Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, as well as assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. On appeal defendant argued that the judge failed to conduct an appropriate voir dire of the prospective jurors during jury selection; his statement to police following his arrest on the day of the killing should have been suppressed; the judge erred in admitting a statement he made to another inmate; the prosecutor's closing argument was improper and created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice; and the judge erred when he instructed the jury that they must consider whether defendant "as a result of a mental illness, lacked the capacity to have the intent, knowledge, or state of mind necessary" to prove the crimes charged. The court addressed each issue and affirmed the convictions. After a complete review of the record, the court declined to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of failing to verify his sex offender registration information by refusing to provide certain secondary addresses, and was sentenced to lifetime parole. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the judge erred in denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty. Because the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to convict defendant, the court reversed. In light of this conclusion, the other issues defendant raised were moot. However, because there appeared to be some confusion concerning whether the complaint properly alleged that defendant could face lifetime parole, the court addressed it briefly. The court concluded that the complaint issued against defendant in this case did not meet requirements of art. 12. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.

Petitioner filed a petition for examination and discharge under G.L.c. 123A, section 9, the section of the sexually dangerous person statute that entitled someone who was committed as a sexually dangerous person annually to file a petition for examination and discharge from the Massachusetts Treatment Center. At issue was whether section 9 rendered admissible the written reports of expert witnesses retained by a section 9 petitioner for purposes of the section 9 proceeding. The court concluded that an interpretation of section 9 to bar the admission in evidence of a written report prepared by a petitioner's expert psychiatrist or psychologist, while authorizing introduction of the reports prepared by the qualified examiners and the community access board, would raise substantial due process concerns. Therefore, the court construed section 9 to render admissible petitioner's experts' written reports. The court agreed with the Appeals Court that the objected-to exclusion of the written reports prepared by petitioner's experts in this case was prejudicial and vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate felony. On appeal, defendant claimed that he was denied a fair trial because the judge disallowed one of his peremptory challenges and barred the third-party culprit evidence he sought to present. The court held that the judge's striking of the peremptory challenge did not amount to reversible error; the "substantial connecting links" doctrine, governing the admissibility of third-party culprit evidence at criminal trials, remained a reasonable evidentiary standard that was valid under the Federal Constitution; the trial court did not err in excluding the third-party culprit evidence at issue after weighing certain considerations and correctly deeming the proffered evidence inadmissible; certain hearsay statements contained within the excluded evidence were not admissible under the then-existing mental condition exception to the hearsay rule and did not preclude the jury from assessing the relevance of the victim's relationship with defendant in considering defendant's guilt; and there was no reason to set aside the verdicts or order a new trial under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was charged with possession of a class D substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, as a subsequent offense, G.L.c. 94c, section 32C(a) and (b). At issue was whether, in view of the enactment of G.L.C. 94C, section 32L, which decriminalized possession of one ounce or less of marijuana, a defendant could be criminally charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of G.L.c. 94C, section 32C(a). The court concluded that the passage of G.L.c. 94C, section 32L did not repeal the offense of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, G.L.c. 94C, section 32C(a), where the amount of marijuana possessed was one ounce or less. The court also determined that, while the sale of any amount of marijuana remained a criminal offense under G.L.c. 94C, section 32L, a prosecution under G.L.c. 94C(a), was not limited solely to situations where the "distribut[ion]" involved a sale. Accordingly, the court reversed the order allowing defendant's motion to dismiss and affirmed the allowance of defendant's motion to suppress.

Defendant, a juvenile, was charged in a complaint with being a delinquent child for breaking and entering a motor vehicle in the nighttime, with the intent to commit a felony. At issue was whether G.L.c. 119, section 58, empowered a Juvenile Court judge to continue a delinquency case without a finding and place the juvenile under the supervision of the probation department, notwithstanding a jury's prior verdict of delinquency. Based on the text of the statute, its placement within the broader statutory scheme, and the underlying philosophy of the juvenile justice system, the court concluded that it did. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court, where an order shall enter affirming the Juvenile Court judge's order.

Defendant was convicted on two indictments charging murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation with respect to one victim and felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate felony, with respect to the second victim. On appeal, defendant claimed that he was denied a fair trial because the judge disallowed one of his peremptory challenges and barred the third-party culprit evidence he sought to present. The court held that the judge's decision to disallow defendant's peremptory challenge against juror no. 78 did not amount to reversible error; the judge correctly deemed the proffered evidence inadmissible; and there was no basis to set aside the verdicts of murder or order a new trial pursuant to G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the judgments were affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of having a firearm without a license in his control in a motor vehicle, possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card, and possession of marijuana. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the admission in evidence of drug certificates of analysis and a ballistic certificate of examination violated his right to confrontation as set forth in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. Because defendant did not argue that the erroneous admission of the ballistics certificate of examination had any impact as to the unlawful possession of ammunition conviction, the court confined its review to the effect of its admission solely as to the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction. Because the evidence that the weapon was operable was not overwhelming without the ballistics certificate of examination, the court concluded that the admission of the certificate was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the judgment of conviction on the indictment charging defendant with having a firearm without a license in his control of a motor vehicle must be reversed.

Defendant appealed his conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder based on a predicate felony of aggravated rape, as well as aggravated rape. The court held that the judge did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the aggravated assault indictment, as there was sufficient evidence from which the grand jury could have inferred the victim did not consent to intercourse with defendant; the evidence of lack of consent, though circumstantial, was very powerful, and supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent to sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with defendant; certain evidence of prior bad acts was admissible; and the prosecutor's statements did not make a difference in the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of murdering his wife and two daughters on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendant argued that the judge erred in allowed the Commonwealth to present evidence of defendant's demeanor, in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty, and in denying his motion for a mistrial because an unsigned note he had handwritten in Spanish was erroneously sent to the jury room. Defendant also asked that the court exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section E, to reduce the verdicts to murder in the second degree. The court held that, because there was no merit to defendant's claims of error and the court discerned no reason to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, the convictions were affirmed.