Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered the apartment of his estranged wife and their two children with a can of gasoline; poured the gasoline so that it landed on himself, his 14-month-old daughter (Diana), the babysitter, and the floor; and ignited it. Fire engulfed Diana’s body, causing permanent disfiguring injuries. Defendant was indicted for armed assault with intent to murder, G.L. c. 265, 18 (b ); aggravated assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon, G.L. c. 265, 15A (c ) (i); assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon, G.L. c. 265, 15A (b ); arson of a dwelling, G.L. c. 266, 1; and armed home invasion, G.L. c. 265, 18C. He testified that he intended to commit suicide, not to injure anyone else, nor to burn the apartment. He did not claim any mental or emotional condition that prevented him from forming requisite intent or that he was not criminally responsible for his acts because of mental or emotional impairment. He was convicted of all charges. The Massachusetts Supreme Court set aside convictions of armed assault with intent to murder Diana and the caretaker, based on admission of incriminating statements defendant made to a psychiatrist after the fire, but otherwise affirmed. The court rejected claims relating to admission of prior bad acts evidence.

Defendant, charged with deriving support from prostitution, was tried before a jury that indicated that they were unable to reach a verdict. The judge declared a mistrial. Prior to retrial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictments against him on double jeopardy grounds. The trial judge (the same judge as at his first trial) denied that motion, finding that the prior declaration of mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that defendant may be retried.

Following internal upheaval in a gang, five members and a nonmember associate executed a sixth member. Two other members testified under cooperation agreements. Davenport, the nonmember who killed the victim, testified that he acted under duress. Following joint trial of four defendants, the jury found all guilty of first degree murder and of other crimes. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting Davenport’s claim that he was entitled to an instruction on duress as a defense to murder. The court also rejected arguments by other defendants that their defenses were mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable with Davenport's duress defense, so that their trials should have been severed, and that the Commonwealth was improperly allowed to challenge a juror who failed to make complete disclosure of his criminal record (the prosecutor discovered the omission after declaring his satisfaction with the juror but before the jury were sworn). The judge properly denied a motion for recusal that was based on statements made during a plea colloquy; properly admitted a statement of another defendant; properly denied a hearing to challenge reliability and admissibility of expert opinion testimony on bloodstain pattern analysis; and properly denied a required finding of not guilty on a charge of aggravated rape.

Defendant pleaded guilty to rape of a child and an unrelated unarmed burglary, and was sentenced to eight to 15 years. He had been the live-in boyfriend of the victim's mother for many years. When the victim was approximately seven years old, he began fondling her chest, and when she was about 10 years old he raped her once or twice each week. The charged rapes occurred when the victim was age 12 to 14. A jury found defendant to be a sexually dangerous person, G.L. c. 123A, 1, and he was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for an indeterminate period of from one day to life. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed for a new trial, based on the court: allowing evidence of defendant’s refusal to participate in sex offender treatment programs; admitting evidence of rumors that he had sexually assaulted another inmate; and instructing the jury regarding mental abnormality and the likelihood of engaging in sexual offenses. The prosecutor's closing argument, regarding defendant's sexual frustration from time in prison, was improper. The court properly excused a prospective juror for cause who expressed his belief that no medical expert could conclusively demonstrate whether defendant is going to commit another sexual offense.

The Commonwealth alleged that, at age 16-17, the defendant committed several crimes including acts of child rape. The defendant was not apprehended until he was 26 years old. The defendant moved to dismiss the youthful offender indictments because he had not been afforded a transfer hearing pursuant to G.L. c. 119, 72A, which states that prior to indictment, the judge must determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offenses charged and, if so, either order the defendant discharged, if consistent with the protection of the public, or dismiss the case, if the public interest requires that the defendant be tried. The judge allowed the defendant's motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Section 72A, states that, "[i]f a person commits an offense or violation prior to his seventeenth birthday, and is not apprehended until after his eighteenth birthday, the court, after a hearing, shall determine whether there is probable cause ...." The language, "after a hearing shall," is clear and unambiguous. Section 54, which states, "[t]he court shall proceed on the complaint or the indictment ... in accordance with [sections 55-72], inclusive," does not exempt the Commonwealth from complying with the requirements of section 72A.

More than a year after his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, defendant, moved for postverdict inquiry of the jurors. The trial judge had recused himself and a different judge granted the motion. After holding evidentiary hearings, the judge allowed the motion for a new trial on the basis that the jury had been exposed to an extraneous influence during deliberations and the Commonwealth had failed to prove that the incident did not prejudice the defendant. The Appeals Court vacated the order for a new trial and remanded the case for further inquiry into the bases for the request for a postverdict inquiry of the jurors and, in particular, the role of defendant and his friend in contacting a juror. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed that remand for further inquiry is appropriate and clarified the procedure for conducting postverdict hearings where, although a defendant claims that the jury were exposed to an extraneous influence, there is also evidence that the defendant or someone acting on the defendant's behalf may have been involved.

Defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine, G.L. c. 94C, 32E (b ) (1), and conspiracy to violate the drug laws, G.L. c. 94C, 40. He filed an affidavit of indigency, G.L. c. 261, 27B, was appointed counsel, and tendered pleas of not guilty. During proceedings on a motion to suppress, the judge questioned the defendant's indigency status, took evidence, and entered an order concluding that the defendant was not indigent because he was not in custody and had "available funds," under S.J.C. Rule 3:10, 1(b), from his girlfriend and his mother. The judge struck the appearance of counsel in the case before her and in the probation revocation proceeding. The Massachusetts Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, rejecting an argument that consideration of the available funds of his girlfriend and his mother infringed on his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

The trial judge found that defendant was indigent but able to contribute $40,000 to his defense against indictments charging him with the murders of his wife, mother-in-law, and children (S.J.C. Rule 3:10, (1)(g)). In setting the amount of the required contribution, the judge considered assets that defendant had reported to the probation department, including bank accounts, a college fund, and an individual retirement account. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Some of the assets are currently unavailable to defendant under the "slayer statute," G.L. c. 265, 46 because those assets were held jointly with his deceased wife or in trust for the deceased children. An IRA is ordinarily to be considered a liquid asset available to a defendant and may properly be included in the assessment of his ability to pay for his representation, at least up to the net amount available to him after accounting for any early withdrawal penalties and taxes.

Following indictment on 93 counts of failure to pay wages timely, (G.L. c. 149, 148), defendant filed an affidavit of indigency and sought appointment of counsel at public expense (G.L. c. 211D, 2 1/2 (a )). After reviewing financial information, which showed that defendant and her husband together had an annual income of approximately $60,000 and owned three properties, the probation department recommended the defendant be found not indigent. The trial judge held three hearings at which defendant appeared without counsel and argued that she had little to no discretionary income and that two of the properties were subject to mortgages and tax liens, hindering their liquidity. She did not present evidence, but relied on oral statements and records discovered by the probation department. Reasoning that the defendant has the burden of proof of her indigency, the judge found the defendant not indigent. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. A criminal defendant who seeks to have counsel appointed at public expense bears the burden of proving indigency by a preponderance of the evidence.

Defendant pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, first offense, G.L. c. 6, 178H (a ) (3). In open court, the defendant was sentenced to incarceration for one year in a house of correction. Thereafter, a sentence to community parole supervision (CPSL) for life also entered on the docket. The defendant subsequently filed an "emergency motion to correct the sentence," arguing that the CPSL portion of the sentence should be vacated. The motion was denied. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Imposition of CPSL is discretionary, not mandatory, under the terms of G.L. c. 6, 178H (a ) (3). The sentencing judge mistakenly believed that imposition of CPSL was mandatory.