Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree, armed assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, and various firearms offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and declined to grant him a new trial or to reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the peremptory challenge of an African-American juror; (2) the trial judge erred in admitting certain evidence concerning Defendant's juvenile record, but the error was harmless; (3) although some of the prosecutor's statements during closing argument may have exceeded the bounds of permissible argument, they were unlikely to have affected the jury's verdicts; (4) the trial judge did not err in concluding that Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the use of force in defense of another; and (5) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on Defendant's assertion that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Scott" on Justia Law

A jury convicted of Defendant of being an accessory before the fact to murder. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction because the evidence did not establish that he had done any act before the assault to counsel, hire, or otherwise procure the assault. The Commonwealth subsequently sought and the grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with murder for his involvement in the killing. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that, because murder was a form, or a "species," of the lesser included offense of accessory before the fact to murder, a second prosecution was barred by double jeopardy. A judge denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the indictment that charged Defendant with murder in the first degree did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, given the erroneous jury instructions and the erroneous admitted evidence, prosecution of Defendant for murder in the first degree was not barred on grounds of double jeopardy. View "Marshall v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury conviction, Defendant was convicted of deliberately premeditated murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and declined to reduce the verdict or order a new trial, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) refusing to instruct the jury that they could consider evidence of voluntary intoxication on the question of Defendant's capacity to premeditate deliberately; (2) refusing to instruct the jury that they could return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter based on evidence of reasonable provocation or mutual combat; and (3) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on his claim of a closure of the court room during jury selection, as Defendant failed to meet his burden of showing there was a general or even a partial closure of the court room. View "Commonwealth v. Lennon" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, and of possession of a firearm without a license. The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Defendant's motions to suppress and affirmed the judgments of conviction, holding (1) the pretrial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's request for a continuance so that he could change counsel; (2) the trial court did not abuse his discretion in declining to allow Defendant to discharge his appointed counsel; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motions to suppress statements; (3) the trial judge did not err in his instructions to the jury; and (4) there was no basis on which to grant Defendant relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws 278, 33E by reducing the murder verdict to a lesser degree of guilt or granting Defendant a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Delacruz" on Justia Law

This matter arose from an application filed by Plaintiff in the Somerville division of the district court department for a criminal complaint against a police officer. The first assistant clerk of the court denied the application and referred the matter to the district attorney. A district court denied Plaintiff's request for a hearing to review the action. Plaintiff then filed a petition seeking an order compelling the clerk-magistrate of the district court to conduct a show cause hearing and issue a criminal complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that Plaintiff had no right to a show cause hearing on such an application and no right to have a criminal complaint authorized. View "Aldrich v. Clerk-Magistrate" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and unlawful possession of one firearm. Defendant's convictions arose out of the then sixteen-year-old Defendant's asserted participation in what the trial judge described as an "alleged contract killing by one drug dealer of another." Defendant appealed from his convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the second degree and possession of a firearm; and (2) vacated Defendant's conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, as assault with intent to murder and assault by means of a dangerous weapon are distinct statutory offenses, and because Defendant was indicted for the former but convicted of the latter, he was entitled to have this conviction reduced to simple assault, a lesser-inclued offense of both crimes. Remanded.

A jury convicted Defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) because the admission of a statement by the victim was not error, there was no ineffective assistance of Defendant's trial counsel based on counsel's failure to object to the admission of the statement; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting expert testimony; (3) Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel based on defense counsel's failure to object to questions posed by the prosecutor to a witness were unavailing; (4) there was no error in the prosecutor's closing argument; and (5) an isolated misstatement by the judge in her instructions to the jury did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

Based on an assault that occurred on June 6, 2007, a jury convicted Defendant of attempted murder, armed home invasion, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery. The appeals court affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending, inter alia, that the assault constituted a consensual sexual encounter, and thus, in light of Lawrence v. Texas, the trial judge committed constitutional error by not instructing the jury that consent is a defense to the crimes of armed home invasion and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no conflict between the reasoning of Lawrence and the Court's prior decisions holding that consent is not a defense to the crimes charged, and the judge appropriately instructed the jury on consent; (2) although the admission of materials retrieved on Defendant's home computer were proper, the judge's failure to view a video clip depicting a nude woman being strangled seemingly to death prior to ruling that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect was an abuse of discretion; but (3) upon independent review, the evidence was highly probative of Defendant's motive and intent, outweighing its plainly prejudicial effect.

Defendant was false accused of assaulting with a gun Ramon Benzan, a person who was performing work for Defendant. After the criminal complaint issued, it became apparent that Benzan had lied to a Boston police detective about the alleged assault in an attempt to extort money. The prosecutor filed a nolle prosequi. Defendant later moved to expunge his criminal records, arguing that the judge had the equitable authority to do so because Defendant had committed fraud on the court. A Boston municipal court judge deneid the motion, concluding that the case was controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Boe and that under Mass. Gen. Laws 276, 100C, the judge had no power to issue an order of expungement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no fraud on the court; and (2) accordingly, the judge correctly determined that he lacked the equitable authority to grant the relief requested.

After a jury trial, Defendants, two brothers, were convicted of several violations of the controlled substances laws, including the possession of class B and class D substances with intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendants primarily claimed that the admission of certificates of drug analysis to prove the chemical composition of the drugs seized in their shared apartment was constitutional error. The appeals court reversed based on improperly admitted drug certificates, even though Defendants both testified at trial and admitted that they possessed the drugs but for personal use. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the submission in evidence of the drug certificates without the testimony of the analyst that prepared them violated Defendants' right of confrontation; but (2) when considering Defendants' testimony along with the totality of the record, the admission of the drug certificates was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.