Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A superior court jury convicted Defendant William Santos of armed robbery and murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder fin the shooting death of Luis Rodriguez. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in admitting many portions of Defendant's statement given to the police following the shooing, and the admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court err in admitting statements made by the codefendant to his sister shortly after the shooting, and the error was not harmless.

The Commonwealth and William O'Connell (collectively, Petitioners) filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from a district court judge's order releasing from impoundment a redacted version of a search warrant affidavit. The affidavit contained a recitation of allegations made against O'Connell, a prominent real estate developer, that were the subject of criminal charges of, inter alia, statutory rape. George W. Prescott Publishing Company sought access to the impounded affidavit on the grounds that the document was presumptively public. The district court judge vacated his earlier order impounding the affidavit but further ordered that the affidavit be redacted before it was made available to the public. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mass. Gen. Laws 41, 97D, which bars from disclosure affidavits containing reports of rape, does not apply to search warrant affidavits; and (2) the judge did not err in vacating the order of impoundment.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for the death of Lourdes Hernandez. Defendant appealed, claiming that inappropriate statements made in the prosecutor's closing argument and a defective jury instruction on reasonable doubt constituted error requiring that his conviction be reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the prosecutor did not commit prejudicial error in his closing remarks; (2) the jury instruction was an accurate statement of the law, the instruction did not denigrate the Commonwealth's burden of proof, and Defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction; and (3) cumulative error did not warrant a new trial.

In 2006, defendant's wife and their nine-month-old daughter were found dead in a bed in the master bedroom of their home in Hopkinton. His wife had been shot once in the forehead; his daughter had been shot in the abdomen from close range while cradled in her mother's arms. Defendant, a British citizen, was charged with their murders and extradited from the United Kingdom, where he had traveled. He was convicted of counts of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, G.L. c. 265, sect. 1. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the motion judge (who was also the trial judge) erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the warrantless searches of his home by officers attempting to find his missing family. The court also rejected defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury because the jury pool was tainted by "saturating and inflammatory" media coverage and because the judge refused during jury selection to probe more deeply into whether prospective jurors had already concluded from the pretrial publicity that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged.

On November 19, 1985, Patricia Clark was discovered stabbed to death in her Lowell home. At the time, the investigation focused on the defendant, a former boyfriend; Clark had ended their relationship earlier that year. Investigators interviewed defendant and searched his automobile, but the case proceeded no further. In 2005, after reviewing photographs of items that had been found in the defendant's vehicle 20 years earlier, Clark's daughter provided "cold case" detectives with new information linking the defendant to the crime. He was indicted, and in 2007 a jury convicted him of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to admission of testimony by certain witnesses, and to a jury instruction on consciousness of guilt.

Three witnesses identified defendant as the shooter. He was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of both premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, G.L. c. 265, s 1; carrying a firearm without a license, G.L. c. 269l s 10 (a); carrying a loaded firearm, G.L. c. 269, s 10; possession of ammunition without a FID card, G.L. c. 269, s 10 (b ); and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a building, G.L. c. 269, s 12E. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, finding that evidentiary errors were not prejudicial in light of the strong case against defendant. The court had allowed the prosecution to introduce a round of ammunition found in defendant's apartment, with an instruction that these items could be considered only to show defendant's familiarity with or access to firearms, The court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of security measures in defendant's apartment: pit bull dogs, a security camera trained on the front door, and a police scanner. The court permitted a state trooper to testify to a conversation between defendant and the key identifying witness, DeMiranda, in which defendant offered to pay DeMiranda to leave the country.

Manavoglu was shot while pursuing the man who had robbed him at gun point in the restaurant he owned in Boston. He died two days later. A jury convicted defendant, whom the police apprehended in the area within minutes of the incident, whom two witnesses identified, and who confessed to the crime during a police interview, of felony-murder in the first degree (G.L. c. 265, 1); armed robbery (G.L. c. 265, 17); possession of a firearm and ammunitions without a firearm identification card (G.L. c. 269, 10 (a) and G.L. c. 269, 10(h )). The Second Circuit vacated the armed robbery conviction as duplicative because it was the predicate to the felony-murder conviction, but otherwise affirmed. The court rejected arguments concerning refusal to suppress statements made during an interview within hours of the shooting; evidence regarding gunshot residue testing conducted on clothing found near the scene; testimony from a witness, who had identified defendant, about his military training on "observations," and incorporation of that testimony into closing arguments; and prosecutorial comments that impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant and inaccurately characterized evidence. The defendant also argued the Commonwealth's case relied heavily on eyewitness testimony that the defendant characterized as "notoriously unreliable."

Defendant was convicted of rape and furnishing alcohol to a person under 21 years of age. On appeal he claimed error in the denial of his right to cross-examine the victim as to her motive to fabricate; in denial of his motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the element that he knew or should have known of the victim's incapacity to consent; and in refusal to instruct the jury that they could consider the defendant's state of intoxication when deciding whether he reasonably should have known of the victim's incapacity to consent. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judge's instruction was error under Commonwealth v. Blache, (2008), in which it held that where the Commonwealth relies on evidence that a rape victim was incapable of consent to establish the element of lack of consent and thereby reduce the degree of required force to that which is needed to effect penetration, "the Commonwealth should also prove the defendant's knowledge of the complainant's incapacitated state." The error, however, did not prejudice the defendant. There was no evidence of debilitating intoxication. He was not entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication.

Healey, convicted of multiple sexual offenses involving children, completed his prison sentences, but remains committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center as a sexually dangerous person. He was initially committed in 1966, under the law then in effect, and was recommitted after he reoffended sexually while on a gradual release program. He unsuccessfully petitioned for discharge under G.L. c. 123A, 9, several times. In 2005, a jury determined that he remained sexually dangerous. Healy filed a petition in the county court, G.L. c. 211, 3, alleging that his conditions of confinement are governed by the 1958 version of the sexually dangerous person law; that he is entitled to be evaluated by psychiatrists rather than psychologists; that he is entitled to hearings before the parole board; that his right to a speedy trial has been abridged; and that he is entitled to proceed jury-waived. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed denial of the petition. Healy was required to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of remedies alternative to G.L. c. 211, 3, and failed to do so. He could have appealed from dismissal of his habeas corpus petition or filed a civil action against the Commissioner of Correction to challenge the terms of his commitment.

At trial, defendant conceded his guilt of murder, but sought a verdict of murder in the second degree on the ground that his impaired mental condition affected his ability to make decisions in a normal manner or to appreciate the consequences of his actions. He was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty for the beating death of his housemate in 2008. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, declining to grant relief under G.L. c. 278, 33E. The court rejected an argument by new counsel that the judge erred in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on mental impairment. In explaining the elements of murder in the first degree committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, the judge directed the jurors to consider each of the Cunneen factors, and he listed them accurately. The judge subsequently instructed the jury in conformity with the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 61-62 regarding consideration of evidence of the defendant's mental impairment. The jury need not be instructed in the exact words requested by the defendant.