Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of murder in the first degree of Elizabeth Lochtefeld based on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed from his convictions and the denial of his amended motion for a new trial. The court held that flaws in the jury selection process required the reversal of his conviction. The court also noted that on remand, the Commonwealth should exercise care to avoid using defendant's exercise of his Miranda rights against him by suggesting that his invocations of or deliberations on these rights demonstrated his criminal responsibility. The court further noted that, at retrial, the judge should consider the application of Commonwealth v. Berry to the case in light of the particular evidence introduced and instruct the jury accordingly. Therefore, defendant's convictions were reversed, the verdicts set aside, and the case remanded for a new trial.

Defendant was arrested following the recovery of a weapon in the glove box of a motor vehicle after it was searched by police. Defendant subsequently sought sanctions from the Commonwealth's violation of discovery orders aimed at preserving firearm evidence and securing the presence of defendant's expert at ballistics testing of the weapon. The court held that because the record was not sufficiently developed either as to the likely exculpatory nature of the unobserved first test firing or the level of culpability that might warrant the shifting of the burden to the Commonwealth, and thus provided inadequate support for the judge's findings, the order for sanctions was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court also held that the judge could consider affidavits submitted by the parties or conduct an evidentiary hearing if requested to do so.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in the death of his former landlady on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On his direct appeal, defendant asserted that an error in the jury instructions and improperly admitted findings from the autopsy victim created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice and required reversal. The court agreed and held that the jury instructions regarding the interaction of the voluntary consumption of drugs and mental illness were flawed and incomplete and created a substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial on that basis.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendant contended that the judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty as to murder in the first degree because the evidence was insufficient. Defendant also urged the court to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the verdict to murder in the second degree. The court held that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support defendant's conviction. After review of the record, the court also held that there was no basis to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce his murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery, possession of a firearm without a license, as a subsequent offender, and as an armed career criminal, and various other firearm offenses. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court held that the judge did not erroneously instruct the jury on the elements of joint venture; a witness's out-of-court statement was made during the court of an ongoing emergency and was therefore, nontestimonial; the statement was also admissible under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule; any impeachment value of the inconsistent statement at issue would have been diminished by the testimony of the police officers and the undisputed evidence, thereby corroborating the witness's spontaneous utterance; the exclusion of cumulative evidence did not constitute prejudicial error; and nothing in the prosecutor's closing statement created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions.

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery of the victim when he punched him at a bowling alley. At issue was whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defense where he instructed the jury solely on whether the force that was used was greater than necessary in all circumstances. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and held that the error in the jury instruction on self-defense did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where defendant was not prejudiced by the incomplete instruction and where there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant used unreasonable force in the circumstances.

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a new trial in which he sought to vacate guilty pleas he entered in 2005, on the ground that he was deprived of his right of effective assistance of counsel, as that right had recently been explicated in Padilla v. Kentucky. At issue was whether Padilla applied retroactively to defendant's collateral challenge to his convictions and, if so, whether he had demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel's shortcomings. The court held that Padilla did apply retroactively on collateral review of guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. The court also held that defendant had made an insufficient showing that had he been properly informed of the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant was charged with several offenses based on events that transpired after defendant and a companion pushed their way into an apartment where a dinner party was in progress. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to commit a felony. The court held that there was insufficient evidence where the inference that defendant intended to commit the felony of assault and battery by mean of a dangerous weapon or knew that his companion possessed a knife when they forced their way into the apartment could be plausible but could not bear the weight of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for entry of judgment of conviction on the lesser included offenses of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor and for sentencing pursuant to that offense.

Defendant appealed from his conviction of the deliberately premeditated murder of his estranged wife in May 2000. Defendant asserted several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a conversation between the victim and their daughter as an excited utterance that supplied the motive for the murder; in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial because the witness's testimony as to her observation of defendant inside the apartment building on the morning of the murder was admissible and because there was nothing objectionable about the questions soliciting that testimony; in concluding that the prosecutor's closing argument was not improper; and in refusing to give a so-called Commonwealth v. Bowden instruction where the judge's instructions on credibility and reasonable doubt were adequate and they allowed defendant the opportunity to present fully this factual issue to the jury. The court also held that there was no error in a jury instruction that defendant alleged, for the first time on appeal, failed adequately to explain deliberate premeditation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle after his license had been revoked for operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. At issue was whether the district court erred by admitting into evidence a certificate from the registry of motor vehicles attesting to the fact that a notice of license suspension or revocation was mailed to defendant on a specified date. The court held that the admission of the certificate violated defendant's rights of confrontation and cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment where the registry certificate did not constitute a non-testimonial business record. The court also held that such admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the registry certificate was the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth to establish notice. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.