Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant and two others were indicted for the crime of aggravated rape, with joint enterprise as the sole aggravating factor. After defendant was convicted, defendant argued that, apart from the court's authority in capital cases under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, an appellate court was without authority to order entry of conviction of a lesser included offense. Defendant further argued that, where the Commonwealth did not request an instruction on the lesser included offense and the conviction on the greater offense was a nullity, the Commonwealth was not entitled to entry of a conviction on the lesser included offense. The court agreed with the Appeals Court and vacated so much of the conviction as alleged aggravated rape, let stand his conviction as to the lesser included offense of rape, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for resentencing as to the crime of rape.

Defendant was convicted by a jury on two indictments charging statutory rape. The alleged victim was his then fifteen year old niece. Defendants subsequently appealed from his convictions. The court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial because the judge erred in excluding testimony of an expert and the evidence of childhood sexual abuse necessary to apply the expert opinion to the facts of this case, and because the error was prejudicial.

Defendants were convicted of carrying a firearm without a license; possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card; and possession of a loaded firearm. Defendants appealed, challenging, among other issues, the sufficiency of the evidence that they possessed the firearm. The court concluded that the evidence that defendants jointly and knowingly possessed the loaded firearm was sufficient as a matter of law. The court concluded, however, that the judge erred in denying defendants the opportunity to offer the affirmative defense that the firearm was manufactured before 1900 and therefore could be lawfully possessed without a license to carry and that this error could have materially influenced the firearm and ammunition convictions. Therefore, the court reversed the judgments of convictions for those charges and remanded for a new trial on those charges.

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm; unlawful possession of a loaded firearm; and unlawful possession of ammunition without a firearm identification (FID) card. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions of possession of a firearm and possession of a loaded firearm. The court rejected defendant's argument and affirmed his firearm convictions. Defendant also appealed from his conviction under the sentencing enhancement provision of G.L.c. 269, 10G(c), on the ground that the evidence presented in support of one of his three prior convictions, assault and battery, failed to establish that he committed a "violent crime" within the meaning of G.L.c. 140, section 121. The court agreed with defendant and vacated the judgment for conviction under G.L.c. 269, section 10G(c), as an armed career criminal based on three predicate offense convictions, and remanded the case for the entry of judgment and resentencing under G.L.c. 269, section 10G(c), based on two predicate offense convictions.

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery (with his fists); assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (shod foot); and the unlawful possession of a firearm outside of his residence or place of business, as well as unlawful possession of a firearm having previously been convicted of a violent crime. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the firearm should have been suppressed because there was neither probable cause that a firearm would be found in the vehicle nor grounds for conducting an inventory search; the evidence was insufficient to prove that he constructively possessed the firearm; and with respect to the assault and battery convictions, defendant contended that the judge improperly permitted the jury to view a photograph of the victim's facial injuries. The court rejected defendant's arguments regarding the firearm and subsequent offender convictions, and discerned no merit in defendant's remaining claims.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on all three theories of murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping. On appeal, defendant argued (1) error in the denial of his motion to suppress statements and evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel predicated on trial counsel's failure to (a) engage a sleep deprivation expert and (b) request a jury instruction on the effect of defendant's intoxication relative to his intent; and (3) improper closing argument by the prosecutor. The court rejected defendant's arguments and affirmed the order denying the motion to suppress and the judgments of conviction. The court discerned no basis to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant's claims on appeal related largely to statements he made to a detective while he was in custody in a hospital recovering from a gunshot wound. Because a number of aspects of the trial, among them the detective's testimony concerning defendant's unrecorded statements, prejudicial limitations on defendant's right to cross-examine a detective, and certain of the prosecutor's remarks in closing argument, created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, defendant was entitled to a new trial.

Defendant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine. On the second day of trial, defense counsel discovered that the Commonwealth had violated a discovery order by failing to copy for the defense at least 500 pages of computer-generated information obtained during the police investigation. Defendant moved to dismiss the case but, for financial and emotional reasons, objected to any declaration of a mistrial. Finding that the Commonwealth had not intentionally violated the order, the trial judge denied the motion to dismiss. The judge further found that the newly disclosed materials contained information that any "reasonably diligent" defense counsel would want to review, and that to do so would take longer than a mere "brief delay." Therefore, the judge declared a mistrial over the defendant's objection. The court held that, based upon the facts of the case, the judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that there was "manifest necessity" for a mistrial. There was no double jeopardy bar and defendant could be retried. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court for an entry of judgment denying the petition.

Defendant was convicted of charges related to an armed robbery and appealed. The court concluded that the motion judge did not err in denying the motion to suppress, but that the trial judge erred in allowing the youthful offender adjudication of carjacking to be used as a predicate offense in finding defendant an armed career criminal, level three, under G.L.c. 269, section 10G(c). The court also concluded that defendant's convictions of assault by means of a dangerous weapon and armed robbery while masked were not duplicative, but that defendant's conviction of the unlawful possession of ammunition must be vacated where defendant had been convicted of carrying a loaded firearm.

Defendant appealed from his conviction of larceny of property over $250 by false pretenses. Defendant's principal argument on appeal was that there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain his conviction. The court agreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient and held, inter alia, that the evidence did not furnish a sufficient basis for concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly made a false statement about the imminent sale of the property at issue either at the time the loan was agreed to or at the time the loan funds were disbursed.