Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested in connection with the shooting death of Jonathan Nieves. While awaiting his initial appearance in the district court and after being held for approximately nine hours in the police station, Defendant was interrogated by police. Defendant moved to suppress the inculpatory statements he made during the interrogation, arguing that the statements were inadmissible under Commonwealth v. Rosario because they were made more than six hours after arrest and before being brought to court for arraignment. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining the Commonwealth’s request to revisit the Roasrio rule, as the rule “continues to serve as an important and practical protection of the constitutional and common-law rights of persons arrested for violations of the criminal laws.” View "Commonwealth v. Powell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and burglary arising out of events that occurred in 1990. Defendant filed two motions for a new trial, which were denied. Defendant subsequently obtained evidence suggesting that the Commonwealth promised its key witness something in exchange for his testimony. In 2009, Defendant filed a third motion for a new trial, arguing that the evidence constituted newly discovered evidence that warranted a new trial. The superior court judge denied Defendant’s third motion for a new trial without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the “newly discovered” evidence was cumulative of other evidence Defendant used to impeach the witness at trial and that, after decades of investigation and discovery, there was no evidence of any agreement between the Commonwealth and the witness. View "Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of possession of a firearm without a license. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting evidence of bullet shell casings and live ammunition found hours after the shooting; (2) the trial court did not abuse his discretion in admitting admitting a recording of a jailhouse telephone call made by Defendant in which he used street jargon and offensive language; (3) jail officials did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights by monitoring and recording Defendant's telephone calls from jail and by sending law enforcement information derived from the calls; (4) there was sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of murder under a joint venture theory; and (5) trial judge properly did not give the jury a special verdict slip and special jury instruction requiring the jury to determine separate whether Defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree as a principal or as an accomplice. View "Commonwealth v. Rosa" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to strike a portion of the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) because counsel did not move to strike the expert witness’s nonresponsive answer, the Commonwealth was provided with the proof it needed to survive a motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the element of intent to distribute; and (2) a new trial was required for the Commonwealth to present the testimony of a witness whose statements were allegedly relied upon by the Commonwealth’s expert. View "Commonwealth v. Sepheus" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant appealed, raising five claims of error. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the trial judge erred in furnishing the jury with an instruction in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriquez and Commonwealth v. Tuey, as a reasonable jury listening to this instruction would have understood that, if they were unable to reach a verdict with respect to murder in the first degree, a mistrial would be declared, and the case would need to be retried; and (2) the error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice with respect to the jury’s decision to convict Defendant of murder in the first degree rather than murder in the second degree. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

Defendant, a noncitizen of the United States, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and received a sentence of probation. Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving without a license and taken into custody by immigration authorities. Contending that his defense counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. A superior court allowed the motion, concluding that Defendant’s counsel gave Defendant constitutionally deficient advice when he told Defendant he would be “eligible for deportation” if he pleaded guilty to the drug possession charges. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the conviction of a noncitizen with intent to distribute cocaine makes deportation or removal from the United States presumptively mandatory, counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient in that it did not convey what is clearly stated in federal law. View "Commonwealth v. DeJesus" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of enticement of a child and four counts of attempting to commit certain offenses, including rape of a child, indecent assault and battery on a child, and disseminating matter harmful to a minor. The appeals court affirmed the convictions of enticement of a child, attempted rape, and attempted indecent assault and battery and vacated the convictions of disseminating matter harmful to a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of enticement of a child and reversed the convictions of attempt, holding (1) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions of attempted rape, attempted indecent assault and battery, and dissemination of matter harmful to a minor; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of enticement of a child, the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the introduction of certain photographs notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s prior stipulation not to introduce the photographs, and the police did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights by searching his computer for evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Buswell" on Justia Law

Petitioners Ronald Watts and Kevin Aguirre were charged by way of complaints issued in district court with criminal offenses that Petitioners allegedly committed when they were each seventeen years old. The Governor subsequently signed St. 2013 ch. 84 (Act), which extended the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to persons who were seventeen years old at the time of committing an offense. Petitioners moved to dismiss the district court charges against them pursuant to the Act, claiming that the district courts lacked jurisdiction over them because they were seventeen at the time the alleged offenses occurred and when the criminal proceedings had begun. The Supreme Judicial Court denied Petitioners’ motions, holding that the Act does not apply retroactively to cases involving juveniles who were seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense and whose criminal cases in the superior court or district court were begun prior to, and were pending on, the effective date of the Act. View "Watts v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape, unarmed robbery, kidnapping, carjacking, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. During trial, the State presented evidence indicating that Defendant’s DNA profile matched that of sperm found on the victim’s underwear worn on the day of the offense. For the next several years, Defendant sought, unsuccessfully, to have the sperm sample analyzed with newer and more sophisticated techniques for DNA testing. After the Legislature enacted Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A, Defendant filed a motion and renewed motion pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A, 3 seeking more sophisticated DNA testing. The superior court denied the motions on the grounds that DNA testing already had been conducted and the evidence against Defendant was overwhelming. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s motions were properly denied where the motions did not provide information demonstrating that the requested analysis had not been developed at the time of Defendant’s conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Donald" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and declined to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge’s handling of witness testimony given pursuant to grants of immunity and plea agreements did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (2) the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument did not amount to improper vouching. View "Commonwealth v. Webb" on Justia Law