which, contrary to Defendant's assertion, did not improperly vouch for the principal witness's testimony; (3) the trial judge did not err in declining to sequester the police witnesses who were involved in the investigation and who had conducted interviews of the principal witness; and (4) the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for Commonwealth witnesses or misstate evidence during his closing argument. View "Commonwealth v. Ahart" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a document in the county court entitled "Defendant-Appellant's Interlocutory Appeal on Confrontation Clause With a Known Confidential Informant - Sixth Amendment" that was not accompanied by copies of any relevant papers from the criminal case pending against Defendant in the district court. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied relief without a hearing. The full Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to meet his most basic obligations as an appellant in the full court because, among other things, his brief failed to contain adequate appellate argument, and his record appendix contained numerous items that were not before the single justice. View "Azubuko v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff became the subject of a federal indictment, the school department (Defendant) suspended her without pay from her position as a school adjustment counselor. Ultimately, the indictment was dismissed. Plaintiff sought reinstatement to her position, but Defendant terminated her employment. Plaintiff filed a grievance challenging the termination, and an arbitrator ordered that she be reinstated. Plaintiff then filed an action seeking confirmation of the arbitration award and back pay for the period of her suspension an the period between her termination and reinstatement. The superior court affirmed the arbitration award but granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to Plaintiff's back pay claims. The appeals court affirmed the denial of back pay with respect to the period between Plaintiff's termination and reinstatement but reversed with respect to the period of her suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed. Remanded. View "Serrazina v. Springfield Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for aggravated rape, indecent assault and battery, and other related offenses. The charges were based on five separate incidents involving five female victims. During the pretrial proceedings, the Commonwealth provided discovery to Defendant that included records related to medical treatment that some of the alleged victims received following the incidents. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for discovery that included the request for additional medical treatment or follow up visits any victim had pertaining to the indicted offenses. The superior court allowed the motion with respect to any follow up medical visits. The Commonwealth sought relief from that order, arguing that the order was improper because it required the Commonwealth to inquire of the alleged victims whether they sought or had follow-up treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the judge was only allowing Defendant's request to the extent it required the Commonwealth to provide information in its possession. View "Commonwealth v. Castillo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant appealed, arguing error in the admission of evidence, the prosecutor's closing argument, and the judge's instructions to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not palpably err in admitting a 911 recording of the victim stating three times, "I've been stabbed"; (2) the prosecutor did not improperly attempt to evoke sympathy from the jury by playing, during his closing argument, the 911 recording; and (3) the trial court did not prejudicially err in its instructions to the jury on self-defense. View "Commonwealth v. Harris" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, assault and battery causing serious bodily injury, assault and battery, and malicious destruction of property. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of assault and battery causing serious bodily injury, holding that the evidence, which consisted primarily of medical records not explained by an expert witness, was insufficient to permit a rational jury to find that the victim suffered "serious bodily injury" within the meaning of the relevant statute. Remanded for resentencing on the remaining convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Scott" on Justia Law

While serving a period of probation for unrelated convictions, Defendant allegedly sold crack cocaine to a confidential police informant. Prior to his probation revocation hearing, Defendant moved for disclosure of the informant's identity. The district court denied the motion. The court then revoked Defendant's probation for violation of the terms of probation. At issue on appeal was whether a defendant facing probation revocation due to an alleged new criminal offense is entitled to disclosure of the identity of an informant who was a participant in the alleged offense, the only nongovernment witness to the offense, and the only percipient witness to the entire alleged transaction. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment, holding (1) under such circumstances, disclosure may be appropriate; and (2) the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion for disclosure on the ground that disclosure is never required in probation revocation proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Kelsey" on Justia Law

Defendant was on parole from his prison sentence for armed robbery and on probation for his conviction of rape of a child when, one evening, his parole officer investigated a possible violation of her directive that Defendant remain home on Halloween to avoid congregating with children who were out trick-or-treating. When the parole officer discovered Defendant was not where he claimed to be that evening, Defendant's parole was revoked and his probation terminated. Defendant was subsequently indicted for misleading a parole officer with the intent to obstruct a criminal proceeding. The evidence at trial revealed that, on the night at issue, Defendant went to his paramour's apartment while her children were present. The trial court convicted Defendant of the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it is a crime under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, 13B for a parolee to mislead a parole officer who is investigating the parolee's possible future to comply with parole conditions, and it does not matter that the parolee failed to succeed in misleading the parole officer. View "Commonwealth v. Figueroa" on Justia Law