Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, and also of armed assault with intent to kill. Defendant appealed from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. Defendant argued that he was entitled to reversal of the convictions and a new trial because the courtroom was improperly closed during individual voir dire of prospective jurors; the judge, outside the presence of defendant, improperly questioned jurors and discussed questions from the jury; defendant was improperly denied a post trial evidentiary hearing on the possible bias of two deliberating jurors; the trial judge committed evidentiary errors; the judge's instructions on malice, voluntary manslaughter, and self-defense were in error; and his trial counsel was ineffective in many respects. The court thoroughly examined the record and affirmed defendant's convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, declining to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33 E.

Petitioners (the witnesses) appealed from the denial by a single justice of their petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3. In their petition, the witnesses sought relief from a Superior Court order granting them immunity pursuant to G.L.c. 233, section 20C-20E, and ordering them to testify in the criminal trial of David Forlizzi and Fred Battista. The court held that the witnesses have not shown that they could not obtain adequate relief from the challenged orders in the normal process of appellate review. Therefore, the denial of their petition was proper. Insofar as the single justice considered the merits of the witnesses' claims, the court also concluded that he correctly determined that the scope of immunity provided to the witnesses pursuant to G.L.c. 233, section 20G, adequately protected their constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the single justice.

This case was before the court pursuant to an order entered by the United States Supreme Court granting defendant's petition for certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remanding the case to the court for further consideration in light of McDonald v. Chicago. At issue was whether McDonald required the court to dismiss the three indictments charging defendant under G.L.c. 269, 10(h)(1), with possession of a firearm and ammunition without a firearm identification (FID) card. The court held that because defendant had not asserted or made any showing that he applied for (and was denied) a FID card to possess a firearm and ammunition, defendant could not challenge his convictions under G.L.c. 269, 10(h)(1), as unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Accordingly, there was no reason to alter the court's judgment.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and of intimidation of a witness. On appeal, defendant claimed that the trial judge committed reversible errors and also raised several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the convictions and declined to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the murder conviction.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, armed assault with intent to murder, and possession of an unlicensed firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that he should be granted a new trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel; that the judge erred in limiting the jury's use of exculpatory evidence of third-party culprits, in admitting evidence of defendant's participation in drug dealing, and in failing to give an alibi instruction; and that defendant was entitled to reversal of the guilty verdict on the indictment charging armed assault with intent to murder. The court affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion for new trial. After a complete review of the record, the court also concluded that there was no basis to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce his murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder on both charges, and of burning of a dwelling house, armed robbery while masked, and assault and battery. Defendant subsequently raised numerous issues of error on appeal related to the denial of his motion for a new trial, denial of his motions to suppress, and admission of DNA evidence. The court affirmed defendant's convictions and declined to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial pursuant to its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E.

After a jury-waived trial on the Commonwealth's petition for commitment under G.L.c. 123A, sections 12-16, a judge in the Superior Court concluded that as applied to defendant, whose victims both historically and predictably were limited to adult women to whom he would expose himself, sometimes while masturbating, the statute could not be construed constitutionally to support a determination that would result in defendant's commitment as a sexually dangerous person. The Commonwealth appealed, and sought a stay of defendant's release pending appeal. The court held that the finding made as to the manner in which defendant had behaved historically, and the findings as to his predicted criminal sexual behavior, did not support a finding that he was a "menace" within the meaning of section 123A. Consequently, the court need not decide the constitutional question and defendant was entitled to a judgment that he was not a sexually dangerous person.

Defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a class C substance, clonazepam, and a class E substance, trazodone; possession with intent to distribute a class D substance, marijuana; and a drug violation near a school or park. Defendant contended, among other things, that the admission of drug certificates without the testimony of the analyst violated his constitutional rights. The court held that because the erroneous admission of the drug certificates was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. Because the Commonwealth could choose to retry defendant, the court considered other issues raised by his claims of error that could be material to a retrial.

In the early morning hours of January 12, 1991, six men were shot execution-style in the basement of an illegal gambling parlor in the Chinatown section of Boston. After the shootings, arrest warrants were issued for the defendants and in 1999, one defendant, Siny Van Tran, was arrested in China. Another defendant, Nam The Tham, was arrested the following year in China. Both defendants were extradited from Hong Kong to the United States and subsequently convicted of five charges of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendants asserted several claims of error related to the denial of motions for severance, the admissibility of airline records, improper prosecutorial vouching, and the admission of inculpatory statements. After the court reviewed the briefs, the entire record, all the issues, and the arguments, the court saw no reason to reduce the degree of guilt on the murder convictions or to order a new trial. Accordingly, the judgments were affirmed.

Defendant, who was under fourteen-years-old at the time of the alleged offense, was subsequently indicted when defendant was twenty-three-years-old on six charges of rape of a child with force and two charges of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. At issue was whether a person who committed an offense at an age under 14, but who was not apprehended until after he or she had passed the age of 18, could be prosecuted. The court held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to try the person for that offense under G.L.c. 119, section 72A, after indictment, provided that a judge in the Juvenile Court had determined that there was probable cause to believe that the person committed the offense charged and that the interests of the public required that the person be tried for the offenses instead of being discharged. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.