Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and discerned no basis to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from the prosecutor’s use of a rhetorical question during closing arguments; (2) the trial judge did not err in refusing, over Defendant’s objection, to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on reasonable provocation; and (3) in response to a jury question, the judge did not err in reinstructing the jury of their duty to find Defendant guilty of the most serious offense that the Commonwealth had proved beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Nelson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty for the murder of his four-year-old daughter, who died from intoxication due to sedating drugs found in her system, or from pneumonia, or from a combination of both intoxication and pneumonia. Defendant appealed his conviction and the denial of his motions for a new trial and for funds to retain a toxicologist. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction and the orders denying Defendant’s motions, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in handling the issue of toxicological evidence at trial, and trial counsel did not otherwise render ineffective assistance; (2) the evidence of malice was sufficient to support the conviction; (3) the prosecutor properly used and commented on evidence of acts Defendant committed after the charged offense to show intent or state of mind at the time of the charged offense; and (4) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing and in denying Defendant’s posttrial motion for funds to retain a forensic toxicologist. View "Commonwealth v. Riley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of violating a protection order issued by a judge in New Hampshire in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, 7. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury regarding the intent required for a finding of a violation of the protection order. Specifically, Defendant argued that had she violated the protection order in New Hampshire, she could not be convicted of violating the order unless a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that she had “knowingly” violated the order, as defined under New Hampshire law, and the same standard should apply where the alleged violation occurred in Massachusetts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where an out-of-state abuse protection order is allegedly violated in Massachusetts and prosecuted under chapter 209A, the violation is governed by Massachusetts law and the jury should be instructed in accordance with Massachusetts law, and therefore, the judge in this case did not err by instructing the jury regarding the requirements of proof under Massachusetts law; and (2) no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice arose with regard to the judge’s further instructions to the jury. View "Commonwealth v. Shea" on Justia Law

After receiving a telephone call from Defendant’s neighbor, police entered Defendant’s front yard without a warrant and seized three dogs, two of which appeared to be dead, that had been left outside in severely inclement winter weather. Defendant was subsequently charged with three counts of animal cruelty. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search. The superior court granted the motion but reported the question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court of whether the ‘pure emergency’ exception to the warrant requirement extends to animals. The Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement extends to police action undertaken to render emergency assistance to animals. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Duncan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder, and related crimes. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of conviction and declined to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial pursuant to the Court’s power under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (2) Defendant’s counsel rendered effective assistance; (3) the prosecutor did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury. View "Commonwealth v. Johnston" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant, who was known to be associated with a gang, was indicted for the murder of a fourteen-year-old and the wounding of a fifteen-year-old. The Commonwealth, which believed the murder was committed in connection with the gang’s criminal activities, obtained from a cooperating witness a surreptitiously recorded conversation between Defendant and other gang members, during which Defendant admitted to the killing. Defendant sought to suppress the recorded conversation as well as statements he made to the police during a post-arrest interview. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress as to all of his statements. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress with respect to Defendant’s recorded conversation; but (2) reversed the denial with respect to statements Defendant made during the custodial interview after clearly invoking his right to remain silent. View "Commonwealth v. Hearns" on Justia Law

In 2000, John Buonomo retired from his position as a Somerville alderman and began receiving pension benefits from the retirement board of Somerville (“Board”). Buonomo was subsequently elected register of probate of Middlesex County. In 2009, Buonomo was convicted of several offenses, including breaking into a depository and embezzlement by a public officer, which crimes were committed while Buonomo was register of probate. In light of Buonomo’s criminal convictions, the Board voted to forfeit Buonomo’s pension under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15. The district court reversed the Board’s decision, determining that because the crimes for which Buonomo was convicted did not arise from his work as a Somerville alderman, for which he was receiving the retirement allowance, the Board lacked a basis for revoking Buonomo’s pension. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) there is no requirement in section 15 that the public office to which a board of alderman for the city of Somerville member’s criminal convictions relate be the same as the public office from which that member is receiving a retirement allowance; and (2) because Buonomo violated the laws applicable to a position of public trust, Buonomo forfeited his entitlement to a retirement allowance from the Board. View "Ret. Bd. of Somerville v. Buonomo " on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing or concealing stolen paintings. The victim of the theft (Plaintiff) filed a civil suit against Defendant for, among other claims, violations of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) due to Defendant’s transfers of assets to his family members following the discovery of his identity as the holder of the stolen paintings. Plaintiff also brought claims for relief under the UFTA against Defendant’s family members alleged to have received the fraudulent transfers. A jury found Defendant had made seven fraudulent transfers within the meaning of the UFTA, entering judgment against Defendant for more than $4.3 million. Additionally, the judge ordered equitable remedies against the relief defendants for the purposes of identifying specific assets that had been fraudulently conveyed and could be subject to reconveyance in satisfaction of the judgment against Defendant. Lastly, the judge dismissed the claim against one of the relief defendants concerning assets in a shared trust because the funds in the trust had been dissipated. Defendant appealed, arguing that money judgments should have been ordered against the relief defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment except in respect to a savings account and the shared trust. Remanded. View "Bakwin v. Mardirosian" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. Defendant’s appeal centered on his argument that the victim, an undocumented immigrant, characterized her consensual sex with Defendant as rape in her report to police to obtain immigration benefits. Specifically, Defendant claimed (1) he was denied the right to impeach the victim with evidence of a prior incident of sexual assault, after which she received a temporary work authorization; and (2) he should have been allowed to access Boston Area Rape Crisis Center (BARCC) records concerning the victim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge properly determined that the probative value of any testimony concerning the prior incident of sexual assault would be outweighed by its prejudicial impact; and (2) Defendant did not make the necessary threshold showing that he was entitled to production of BARCC records. View "Commonwealth v. Sealy" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were amendments to the Sex Offender Registry Law that the Governor signed into law on July 12, 2013, including amendments that would require the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) to publish on the Internet information contained in the sex offender registry regarding individuals given a level two or three classification. On July 5, 2013, Plaintiffs, as putative representatives of a class of persons presently and prospectively classified as level two sex offenders, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking an injunction barring SORB from publishing registry information on the Internet of the class of level two offenders. The Supreme Judicial Court declared unconstitutional the retroactive application of the amendments to the extent they would require the Internet publication of the registry information of individuals who were finally classified as level two sex offenders on or before July 12, 2013 but noted that SORB was allowed to publish on the Internet the registry information of any individual who was given a final classification as a level two sex offender after July 12, 2013. View "Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law