Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. After various proceedings, Defendant filed his fifth motion for a new trial, arguing that newly discovered evidence in the form of third-party culprit evidence warranted a new trial. The superior court denied the motion as well as Defendant’s motions for reconsideration. Defendant appealed the denial of his fifth motion for a new trial pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the appeal to proceed. The Supreme Judicial Court then affirmed the order denying Defendant’s fifth motion for a new trial, holding that the new evidence did not cast real doubt on the justice of Defendant’s conviction because there was no a substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had this evidence been admitted at trial. View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony murder. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that in litigating his motions to suppress, he should have been afforded “target standing” to challenge the violation of his alleged coventurers’ constitutional rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) even assuming the availability of target standing, Defendant was properly denied target standing to challenge the violations of his coventurers’ constitutional rights; (2) the witness immunity statute was constitutional as applied to Defendant; (3) certain identification testimony was improperly admitted into evidence, but the improper testimony was not prejudicial; and (4) the trial judge erred in failing to give an instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Vacher" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree of a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed, raising five allegations of error. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the first four of Defendant’s claims but agreed with the fifth, holding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that they may consider Defendant’s consumption of alcohol in determining whether Defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner in causing the victim’s death, and the error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

For over twenty years, Plaintiff worked as a ninth grade science teacher. In 2004, Plaintiff was arrested for the purchase and possession of child pornography. In 2006, Plaintiff resigned his position. In 2007, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to eleven counts of purchasing and possessing child pornography. After his arrest but prior to his plea and sentencing, Plaintiff filed a retirement application with the Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System (MTRS). Plaintiff received retirement benefits until 2009, at which time the MTRS Board concluded that Plaintiff’s pension was forfeited by operation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15(4) due to his convictions. The superior court vacated the decision of the Board on the basis that there was not a direct link between Plaintiff’s criminal offenses and his position as a teacher. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that forfeiture of Plaintiff’s retirement benefits under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 51(4) was not warranted because Plaintiff’s offenses neither directly involved Plaintiff’s position as a teacher nor contravened a particular law applicable to that position. View "Garney v. Mass. Teachers' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Trenea Figgs was a participant in the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Section 8 program, which was administered by the Boston Housing Authority. After the discovery by police officers of marijuana and a loaded firearm in Figgs’s apartment, the BHA notified Figgs of its intent to terminate her participation in the Section 8 program due to violations of her lease. A hearing officer concluded that termination of Figgs’s Section 8 housing subsidy was proper in light of her serious lease violation. The Housing Court reversed and ordered the BHA to reinstate Figgs’s Section 8 housing subsidy. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the Housing Court, holding that, notwithstanding the enactment of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32L, which decriminalized the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana, the hearing officer properly concluded that Figgs violated her lease based on evidence of other criminal activity in Figgs’s rental premises, and the violation warranted Figgs’s termination from the Section 8 program. View "Figgs v. Boston Housing Auth." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, asserting multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and requested an evidentiary hearing. The trial judge denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and the denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial; and (3) there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in the trial judge’s failure to make written findings. View "Commonwealth v. Torres" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and armed robbery. Defendant’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently sought postconviction relief in both state and federal courts, without success. Defendant’s later motion for scientific testing of a jacket purportedly worn by Defendant during the killing was granted. The jacket was retested and screened negative for the presence of the victim’s blood. On the basis of the new test results, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The motion judge granted the motion, concluding that the jacket was a key piece of corroborative evidence against Defendant and that the newly available evidence arising from the retesting of the jacket cast real doubt on the justice of Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment granting Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding that the motion judge did not abuse her discretion in ruling that physical evidence arising from the jacket served as a “real factor” in the jury’s deliberations such that the new test results “cast real doubt on the justice of the defendant’s conviction.” View "Commonwealth v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court set forth a new standard for determining when substantial justice would best be served by the sealing of certain criminal records under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 100C after concluding that the stringent standard for discretionary sealing articulated nearly twenty years ago no longer achieves the proper balance of interests. Here, Defendant filed a petition to seal his criminal record pursuant to chapter 276, section 100C due to its impact on his employment opportunities. The judge denied the petition. Although Defendant attained desired relief through another process, the Supreme Judicial Court exercised its discretion to revisit the standard for discretionary sealing pursuant to chapter 276, section 100C. View "Commonwealth v. Pon" on Justia Law

After Defendant’s first three trials ended in mistrials, a fourth trial was held, and Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of felony-murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed, raising numerous claims of error. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its evidentiary rulings; (2) any error committed by the prosecutor during closing argument was not prejudicial; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments against him; and (4) the Commonwealth engaged in egregious misconduct by issuing a press release regarding the case, but the conduct was not of sufficient significance to result in the denial of Defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Court also reinstated Defendant’s two convictions of armed robbery - the underlying felonies in the felony-murder conviction - which the trial judge had dismissed as duplicative, holding that those convictions were not duplicative where Defendant was also convicted on another theory of murder in the first degree - murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty. View "Commonwealth v. Wood" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by police officers while walking down the street. An officer asked for permission to search the backpack Defendant was carrying, whereupon Defendant removed the bag and handed it to the officer. The officer then removed a box designed to look like a cigarette package but which was “noticeably heavier.” At this time, Defendant changed his mind and told the officer he could not look in the bag. The officer proceeded to open the box and discovered cocaine. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his stop and subsequent arrest. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. Defendant was subsequently convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding (1) the investigatory stop of Defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion; but (2) there was no probable cause to make an arrest when the cigarette box was opened, and the opening of the cigarette box could not be justified as a search incident to arrest. View "Commonwealth v. Stewart" on Justia Law