Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution of cocaine and of a drug offense in a school zone. The Appeals Court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. King, affirmed defendant's convictions, holding that a field test and other circumstances rendered the admission of the certificate of drug analysis harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted defendant's application for further appellate review and paired this case for argument with Commonwealth v. King, a case that raised the same issue and involved the same prosecutor and the same detective as were involved in this case. Because the court concluded, as it did in King, that in the specific circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth's evidence was not so overwhelming as to nullify the effect of the erroneously admitted certificate, the judgment was reversed.

Defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution of cocaine. The Appeals court affirmed his conviction, holding that the field test and other circumstances rendered the admission of a certificate of drug analysis harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted defendant's application for further appellate review and paired this case for argument with Commonwealth v. Billings. Because the court concluded that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth's evidence was not so overwhelming as to nullify the effect of the erroneously admitted certificate, the judgment was reversed.

While being held for custodial interrogation, and without having first waived the Miranda rights of which he had been advised, defendant shook his head from side to side in response to the question, "So you don't want to speak?" At issue was whether defendant, by his conduct, had invoked the right to remain silent guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of rights and, if so, whether the police sufficiently honored that right. The court concluded that, under both the Fifth Amendment and art. 12, the right to remain silent was invoked but was not "scrupulously honored" and that suppression of the subsequent incriminating statements was accordingly warranted. In so concluding, the court held that, in the prewaiver context, art. 12 did not require a suspect to invoke his right to remain silent with the utmost clarity, as required under Federal law.

Defendant was charged with possession of a Class B substance with intent to distribute and possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute and eventually entered into a plea agreement. At issue was whether a judge had the authority under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29(a), to reduce a sentence after defendant and the Commonwealth had entered into a plea in which the Commonwealth agreed not to seek indictments against defendant on the pending charges, defendant had agreed to plead guilty to the charges and join the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation, and the judge had imposed the recommended sentence. The court concluded that where, as here, a judge acted on his own timely motion to revise or revoke a sentence, the judge had the authority to reduce a sentence where it appeared that justice may not have been done regardless whether a plea agreement included an agreed sentence recommendation.

Defendant was charged in a criminal complaint with a single count of armed robbery and eventually plead guilty in the District Court to a reduced charge. At issue was whether the Commonwealth had the authority to require a judge to vacate a defendant's guilty plea where the Commonwealth made a charge concession as part of the plea agreement and the judge imposed a sentence less severe than the agreed sentence recommendation. The court concluded that the Commonwealth did not have this authority under Mass. R. Crim. P. 12, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511, or G.L.c. 278, section 18. The court further concluded that if the guilty plea were to be vacated at the prosecution's request and over the objection of the defense, double jeopardy would bar further prosecution on that charge.

Defendant was convicted on two indictments charging statutory rape of his fifteen year old niece. At issue was whether defendant, whose motion to stay the execution of his sentence was denied by a single justice of the Appeals Court, could file another motion to stay the execution of his sentence before a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court after direct appellate review was granted. The court concluded that he could so proceed, and that the single justice could elect to consider de novo defendant's application for a stay. Because the court concluded that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in allowing defendant's motion to stay the execution of the sentence, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted, among other things, of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant subsequently appealed his convictions. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the murder conviction; the prosecutor did misstate certain evidence at trial but the court concluded that the error did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice; and the trial judge's instructions to the jury were not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and declined to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial.

Defendant was found guilty of rape of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. On appeal, defendant challenged the admission of testimony concerning a "second complaint" made by the victim. The court concluded that, under the first complaint doctrine, the Commonwealth was not entitled to present evidence, either from the victim or her mother, pertaining to the victim's disclosure to her grandmother. However, the court further concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the admission of such evidence did not constitute prejudicial error because it was properly admitted to rebut defendant's suggestion that the victim had fabricated her accusations against him. The court modified the scope of judicial review of decisions on the admissibility of testimony pursuant to the "first complaint" doctrine set forth in Commonwealth v. King and its progeny. Defendant also challenged the admission, under the doctrine of verbal completeness, of a prior consistent statement made by the victim during her grand jury testimony. The court concluded that all the components of the verbal completeness doctrine were met and defendant had not demonstrated that the judge abused her discretion when she admitted the additional portion of the victim's grand jury testimony. Therefore, there was no error. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, resisting arrest, and operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license and subsequently convicted of being an armed career criminal. Defendant raised three issues on appeal. The court held that the Superior Court judge did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the firearm, ammunition, and marijuana seized from his vehicle where there was ample probable cause to permit a search of defendant's motor vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant. The court held, however, that defendant's convictions of unlawful possession of ammunition and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm were duplicative, and his separate sentences for each crime violated the double jeopardy clause because he was punished twice for possession of the same ammunition. This error gave rise to a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice and therefore, defendant's conviction and sentence on the lesser included offense of unlawful possession of ammunition was vacated. The court further held that the requirement of licensing before one could possess a firearm or ammunition did not by itself render the licensing statute unconstitutional on its face and therefore, defendant's challenge to the Commonwealth's statutory licensing scheme failed.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the conviction must be overturned because (1) closure of the court room during jury selection violated his constitutional right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment; (2) defendant improperly was precluded from presenting evidence of potential third-party culprits; (3) one of the Commonwealth's DNA experts offered improper testimony; (4) the Commonwealth failed to make timely disclosure of expert materials; (5) the prosecutor's closing argument was improper; and (6) trial counsel was ineffective. Defendant further argued that the motion judge erred in ruling on his motions for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court affirmed the conviction, the orders denying defendant's motion for a new trial and his supplemental motion for a new trial, and declined to grant relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E.